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Abstract 
The African nations determined that an African continental body was needed to 
specifically address the African States’ needs for self-determination in addressing 
African problems, rather than relying on outside assistance, specifically for intervention 
determination.  The African Union (AU) rose from the ashes of the former Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) in 2002 to address this. Central to the African Union is the 
capability to mount and sustain peace-support and peacekeeping missions on the 
continent of Africa.  Just such a mission presented itself to the AU in 2004 in the Darfur 
region of western Sudan.  This study assesses the key factors of the AU leadership, 
organization, US Support and communication in executing African Union Mission in 
Sudan (AMIS) from its inception in 2004 through its conclusion in 2007 prior to the 
United Nations-African Union Hybrid Mission, UNAMID, using the perceptions of 
United States (US) senior officials who were involved with and interacted with AMIS.  
The dissertation is a qualitative study using the case study method, capturing the 
perceptions of eight US senior officials addressing organization, leadership, US support 
and communications.  The theoretical framework used were transformational 
leadership, cross-cultural communications, organizational and grounded theory. 
The data suggested that the AU was lauded by the US officials for its decision to 
engage with the execution of AMIS, although the AU was severely challenged by a 
shortage of resources, personnel, organic logistical base, equipment, training, 
experience, modern communications, and organizational structure.  AMIS was 
hampered by impediments of the host nation, Sudan, and the ability of the AU to 
request and receive US Support. 
xiii 
This case study examined the US leaders’ perceptions of the leadership and 
communication organization of the AU and its challenges for intervention in an 
intrastate genocide within the continent of Africa—the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, 
Sudan.  An analysis of the case study of a major African-led and directed peace-support 
operation, such as AMIS, in reaction to the Darfur crisis may serve as a significant 
interest in lessons learned for future US interaction for a future peace operation by the 
AU.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Background 
 There have been several Africa-related issues that a regional body could address 
since the fall of the colonial powers within the continent of Africa in the 1960’s.  The 
world leaders established the United Nations (UN) following World War II to address 
global issues, including Africa.  A large number of African nations were under the 
“protection” of the colonial powers until the 1960’s, when most African nations won or 
were provided with freedom to establish sovereign nations, independent of the former 
colonial nations (Reader, 1998, p. 663).  The UN, as well as the world’s industrial 
nations, did not shoulder responsibility or show moral obligation on a humanitarian 
level to assist Africa outside of any assistance that the former colonial powers were 
willing to provide during the colonial period.  The international community interests in 
Africa were economic as well as political throughout the Cold War era, which followed 
the Colonial period (Murithi, 2005, p. 15).  The only recourse for most African nations 
was through the UN, which was controlled mainly through developed nations’ 
manipulation or through the nations that had subjugated them throughout the colonial 
period.  This led to the formation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 
with the follow-on organization, the African Union (AU) established in 2002 (Moller, 
2009, p. 1), the subject matter of this research study. 
 The current study was intended to develop a grounded theory based on 
transformational leadership theory and cross-cultural communication theory to illustrate 
the challenges that the AU exhibited in executing AMIS.  Interviews of eight senior US 
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officials out of a population of 12 were used by the researcher to capture their 
perceptions of the challenges faced by the AU. 
 The African nations determined that an African continental body was needed to 
specifically address African states’ needs for self-determination in addressing African 
problems, rather than relying on outside assistance, specifically for intervention 
determination (Moller, 2009, p. 5).  There was a recognized need by the Africans for an 
African solution to African-specific issues and a military as well as a civilian police 
force to act as a reaction force that could be used as an instrument for humanitarian and 
peace operations on the African continent (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 71). 
 The genocide in Rwanda that started in 1994 has been debated throughout the 
western world as a case where there was a justifiable need for an outside intervention to 
save lives and stop destruction of a nation and its people (Oguonu & Ezeibe, 2014, p. 
325).  Although the UN was aware of the occurrence of the genocide in Rwanda, the 
UN did not have the mandate or the military strength on the ground to react (Reader, 
2008, p. 676).  Powerful nations, such as the United States (US) and France, were 
determined not to intervene.  The African continent had an organization, the OAU, in 
existence at the time of the genocide, 1994. However, the OAU did not have the ready 
military force nor the mechanisms in place in order to deal with such a rapidly moving 
intra-state humanitarian crisis—which fell outside of the OAU’s charter of non-
interference in an intra-state issue (Fogwell, 2013, p. 6).   
The OAU was abandoned and a new charter established under the banner of a 
newly formed African Union (AU), established in 2002, providing the AU with the 
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charter to allow for invention in an intra-state issue should it be deemed appropriate by 
the AU leadership (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 40). 
 Central to the AU is the capability to mount and sustain peace-support and 
peacekeeping missions on the continent of Africa.  Just such a mission presented itself 
to the nascent AU in 2004 in the Darfur Region of Sudan.  The number of internally 
displaced persons (IDPs) in the Darfur region was estimated at three million (Adebajo, 
2011), with no relief in sight as rebel groups leveraged for control of areas which were 
under the control of the Government of Sudan.  The AU established the African Union 
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) in 2004 in order to act as an observer force and protection 
force to assist the IDPs and minimize the effects of the rebel forces in the Darfur region 
(Bellamy, 2005, p. 32).  The AU had engaged in a peace-support operation in Burundi 
in 2003 and therefore had an opportunity to learn from the lessons that it had 
experienced in that operation which could then be applied to the design and execution 
of AMIS. 
 In the years following the end of the Cold War, the international community did 
not view Africa as strategically vital to their national interests, as had been the case 
during the polarizing years of the Cold War era (Cilliers, 1999).  The US was distracted 
with two wars in the Middle East in 2004 and hesitated to characterize the mass killings 
in Darfur as genocide and therefore did not react nor engage international partners or 
the UN to react to the Darfur humanitarian crisis (Piiparinen, 2007).  China was 
beginning to demonstrate an interest in oil production in Sudan and did not desire to 
endanger its relationship with the Government of Sudan (Kagwanja & Mutahi, 2011).  
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The AU initiated the all-African led and staffed AMIS in 2004 in the absence of a UN 
mandate. 
 The AU established AMIS in an effort to address the Darfur Humanitarian Crisis 
in February 2004 with the establishment of AMIS I with sixty AU “green beret” African 
troops as observers, closely followed by the inclusion of three hundred and eight 
African troops who acted as a protection force for the observers (Adebajo, 2011).  An 
expanded AMIS mission was authorized in July 2005, known as AMIS IIE (AMIS II 
expanded) (Appiah-Mensah, 2006, p. 4).  The AU relied on troop-contributing countries 
for voluntarily donating the required number of African troops to conduct AMIS 
(Cohen & O’Neil, 2006, p. 56). At that time, 2004-2007, 53 of the 54 African nations, 
all but Morocco, were members of the AU which could be called upon to voluntarily 
contribute troops to the AMIS missions (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 25). 
AMIS ended in 2007 when the UN and AU formed a hybrid UN-AU mission in 
Darfur (UNAMID) to address the continuing struggle in western Sudan, Darfur (De 
Waal, 2007).  UN Security Resolution 1769 passed by the international community in 
2007 authorized a turn-over of mission responsibility from AMIS to UNAMID in Dec 
December 2007 (Kreps, 2007).  Prior to the Hybrid UN-AU mission, UNAMID, the AU 
struggled to produce a mandate that was effective in stemming the violence and the IDP 
genocide (Akuffo, 2010, p. 81). The AU, during the period 2004-2007, found it 
increasingly difficult to organize, lead, garner US support and communicate effectively, 
with Africans from the troop-contributing countries who fielded AMIS in Darfur. 
The US was a major supporter and contributor to the AU during the execution of 
AMIS (US GAO Report, 2006, p. 23).  The terrorist events that unfolded in New York 
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and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001 were factors that the US was taking into 
account with its support of the AU during the execution of AMIS (Makinda et al., 2016, 
p. 150).   The US European Command (EUCOM) and the US Central Command 
(CENTCOM) held the largest share of US military interaction on the African continent 
during the execution of AMIS.  However, the US, sensing the importance of Africa and 
the strong involvement of the European Union (EU) and growing Chinese presence, 
established a US military major combatant command, the US Africa Command 
(AFRICOM) to execute US military interests on the continent (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 
151). 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework of this study revolved around leadership theories of 
transformational and transactional leadership and communications theories of 
organization and culture to determine if the organizational and cross-cultural 
communications were a challenge that the AU faced in executing AMIS.  These theories 
formed the analytical basis of this study.  The theories were used in the analytical 
portion of the study for comparisons between the responses of the participants and four 
major areas that addressed the AU’s organization, leadership and communications, as 
well as a look at the challenges perceived for US support as requested by the AU. 
Context of the Problem 
 The current scholarly literature addresses lessons that have been learned during 
and after the AU peacekeeping mission in Darfur region of Sudan.  However, a gap in 
the current scholarly literature exists in that the most senior US officials who were 
directly involved with the AU during its execution of AMIS, 2004-2007, have not 
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contributed to the scholarly literature.  The senior US officials have not voiced their 
perceptions of the AU organization, leadership, US support and communication issues 
related to the AU’s execution of AMIS in any scholarly research studies to date.  On a 
larger scale, their experiences may help us better understand the issues of collaborative 
leadership for other organizations that engage in collaborative support roles. 
Purpose of the Study 
 The purpose of this study is to investigate the perceptions of senior US officials 
of challenges that the AU faced during its execution of AMIS from the inception of the 
mission (AMIS) in 2004 through the conclusion of the mission in 2007.   This 
dissertation, using a qualitative case study, looked at the challenges experienced by the 
AU during AMIS.  A case study method was chosen in order to study the AU related to 
mission and time frame and examining the case to provide a clear understanding of the 
challenges faced by the AU (Creswell, 2013, p. 123).  Leadership theories of 
transformation and transaction and communication theories of cross-cultural 
communication were examined against the responses of the participants’ perceptions to 
determine, from a US perspective, the challenges that the AU faced in its execution of 
AMIS.   
Significance of the Study 
 The Africans began to shoulder more responsibility in addressing African issues 
by establishing the peacekeeping mission of AMIS.  The UN and the internal 
community have addressed many peacekeeping operations since the inception of the 
UN peacekeeping operations as an observer force in Palestine in 1948 (Goulding, 1993, 
p. 452).  The importance of this study centers on the perceptions of how senior US 
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officials viewed the AU and its peacekeeping mission, AMIS.  Both the AU and the US 
could better organize the support mechanisms that are provided by the US for future 
peacekeeping missions through the AU from the results of this study.  The fact that the 
AU is taking more responsibility and direct action in the realm of peacekeeping on the 
continent of Africa demonstrates a need for such a study to determine, the challenges of 
leadership, organization, support and communication. 
 This study is significant because it addresses the US perceptions of the 
challenges that the AU faced in executing AMIS in the areas of organization, 
leadership, US support and communications.  The findings can be can be applied to 
future African-led peacekeeping missions on the continent of Africa.  How the US 
supports a non-UN mission can be gleaned from a study that address the challenges of 
organization, leadership, US support and communication as a case study.  
Scope and Limitations 
The scope of this study is reflective of the perceptions of senior US officials 
who were involved with directly supporting the AU and AMIS through the inception of 
AMIS beginning in 2004 through the close of AMIS in 2007.  The study is limited to 
AMIS and does not cover the period before AMIS was officially organized as a 
peacekeeping mission in 2004, nor does the scope extend beyond 2007 when AMIS 
officially ended and transferred to a hybrid UN-AU mission known as UNAMID.  Berg 
(1998, p.229) suggests that by using the purposive sampling technique that was used by 
the researcher in this study, there may be a limit in the ability of the researcher to 
generalize the findings to the general population. Grounded theory was used to develop 
an explanation derived from the collected data and illustrated by providing examples of 
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the data (Pickard, 2007, p. 160).  Emotionalism provided the basis of the collected data 
as the interviewees were providing their insight from their experiences (Silverman, 
2001, p. 87) in dealing with US policy and support while observing the challenges that 
the AU experienced in the areas of leadership, organization and communication.  The 
scope of the data collected was using the participants’ beliefs about the facts related to 
the AU during the execution of AMIS (Silverman, 2001, p. 88).  While more 
information would be gained by also including perceptions of AU and UN officials, the 
current study has the limited focus on US officials involved in AMIS.   
 Keeping Berg (1998) in mind, this study is also limited in scope in that it 
provides only the perceptions of US senior officials that were able to or willing to 
respond to the researcher’s recruitment for this study.  Of the 12 senior US officials who 
were involved with the AU, four were either unavailable or failed to respond, and 
therefore their perceptions were not captured in this study.  The study is further limited 
by the fact that the perceptions of the US senior officials may or may not accurately 
reflect the perceptions of other nations that were involved with the AU and AMIS.  The 
study does not capture the perceptions of the African Union officials and is narrow in its 
scope, capturing solely the perceptions of US senior officials that responded to the 
study. 
 The scope of this study is further limited to addressing four areas related to 
organization, leadership, US support and communication within the AU and addressing 
its execution of AMIS.  No other peacekeeping missions of the AU were addressed. 
There were a number of other areas that could be addressed in further research, and 
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these are described in Chapter 5, Conclusion and Recommendation for Future 
Research. 
Assumptions 
 It is assumed the perceptions of the study participants are accurate to the best of 
their recollection.  This study assumes that the perceptions captured through interviews 
reflect the thoughts and perceptions of the individual participants only and does not 
reflect any official US policy or the perceptions of others that assisted the AU in the 
execution of AMIS during this period. The perceptions of the study participants are 
assumed to be as accurate as possible nine years after the end of AMIS and may or may 
not completely cover all aspects of organization, leadership, US support, and 
communications.  It is assumed that each participant had varying degrees of access and 
perceptions due to their particular role and involvement with the AU as the AU faced 
challenges with executing AMIS.  Each participant is assumed to have direct knowledge 
of the AU challenges during the execution of AMIS. 
Research Question 
 There is one main question with four key sub-questions to ascertain the 
perceptions of the senior US Officials who were intimately involved with the African 
Union and the African Union Mission in Sudan from 2004 to 2007.   The research 
question is designed to ascertain the perceptions of US officials of the challenges that 
the African Union faced in executing the African Union Mission in Sudan.  The key 
sub-questions are designed to focus on four challenges in the areas of organization, 
leadership, US support and communication.  
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The main research question is: “How did the US senior military and State 
Department officials view the challenges in organization, leadership, US support and 
communication the African Union faced in conducting the African Union Mission in 
Sudan from 2004-2007?” 
Key Sub-questions 
Key Question One 
Organizational Structure: What were the challenges for the African Union 
organizational structure in executing the African Union Mission in Sudan? 
Key Question Two 
Leadership:  What were the leadership challenges for the African Union in executing 
the African Union Mission in Sudan? 
Key Question Three 
US Support: What were the challenges of US support to the African Union during the 
African Union Mission in Sudan? 
Key Question Four 
Communication: What were the communications challenges, including cross cultural 
communication, in executing the African Union Mission in Sudan? 
Justification for Research 
 Africa has become increasingly important to the US, the European Union (EU) 
and China, after a long period of neglect in the post-Cold War era.  The US, EU and 
China have begun to engage the African nations, organizations and institutions in an 
effort to gain influence and resources on the continent.  The Darfur Humanitarian Crisis 
did not foster a positive response from the international community in the form of a 
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peace-support or peacekeeping mission or mandate for intervention in Darfur during the 
period 2004-2007.  Therefore, the AU established AMIS to address the increasing 
humanitarian crisis that was looming in the vacuum created by non-engagement from 
the international community, namely the UN, US, EU and China. 
 The increased importance of the continent of Africa on the global stage has 
become apparent, during AMIS and since the end of AMIS and transference of the AU 
led AMIS to a hybrid AU-UN mission under UN African leadership and staffing known 
as the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).  The US 
demonstrated an increase in engagement with Africa by establishing a new combatant 
command, the US Africa Command (AFRICOM), in 2008.  Prior to 2007, Africa 
mission responsibility for the US was divided among three Combatant Commands: US 
Central Command (CENTCOM), the US European Command (EUCOM) and the US 
Pacific Command (PACOM).  AFRICOM is now fully engaged throughout the 
continent of Africa but did not exist during the important days that the AU was 
organizing and implementing AMIS.  Sudan was located in the CENTCOM area of 
responsibility as well as the AU headquarter, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  The 
CENTCOM was heavily engaged in the Global War in Terrorism (GWOT) in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Djibouti and distracted during the period of the African Union Mission 
in Sudan with the three Combined Task Forces in the above-mentioned areas of 
responsibility. 
 China has demonstrated its commitment to the establishment and 
implementation of strong economic ties to Africa over the last decade.  The EU, 
comprised several former colonial powers (France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, 
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Spain and Germany), has been a strong contributor to the African Union Mission in 
Sudan and has become increasingly involved in Africa as a major player, representing 
all EU-member states.   
The increase in Chinese, European and US involvement and the associated 
engagement and economic ties has demonstrated a need for research to ascertain how 
the US viewed the African Union’s execution of AMIS in the areas of organization, 
leadership, US support and communication. 
Definitions 
 A list of acronyms is provided in Appendix A.  The main definitions that are 
essential to the understanding of the research study and its focus are included in this 
section. 
The Organization of African Unity (OAU):  Pan-African organization established in 
May 1963 with a commitment of member states to collectively establish, maintain and 
sustain peace and security in Africa until disbanded in 2002 with the establishment of 
the African Union (Murithhi, 2001, pp. 71-72). 
The African Union (AU):  Pan-African organization established in 2002 with a 
commitment of member states to collectively establish, maintain and sustain peace and 
security in Africa with a charter that included the authority of the AU for intervention in 
intrastate conflict (Murithi, 2001, pp. 75). 
Combatant Command: A unified or specified command under a single commander 
established by the President of the United States, through the Secretary of Defense with 
a geographical responsibility (Staff, Joint, 2001, p. 37). 
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US Official:  A person who has a position of authority in the US government (Merriam-
Webster, 2004).  
Peacekeeping:  A technique to help control and resolve armed conflicts (Goulding, 
1993, p. 452). 
The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS): AU established peacekeeping mission, 
2004 to 2007, in the western Sudan region of Darfur. (Murithi, 2001) 
United Nations and African Mission in Darfur (UNAMID): A hybrid peacekeeping 
mission in the western Sudan region of Darfur that replaced AMIS in 2007. 
Troop-Contributing Country (TCC):  Individual country that provides military or 
civilian personnel and assigned to the United Nations or African Union for 
peacekeeping missions. (Accessed through World Wide Web: 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors.shtml) 
Data Collection Strategy 
 Data collection consisted of structured interviews with eight senior US officials 
who were directly involved with AMIS, either directly in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia or in 
Washington, DC during the period 2004-2007.  Every attempt was made to conduct in-
person structured interviews.  When an individual subject was either at a significant 
distance, in an area not accessible to the researcher, or it was requested by the 
participant, interviews were conducted through secure email.  Due to concerns about 
anonymity of the participants as well as security, no telephonic or virtual 
telecommunication (VTC) or Skype was used of the subjects with participants who 
were not able to take part in face-to-face interviews.  
14 
How this Study is Unique 
This research is unique in that it fills a research gap that currently exists related 
to the AU mission challenges conducting AMIS.  Specifically, information is needed on 
how US officials (and the US more generally) perceived the operation, which could 
inform future missions similar in nature.  The researcher was a member of the US 
Defense liaison and the senior military advisor to the African Union, as well as a 
member of the U.S Embassy and US Defense Attaché Office, located in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, from 2004-2007, which provided direct access to the senior US officials that 
comprised the participants of the in-depth interviews that formed the basis for this case 
study.  The researcher was assigned to AMIS and deployed into Darfur with the AU in 
the summer of 2006 and served with the US Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 
2004 to 2007 as a member of the Darfur Integrated Task Force. 
The researcher, after exhaustive review of the existing academic research related 
to AMIS, recognized that there was a gap related to the testimony and experience of 
senior US officials that could add to the body of knowledge and spur additional research 
on AMIS and other African peace support operation and missions. This study may 
provide a clearer understanding and knowledge of AU capability that may be useful to 
US officials and African planners, as well as the international community that may 
support African peace operations initiatives and development of independent AU peace 
operations capacity. 
 Study Layout and Chapter Design 
 Chapter 1 provides the historical basis of the AU and AMIS.  The introductory 
chapter of this research study provides the background of the AU and its execution of 
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the AU mission in Darfur, Sudan (AMIS), from its inception in 2004 through its 
conclusion in 2007. AMIS was disbanded and turned over to a hybrid AU and UN 
mission entitled UNAMID in January 2007.  Chapter 1 includes a brief description of 
the theoretical framework, the context of the problem, the purpose of the study, the 
significance of the study, the scope and limitations, assumptions, the research question 
and the key sub-questions, justification for the research, and the definitions 
Chapter 2 consists of a comprehensive review of the existing literature covering 
the AU and AMIS and the challenges experienced by the AU in executing AMIS.  
Additionally, this chapter reviews the theoretical literature for the study.  The review of 
literature is broken in four thematic areas: The African Union, the African Union 
Mission in Sudan, leadership theory and communications theory 
Chapter 3 lays out the methodology of the study. A qualitative study was 
determined by the researcher to be the best method for determining the perceptions of 
US senior officials who had been involved with the AU and AMIS.    A case study was 
determined to be the method that would most effectively capture the perceptions of the 
US senior officials was a case study.  The case study chosen for this study was AMIS 
and the challenges that the AU faced in executing AMIS.  The researcher used a set of 
interview questions that focused on organization, leadership, US support and 
communications.  Participants were selected from a small, comprehensive population 
that consisted of 12 US officials with Department of State and Department of Defense 
senior rank that were involved with the AU and AMIS during the entirety or partial 
period of 2004 to 2007. Eight individuals were interviewed. 
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Chapter 4 consists of the findings from an analysis of the data. The researcher 
conducted seven face-to-face interviews in the Washington DC area with the 
participants who agreed to participate in the study.  One participant requested the 
interview be conducted via email due to senior official responsibilities, time constraints 
or location.  Additionally, two potential participants who had initially responded 
favorably to the request for an interview had requested that the interview be conducted 
through email due to distance and professional time constraints but did not provide any 
written responses to the researcher and were not included in this study.  None of the 
participants felt comfortable with using Skype or teleconferencing due to security 
concerns.  
Chapter 5 provides the purpose of the study and the researcher’s background 
with the subject matter.   The discussion focuses on an analysis of the findings and 
recommendations for policy and program applicability and a recommendation for future 
research that could be of a guide to the scholars and followers of the AU. 
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Chapter 2 
Review of Literature 
Overview  
In order to identify the gap that exists in the literature, a thorough review of 
existing literature was conducted focusing on the challenges faced by the African Union 
(AU) in executing the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS. The review of existing 
scholarly literature provides preparation for conducting a case study (Yin, 2009, p.37) 
and identifies what has already been done related to the topic at hand. 
The literature review is focused on three areas: the AU organization and its 
challenges as it relates to AMIS, relevant theories of leadership and communications 
that could be used to illuminate the responses of the participants and focus the responses 
in this study, and developing and designing the methodology using a grounded theory 
approach.   The theories of leadership and communication, particularly transformational 
leadership as applied to culture as well as cross-cultural communication, were reviewed 
for applicability to the response of the participants.  This led to the design of a study for 
this dissertation.    
The African Union 
Historical Background of the AU 
Pan-Africanism remains the most effective vehicle addressing the debilitating 
problems of Africa.  Africa cannot be developed using externally imposed 
economic paradigms, cultures and models.  Africa is in need of an African 
cultural renaissance.  An African socio-cultural renaissance is essential…to 
reverse the on-going marginalization of the continent…and this can only be in 
the interests of the African people. (Matthews, 2008, p.36) 
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 An examination of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) offers the 
researcher the ability to better understand how the AU is organized, led, and 
communicates.  The OAU preceded the AU as the Pan-African organization that was 
designed to address the African-specific issues related to peace, governance and 
stability on the continent (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 13).  The OAU provides the basis for 
understanding the current configuration of the AU.  The OAU was established on May 
25, 1963 (Binns, et al., 2012, p. 340; Kieh, 2008, p. 114).  It existed as an African 
organization from 1963 to 2001 when the OAU was replaced by the AU in 2002 
(Fogwell, 2013, p.1).  The OAU Charter was replaced by the Constitutive Act of the 
AU (Odinkalu, 2013, p. 852) 
 Fogwell argues that the objective of the OAU was to promote “unity, solidarity, 
and cooperation between African States” in relation to forming independent African 
states into a collaborative organization after they gained independence from the former 
colonial powers (Fogwell, 2013, p. 5).  The AU served as a forum for cooperation 
among nascent African states that were not prepared to have a continental organization 
supplant state sovereignty (Yusaf, et al., 2012, p. 17).  A unified Africa would allow for 
the union of independent African states for the economic well-being as expressed 
through a Pan-African organization for cooperation, as pointed out by Mohammed 
Bedjaoui (Yusef, et al., 2012, p.16).  The charter of the OAU did not allow for 
intervention into intra-state issues during its tenure (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 13).  The 
intent of the OAU was to give Africa “an independent voice in world affairs” and to 
unite all of Africa together under one organizational umbrella (Reader, 1999, p. 666). 
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 The Constitutive Act that created the AU in Togo in 2001 and the Secretary 
General of the defunct OAU stated: 
 [It] is important to point out that when African leaders decided to establish the 
African Union when they adopted the declaration and, subsequently, the 
Constitutive Act, they did not aim at establishing an organization which was 
going to be a continuation of the OAU by another name. (Yusef and 
Ouguergiuz, 2012, p. 50) 
The transition from the OAU to the AU was summed up by the Interterm Chairperson 
of the Commission of the AU: 
The world had changed, the continent had changed but the organization vehicle 
at the regional remained pretty much the same, with prisms and methods that 
could not cope with emerging challenges.  The commitment to change this 
situation fostered the birth of the African Union. (Yusef and Ouguergiuz, 2012, 
p. 50) 
The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 is just one example of an issue with which the 
OAU was not able to engage since this was an intra-state issue that was beyond the 
ability of the OAU to address.  However, the need to revamp the Charter of the OAU 
was slow to materialize as the OAU Charter Review committee met only six times 
between 1994 and 2001 (Yusef & Ouguergiuz, 2012, p. 30). 
 One of the main objectives of the AU design was the charter that allowed for 
intra-state intervention, a mechanism that the OAU did not possess (Chazan et al., 1999, 
p. 311).  The OAU did not possess the political will and had a limited mandate to 
intervene in in intra-state and regional affairs that the AU does possess in its charter 
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(Affa’a Mindzie, 2010, p. 176).  The start of the change in the mindset of the Africans 
began with the end of the Cold War in the late 1980’s when they decided that a change 
was necessary with regards to an approach to crisis intervention (Affa’a Mindzie, 2010, 
p. 176).  The AU was designed with the change in mindset of the Africans to the “right 
of the AU to intervene in domestic affairs of member states” with the decision of the 
AU Assembly (Moller, 2009, p. 9).  The AU, through its Peace and Security 
Commission, differed from the former OAU charter by offering: 
A definition of defense which encompasses both the traditional, military, and 
state-centric notion of the use of armed forces of the state to protect its national 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as the less traditional, non-military 
aspects which relate to the protection of the people’s political, cultural, social 
and economic values and ways of life (Moller, 2009, p. 13). 
 Article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the AU served as the mechanism that 
allowed the AU to “promote” peace through a responsibility to protect (Murithi, 2007, 
p. 15).  This differed from the charter of the OAU that was mainly designed to address 
the issues related to the African continent with the end of colonialism (Murithi, 2007, p. 
16). 
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Figure 1. Map of African Union Member States 
 
Note. Map of African Union member states.  Reprinted from Student News Daily, 
Retrieved from https://www.studentnewsdaily.com/world-current-events/news-
from-taiwan-germany-and-philippines. Accessed 30 November 2016 
 
Organization of the AU 
 There are currently 54 member states of the AU (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 25) 
(see figure 1).   Fifty-three of the 54 African nations, all of which but Morocco were 
members of the AU, could be called upon to voluntarily contribute troops to the AMIS 
missions (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 25). 
Since its inception in 2002, the AU was organized around 26 “organs” that fall 
under an assembly of the AU (Makinda, et al., 2016, p.43).  The Assembly of the AU 
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consists of Heads of State or national representatives that must reach a major consensus, 
two-thirds, on its decision-making process, including peacekeeping operations such as 
AMIS (Makinda et al., 2016, pp.44 and 45).  The term of office is one year (Makinda et 
al., 2016, p.44). Another organ of the AU is the Executive Council consisting of African 
foreign ministers that have been appointed through the Assembly members (Makinda et 
al., 2016, p.47).  The Pan-African Parliament of the AU is a major organ of the AU that 
comprises five members of each member State and has to include at least one female as 
a part of the five (Makinda et al., 2016, p.49).  The Pan-African Parliament serves as a 
continent-wide advisory role for the AU (Makinda et al., 2016, p.48). 
 The Peace and Security Council of the AU has the responsibility to promote and 
advise on the “peace, security and stability” issues facing the continent that the AU may 
wish to address (Makinda et al., 2016, p. 52).  The Peace and Security Council consists 
of 15 members and is distributed equally among the five regions of Africa (Makinda et 
al., 2016, p. 53). 
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Figure 2. Organization Chart of the Assembly of Heads of State or the AU. 
 
Note. Organization Chart of the Assembly of Heads of State of the AU.  Reprinted 
Ft. Leavenworth, Retrieved from  
http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/OEWatch/201306/images/African%20Union.JP
G. Accessed 30 November 2016 
 
Leadership of the AU 
The AU leadership includes: The Chairperson, the Assembly of the Union, the 
Executive Council, the Pan-African Parliament, the Judicial and Human Rights 
Institution, the Commission, the Permanent Representatives Council, the Specialized 
Technical Committee, the Peace and Security Council, the Financial Institutions, the 
Economic, the Social and Cultural Council and the Legal Organs (AU Website, 
Accessed 2016, para. 1).  There is a total of 26 organs of the AU (Makinda, Okumu & 
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Mickler, 2006, p. 43).  For the purposes of this research, the leadership of the Assembly 
of the Union and the Peace and Security Council will be reviewed. 
The Assembly of the Heads of State for the AU is considered the supreme organ 
of the AU, according to Makinda, Okumu and Mickler (2016, p. 43).  The Chairperson 
of the Assembly is elected by the African heads of state and serves a one year term 
(Makinda, Okumu & Mickler, 2016, p. 44). According to the AUs main website (Union, 
2016, para 1): 
The Assembly is the African Union’s (AU’s) supreme organ and comprises 
Heads of State and Government from all Member States. It determines the AU’s 
policies, establishes its priorities, adopts its annual program and monitors the 
implementation of its policies and decisions … It may give directives to the AU 
Executive Council and Peace and Security Council on the management of 
conflicts, war … and the restoration of peace. The AU Constitutive Act provides 
for the Assembly to decide on intervention in or sanctions against Member 
States in specific circumstances. The Assembly delegated this mandate to the 
Peace and Security Council when it became operational in 2004 (See figure 2) 
 The official website of the AU illustrates that the leadership of the Assembly 
was delegated to the Peace and Security Council in 2004, thus the focus of the literature 
review for the AU leadership (Union, 2016, para 1).  The Peace and Security Council 
consists of fifteen members whose terms range from two to three years (Makinda, 
Okumu & Mickler, 2016, p. 52).  The Council is charged with decision-making “for the 
prevention, management and resolution of conflicts” (Maganga, 2007, p. 2).  
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Figure 3 Organization Chart of the Peace and Security Department of the AU. 
 
Note. Organization Chart of the Peace and Security Department of the AU.  
Reprinted from Transitional Demobilization and Reintegration Program, 
Retrieved from http://www.tdrp.net/news_102411.php. Accessed 30 November 
2016 
 
US Support to the AU 
 The AU has a funding requirement for each African member state (Muganga, 
2007).  Article 4 of the AU’s Constitutive Act states that one of the objectives of the 
AU is to “encourage international cooperation” (Makinda, 2016, p. 136).  The AU has 
depended on the international community for “forging” partnerships that include peace, 
security and governance as well as funding shortfalls it experiences from its member 
states (Makinda, 2016, p. 137).   The US has been a major donor nation to the AU, in 
particular during the AU’s execution of AMIS (Dagne, 2006, p. 10). 
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 The US established a combatant command specifically for Africa, called the 
Africa Command (AFRICOM) (Makinda, 2016, p. 151).  However, the support that the 
AU has received and continues to receive from the US in the form of AFRICOM, did 
not exist during AMIS.  AFRICOM was established in 2008, and for the first time in US 
history brought forth a capability of military support (Garrett III et al., 2010, p. 16) that 
was not available for support to the AU in executing AMIS.   
The AU itself suffers from a lack of internal African funding as did the OAU 
and must depend on the international partners, such as the US, to fund its missions 
(Udombana, 2002, p. 1239).  The US provided support to the AU unilaterally and under 
the flag of NATO during AMIS (Murithi, 2007, p. 14).  NATO, with the US as a lead 
member, provided training and airlift to the AU as it deployed African troops into 
Darfur (Murithi, 2007, p. 14).  NATO, again with the US as a senior member, assisted 
the AU with airlifting African troops during AMIS and provided training to AU officers 
as well as “technical assistance” to the AU at its headquarters with US and European 
support staff (Daalder & Goldgeier, 2013, p. 109).  NATO, which received heavy US 
financial support, was a strong supporter of the AU throughout AMIS, including 
capability building and logistics (Smith-Windsor, 2013).   Appiah-Mensah (as cited in 
Jentzch, 2014, p. 97) illustrated the NATO, and the US, contributions to AMIS as well 
as UNAMID airlift by demonstrating that NATO had airlifted in approximately 31,500 
troops from 2005 to 2008.   
The US has provided other valuable non-monetary support to the AU.   The US 
sought a negotiated peace to the conflict in Darfur (Murithi, 2007, p. 14): 
The United States has made solving conflict in this region [Darfur] a priority 
[and] our view remains that a negotiated way out of the crisis in Darfur … is the 
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most desirable alternative and option most likely to yield success (Murithi, 
2007, p. 14; US Department of State, 2007). 
 
Vorrath (2012, pp. 1-2) illustrated the problem that the AU faced with funding 
during its execution of AMIS in that the AU received only two percent of its peace fund 
from member states.  The time frame that Vorrath (2012, pp. 1-2) was referring to was 
2008 to 2012 but it does demonstrate how the AU must depend on the international 
partners, such as the US, for funding. 
Communications of the AU 
 There was a dearth of literature on the cross-cultural communications directly 
related to the OAU or the AU, especially during the AU’s execution of AMIS.  The AU 
organizational structure dictates the methods of communication internally within the 
organization and external to the organization.  The AU possessed a mix of cultures 
within the organization with a host of international personnel and languages that 
illustrate cross-cultural communication issues of the 53 member states during AMIS 
(Makinda, Okumu & Micklar, 2016).  Muganga (2007, p.12) did point out that the AU 
possessed a “chronic lack of resources … that effectively crippled … communications” 
within AMIS.  The AU communicates with its member states via communiques that are 
produced in four languages; Arabic, English, French and Portuguese (Magliveras & 
Naldi, 2002, p. 423).  
  
Review of the African Union Mission in Sudan 
 Historical Background of AMIS 
 Darfur is a region located in western Sudan.  The region of Darfur was an 
independent Muslim sultanate until 1916 (Medani, 2010, p 1039).   Darfur became a 
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part of Sudan during the 40 year Sudanese colonial period from 1916 to 1956 (De Waal, 
2007, p. 1039).   Darfur, along with Sudan, gained independence from colonization in 
1956 and found itself embroiled in the Chadian civil war in the 1980’s, which caused 
friction with the Sudanese government in Khartoum (Burr and Collins, 2008). 
 The conflict in the Darfur region began when two rebel groups, the Sudan 
Liberation Army Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement attached the 
Sudanese Air Force while the aircraft were on the ground in El Fashir, Darfur, in April 
2003 (Salih, 2005, p. 15).  It was at this point that the Government of Sudan reacted by 
conducting a counter-insurgency campaign using a rebel group, the Janjaweed, that 
Sudan had trained and equipped for just such a mission (Flint & De Waal, 2005, p. 36).  
There had been an estimated 350,000 individuals killed in Darfur with the displacement 
of nearly two million individuals by 2006 (Nathan, 2006, p. 1). 
The protection of the civilian population in each African nation was stated in the 
Constitutive Act adopted by the AU as it organized in 2002 (Mirithi, 2007, p.5).  The 
AU reserved the right to intervene under its organization if a nation did not adhere to its 
own right to protect its civilian population, as determined by the AU in Darfur (Appiah-
Mensah, 2006). 
The AU sent special envoys to Khartoum, Sudan, in March 2004 in order to 
discuss the involvement of the AU in the struggle and to stem the violence perpetrated 
against the civilian population (Mugnaga, 2007, p. 6).  The AU established AMIS as a 
way of monitoring the Humanitarian Cease Fire Agreement and became operational on 
June 19, 2004 (Muganga, 2007, p. 6; Allen, 2010, p. 7).  Murithi (2007, p. 77) points 
out that the AU had established AMIS in order to “alleviate the suffering of the 
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Darfurians” while the AU was seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict.  AMIS 
experienced the escalation of protection force deployments throughout 2004 to 2007, 
reaching a high of 7,000 African troops, ending the mission (AMIS) in July 2007 to 
merge into a hybrid UN-AU mission called UNAMID in 2007 (Murithi, 2007, p. 78; 
Williams, 2006). 
Organization of AMIS 
Chad, with the assistance of the AU, began an “initial round of negotiation to 
resolve the Darfur conflict” in Sudan on April 8, 2004 (Murithi, 2007, p. 5).   The AU 
became involved with the Darfur crisis on May 28, 2004 when the AU assigned an AU 
Chairperson to the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, followed by the deployment of 
60 AU observers to Darfur on June 19, 2004 (Appiah-Mensah, 2006, p. 1; Murithi, 
2007, p. 6).   AMIS, as the mission was referred to in 2004, had an initial mission of 
observing and protecting the observer force that was followed by a protection force of 
300 in July 2004 (Murithi, 2007, p. 6; Grono, 2006, p. 625).   The original mandate of 
AMIS was to observe only and further bolstered its presence to include monitoring the 
ceasefire in AMIS II.  The addition of protecting civilians was added to the mandate of 
AMIS II-E (Expanded) in July 2005 only if AMIS troops were able to conduct the 
mission with confidence of success (Appiah-Mensah, 2006, p. 4).  AMIS, including 
AMIS, AMIS II and AMIS-II-E spanned the period of time from June 2004 to July 
2007 (Baldo, 2011).  The AU programmed AMIS to be a transition between assisting 
the civilian population in the Darfur region of Sudan in 2004 to an eventual turn-over of 
the mission to the UN—which did not occur until 2007 (Cilliers, 2008, p. 7 & 8).  
AMIS II was established in October 2004 followed by the expanded AMIS II, AMIS-II-
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E, in July 2005, with an expanded AU mandate to strengthen the role of the AU in 
enforcing the ceasefire agreement, protecting civilians, disarming the rebel force and 
ensuring that humanitarian aid was received in the Darfur region (AU PSC, 2004; 
Muganga 2007, p. 14).  Murithi (2007) points out that at the insistence of the 
Government of Sudan, the AU deployed a smaller force than originally envisioned and 
its mandate did not include the protection of civilians until AMIS II-E. 
The AU had initially established AMIS with the ideal of turning over the 
mission to the UN but the UN was slow in convincing the Government of Sudan for an 
UN mission in Darfur (Grono, 2006, p. 626).  The turnover did not occur until July 31, 
2007 with the adoption of UN Security Resolution 1769 and was a referred to as a 
hybrid UN and AU mission called the UN and AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) 
(Allen, 2010; UN.ORG, Accessed 2016, para 1).  The establishment of UNAMID 
officially ended AMIS. 
Leadership of AMIS 
 The senior leadership of the AU’s mission in Sudan (AMIS) came in the form of 
a force commander, a police commander and a senior political officer (Muganga, 2007).  
Appiah-Mensah (2006, p. 4) argues that the force commander often misinterpreted the 
mandate and thus weakened the leadership component of AMIS.   
US Support to AMIS 
We are totally dissatisfied with the fact that the African Union … has asked the 
international community to allow it to be an African solution to an African 
problem, and unfortunately the logistics from our own governments did not 
follow … The UN Security Council, the European Union, the African Union, 
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the United States Foreign Minister Gadio of Senegal, 2005 (Rice, as cited by 
Allen, 2010, p. 12). 
 
 The US support first came in the form of supporting the Darfur conflict from a 
political standpoint.  The Secretary of State, Colin Powell, stated in September 2004 
that genocide was being committed in the Darfur region of Sudan (Makinda et al., 2016, 
p. 188).  AFRICOM was a US effort to bolster the US support mechanism throughout 
Africa and the planning for the AFRICOM occurred during the AMIS time frame 
(Francis, 2010, p. 9).  The formation of AFRICOM did not occur until the 2007-2008-
time frame, outside of the AMIS mission although AMIS had an impact on the 
establishment of AFRICOM (Francis, 2010, p. 8).   
 The US trained African peacekeepers through the African Contingency 
Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program during AMIS (Copson, 2007, p. 
105).  ACOTA, at the time of AMIS, was a bi-lateral training program and therefore 
could not train on a multi-national level such as in the AU which had brought together a 
multi-national force for executing AMIS (Copson, 2007, p. 106).  Due to the failure of 
ACOTA to offer training to institutions during the AMIS time period, ACOTA did not 
have the availability to train the AU and AMIS staffs (US State, 2016, web-site).  
Liegeois (2010) illustrates the lack of internal AMIS facility to conduct its mission, 
“lack of ability … despite numerous international actors providing considerable 
financial, material and training assistance” (Liegeois, as cited by Allen, 2010, p. 13). 
 Donor funding was a major impediment to the execution of AMIS.  Muganga 
(2007, p. 9) illustrates the funding issue by stating that the US had provided $43 million 
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of the pledged $243 million in October of 2004.   Commander Seth Appiah-Mensah, a 
military advisor to the AU, noted that AMIS possessed a, “chronic lack of resources” 
(Muganga, 2007, p.12).  
Communications of AMIS 
Communication during AMIS was a debilitating factor for execution of the 
mission, according to Maganga (2007, p.12).  No scholarly literature exists that 
illustrate the cross-communication or organizational communication issues that existed 
in AMIS.   
Review of Leadership Theories 
 The multitude of good communication channels and trust among people in thick 
informal networks allow for an ongoing process of accommodation and 
adaptation regarding who plays what role, and regarding conflict among roles.  
Those channels also help produce visions that are linked and compatible (Kotter, 
1990, p. 91). 
This study focuses the responses of the participants, leading to the development 
of a grounded theory. However, existing transformational leadership and culture of 
leadership is relevant. An historical view of how leadership theories developed is 
germane to understand how the scientific method contributed to the formation of the 
present-day leadership theories used in this study.  The theories of transformational 
leadership and culture of leadership, the scholarly literature of such leadership 
researcher notables as Bass, Conger, Fiedler, House, and Russell and were examined for 
their applicability to the study.   Bass, Conger and Fielder have contributed to the field 
of leadership and organizational design for understanding the reasons behind different 
theories such as Transformational Leadership.  House, Hnages, Javidan, Dorfman and 
Gupta produced Culture, Leadership and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 
Societies that offers insight into the leadership dynamics related to international cultures 
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and their views of leadership.   GLOBE stands for ‘Global Leadership and 
Organizational Behavior Effectiveness” (Northouse, 2013, p. 387).    
Historical 
The basis of transformational leadership as well as culture related to leadership 
were derived after the establishment of organizational study research methods 
developed in the early half of the 20th century.   The historic view of the methods that 
led to the use of scientific method of enquiry laid the foundation of the theories used in 
this study. 
Taylor discussed the development of the scientific method as applicable to the 
study of leadership and management by addressing and studying the selection and 
training of workers for specific jobs as industry began to build steam (Kanigel, 2005).  
Many theories have evolved related to leadership, starting with Taylor publishing The 
Principles of Scientific Management in 1911. He used observation, collection of data 
and analysis to determine that using the method of scientific management paid off for 
organizations in the end by lowering the cost of production and creating higher output 
through more efficiency (Wrege & Greenwood, 1991).  He also provided support for his 
argument that by using scientific management techniques, the organization and the 
individual worker both profit in productivity as well as efficiency (Nelson, 1980).   
In 1926, Follett suggested that there is a need for executives to recognize that 
that they will not receive worker buy-in without changing the patterns of habit and 
action (Natemeyer & McMahon, 2001).  He further suggested that convincing the 
workers through intellectual means alone is not enough to guarantee worker compliance 
with executive orders (Natemeyer & McMahon, 2001). 
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The Hawthorne Experiments were a watershed event in experimentation by 
illustrating an effect on the outcome to stimuli that were not considered to be a part of 
the experiment: that of the effect of the presence of researchers on the subjects (Mayo, 
1930).  The Hawthorne Experiments were the genesis of the idea that external, 
unexpected factors can influence the outcome of an experiment and emphasize the need 
control external factors to the extent possible (Jones, 1992). 
In the early 1900’s, there was an increasing desire to use the factors of human 
behavior and psychological recognition that scientific principles could be applied to 
management in order to positively affect the productivity of the worker, while at the 
same time realizing that workers needed stimulus and input in order to function at the 
optimum level (Natemeyer & McMahon, 2001).  This was a change from the past where 
the boss and management issued orders with an expectation that the orders would be 
followed without question and without taking the workers into account (Natemeyer & 
McMahon, 2001).  Natemeyer and McMahon (2001) suggest that this stemmed from 
labor-intensive work that was changing with the industrial revolution and the invention 
of advanced mechanisms that increased productivity and moved the worker from a mere 
muscle-driven status to a more integrated part of production. 
Progressing into the 1940’s, there began an approach to understand how and 
why managers, leaders and followers reacted to increased productivity that included 
Douglas McGregor’s X, Y theory of management (Natemeyer & McMahon, 2001).  In 
the 1950s, the work of Argyris brought to the forefront a view toward motivating the 
individual, while Douglas McGregor emphasized the humanistic side of an enterprise 
(Koontz, 1961; Greenwald, 2008).  McGregor pointed out some challenges that must be 
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overcome and recommended a series of steps such as delegating authority and allowing 
an individual to expand responsibility, as illustrated in corporate giants such as I.B.M. 
(McGregor, 1960).  McGregor suggested that by allowing individuals to be creative, 
they were encouraged to set targets and objectives and become more self-evaluative 
(Kopelman, Prottas, & Davis, 2008; McGregor, 1960).  McGregor completed his 
proposal for the new Theory Y by restating that he believed in the approach of Theory 
Y as humanistic and raising the importance of the process, rather than simply the 
economic ends, bringing in the social sciences to the equation of management (Carson, 
2005). 
An historical view of leadership and organizational theory assists the researcher 
and the reader in understanding the historical roots that formed the basis for the 
leadership theories of today.  The theory of transformational leadership was next 
explored to understand the challenges that the AU faced in executing AMIS.  
   
Transformational Leadership 
Transformational leadership theory was used in this study to understand the 
perceptions offered by the senior US officials that were involved with the AU during 
AMIS.  The terms visionary leadership and inspirational leadership are often used to 
describe transformational leadership with an understanding of charismatic and 
emotional aspects of leadership (Yukl, 2013, p. 53). 
Literature exists that marks a distinction between transactional leadership and 
transformational leadership. There are distinct differences between the two. In the 
transactional leadership model, there is an exchange between the leaders and the 
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followers (Northouse, 2013), and rewards are provided to employees for the services 
they deliver (Bass, 1990). Transformational leadership offers a connection, according to 
Northouse (2013), which will increase the level of both the leader’s and the follower’s 
motivation and morality.  Burns was the first to coin the concept of transactional and 
transformational leadership in 1978 (Bass, 1998). Bass (1998) provides a picture of 
transactional leadership as satisfying the followers’ immediate self-interests where a 
transactional leader exchanges things of mutual value, to the leader as well as the 
follower (Kuhnert, 1994).  Transformational leadership may also lead to major changes 
in attitude and assumptions of the members of an organization that will lead to the 
establishment of commitment to the organization’s mission and strategy (Yukl, 1989), 
while Bass and Avolio (1990) points toward transactional leadership using merely 
contingent reward and management by exception. 
A transformational leader will instill a change in an organization further than 
expected through a strong emotional connection with the followers leading to a 
collective commitment (Diaz-Saenz, 2011).   Burns was the first to bring 
transformational leadership into use in 1978 by stressing that transformational 
leadership involved a leader “morally uplifting” the followers through creating a vision 
(Diaz-Saenz, 2011, p. 300)    A transactional leader finds him/herself separated from 
his/her followers, while a transformational leader is more in tune with the internal 
motivation of his/her followers (Greenwald, 2008).   A transformational leader must 
possess the ability to take risks and to fail (Burns, 2008, p. 903).  An organization is 
changed through a transformational leader when that organization is led by inspiring 
and sharing a vision between leader and follower, creating a “great revolutionary force” 
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to cause a new orientation in an organization (Burns, 2003, p. 26).  When the leader and 
the followers raise each other to a higher level, transformational leadership occurs 
(Burns, 1998).  Transformational leadership can also be viewed as appealing to a 
follower’s values, raising their consciousness regarding ethical issues and mobilizing 
their energy and resources to reform an institution (Yukl, 2013, p. 321). 
Bass focused a great deal on distinguishing between transactional and 
transformational leadership (Seltzer & Bass, 1990; Bass, 1996).   Bass and Riggo 
(2006) tied transformational leadership with contingency reward and management-by-
exception, adding idealized influence, inspirational motivation, intellectual stimulation 
and individualized consideration.  There are four common strategies exercised by 
transformational leaders: vision; social architecture; trust; and creative deployment of 
self through positive self-regard (Bennis & Naum, 1985).  Other research with CEOs 
found that leaders managed change using a “three-act” process: recognize the need for 
change; creation of a vision; and institutionalizing changes (DevVanna & Tichy, 1990 
as cited in Northouse, 2013).  Kotter (1996) took the three-act process concept a step 
further and suggested that charismatic leaders transformed organizations. There are a 
number of strengths to this theory based on a number of qualitative studies, according to 
Northouse (2013).   This theory also provides for a wider look at the field of leadership 
based on becoming aware of the process that occurs between the leader and the follower 
(Seltzer and Bass, 1990). There are inherent criticisms as well. It ignores how 
leadership training and education, as well as experience, can add to the leader’s ability 
to lead (Bryman, 1992). A major criticism is in the measuring instruments used to 
examine transformational leadership (Tejeda, Scandura & Pillai, 2001).  
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Mumford developed a “three components of skills model” that outlined 
individual, attributes, competencies and leadership outcomes (Northouse, 2013).  Aside 
from the “great person” approach, the literature of the 1990’s to present has focused on 
skill development through training, education and experience (Northouse, 2013).  Skills 
can be divided by level. For example, a lower level manager-leader (supervisory level) 
will concentrate on skills development at the technical and human interaction level. 
Katz (1955) points out that the conceptual level required by a lower level manager is 
less than that of a middle or top level manager-leader. This concept has held true, as we 
have seen in the leadership literature of the 1970’s that started to address how leaders 
motivate their followers in order to reach the goal.  
Transformational leadership will form the lens through which the responses of 
the senior US officials will be viewed in this study related to the challenges of 
leadership of the AU.  Contingency theory, emotional intelligence, management versus 
leadership and charismatic leadership theory will also assist the researcher in examining 
the AU and applying the theory of transformational leadership.  
Contingency Theory 
Cultural effects will be most powerful in the process of organizations relating to 
authority, style, conduct, participation and attitudes, and less powerful in formal 
structuring and overall strategy.  However, we will require a more adaptive 
theory of organizations which specifics the points at which contingency, culture 
and the system of relationships have their main effects (Boyacigillar & Adler, 
1991, p.p. 270-271).  
The study of contingency theory in light of transformational leadership may 
offer insight into the African leadership style of the AU during AMIS.  Contingency 
theory, (Fiedler, 1978) deals with matching the leadership style to the situation.  Other 
scholars have dealt with situational leadership. Hersey and Blanchard (2008, illustrated 
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how to match the leadership style to the follower.  Fiedler (1978) uses contingency 
theory to match the leadership style to the context and setting.  According to Fiedler 
(12981), Sogdill’s concept of perception is something a leader has inherently and is not 
supported by research evidence.  He further suggests that the effectiveness of the leader 
is determined by the situation and context (Fiedler, 1981). 
The Least Preferred Co-Worker Scale (LPC) and Contingency Model of 
Leadership Effectiveness developed by Fiedler transcended the earlier works related to 
leadership styles (Jago, 1982).  Jago (1982) argues that Fiedler’s model is trait-based 
rather than behavior-based.  Fiedler (1981) laid the ground work in contingency theory 
that others, like Jago, have taken to the next level of research and scholarly publication.  
Contingency theory is supported by a large volume of empirical research and has 
brought forth the third dimension of leadership: the context of the situation with the 
follower and leader, not merely follower-leader or leader-situation (Northouse, 2013).  
The strength in contingency theory allows for the leader not to have to be effective in all 
situations (Northouse, 2013).  There are criticisms of the theory.  Contingency theory 
can be criticized because of the enigma of why certain individuals are more effective in 
certain leadership situations (Fiedler, 1993).  Another criticism is its reliance on the 
LPC as a measure (Fiedler, 1993 as cited in Northouse, 2013).   
However, Trandis (1993) suggests that contingency theory may be applied from 
a cultural perspective deriving from the leader’s behavior based on their cultural 
background. The cultural aspects of contingency theory may add a measure of 
comprehension to the perceptions that participants in this study had in observing the 
AU.   
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Emotional Intelligence 
Another transformational leadership characteristic involves emotion.  Daniel 
Goleman (1995) popularized the concept of emotional intelligence. He codified 
emotional intelligence as one’s ability to recognize, understand, and manage one’s own 
feelings and emotions and project that onto others as well—creating a vision.  There 
have been a number of studies using emotional intelligence as a basis, and there have 
been several forms of measurement and testing developed, such as the Mayer-Salovey-
Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT), the EQi and the Bar-On.  Goleman has 
published numerous articles and books on the subject (Goleman, 1995; Goleman, 1998; 
Goleman, 2001a; Goleman, 2001b; Goleman, Boyatzis & McKee, 2002) Goleman 
defined emotional competence as “a learned capability based on emotional intelligence 
that results in outstanding performance at work” (Cherniss & Goleman, 2001, p. 27).  
Boyatzis, Goleman and Rhee (2000) further developed this by introducing emotional 
resonance. Resonant leadership starts with emotional intelligence identification through 
personal competence (self-awareness and self-management) and social competence 
(social awareness and relationship management) (Boyatzis & McKee, 2005).  When 
leaders get in touch with their emotional intelligence as well as that of followers, they 
are able to foster a change so that creates resonance.  A leader’s positive or negative 
emotion can cause a positive or negative impact on self and followers, opening the 
leader up to cognitive flexibility (Boyatzis & McKee, 2005).  Leaders are at the highest 
point of instilling a sense of emotional tie to the organization by the follower as a 
stakeholder of the organization, reaching inside to have an effect on their emotional 
intelligence (Freidman, 2002). 
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Goleman (2008) refined his emotional intelligence model and reduced the 
number of competencies down to 20 and the previous five domains into “four clusters 
of general abilities” (self-awareness, social awareness, self-management, and 
relationship management) based on the findings of Boyatzis, Goleman & Rhee (2000, p 
28).  This fits with Burn’s (2003) analysis of transformational leadership, where an 
organization is changed by a leader who inspires and shares a vision between leader and 
follower and where a leader and the followers raise each other to a higher level.  The 
strength in the theory of emotional intelligence is that it can offer leader insight to 
broaden their leadership ability and to identify how emotion has an effect on their 
ability to transform themselves and their organization (Mayer and Gehr 1996).   
Ciarrochi, Chan, Caputi and Roberts (2001) criticize the validity of emotional 
intelligence and note that a scientific test to validate emotional intelligence is needed.  
The measuring instruments may not actually identify the emotional intelligence 
quotient, and further standardization is needed before it can be viewed as an acceptable 
theory (Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey, 1999). However, tests to measure Emotional 
Intelligence such as the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT), 
the EQi and the Bar-On may not be applicable to the cultures that represent the AU.  
Measurement tools that would arguably work fine with the US or other western cultures 
may not be effective for the various African cultures.  The aspects of emotional 
intelligence would not be an effective manner to collect data on leadership at the AU.  
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Figure 4 Comparing Management and Leadership 
 
Note.  Comparing Management and Leadership. Reprinted from John P. Kotter, 
A Force for Change. The Free Press, 1990. 
 
Management versus Leadership 
One of the key sub-questions of this study deals with the perceptions of senior 
US officials in regards to the AU leadership.  To understand whether senior US officials 
view the style of the leaders of the AU as leaning toward management or leadership, a 
review of the literature of management versus leadership was conducted.  Management 
and leadership are different in their approach and outcome (Kotter, 2012) See Figure 4. 
Kotter’s (1990) contribution in this area of research deals with seeing 
management as producing order and consistency, while distinguishing the function of 
leadership as producing change and movement.  Kotter (2007) takes Bass’ theory on 
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transformational leadership and offers that there are eight stages that, if accomplished, 
provide an avenue for better success in transformation (see figure 5): 
Figure 5 Eight Steps to Successful Change 
 
 
Note.  Eight Steps to Successful Change. Reprinted from John P. Kotter, Leading 
Change.  Harvard Business Review Press, 2012. 
 
The leader of an organization causes a transformation through his vision and 
empowering the followers to act on that vision (Kotter, 2012, p. 82).  Kotter and 
Schlesinger (2008) looked further at adapting strategy to the situation after diagnosing 
the various types of resistance that could be encountered (see figure 6). 
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Figure 6 Methods for Dealing with Resistance to Change 
 
Note.  Methods for dealing with Resistance to Change. Reprinted from John P. 
Kotter and Leonard Schlesinger, Choosing Strategies for Change.  Harvard 
Business Review Press, 2008, p. 136. 
 
Plato provides an avenue of contrasting leadership from management and 
administration in The Republic.  He described the differences between the leader (the 
Philosopher-King), the mid-range manager (the Guardian), and the administrative level 
(the Bronze level) or follower (Cawthon, 2002).  Northouse (2013) suggests that there 
are a number of similar attributes and functions that a manager and a leader share, but in 
the end, leadership can be distinguished by the power of the leader to shape vision and 
strategic vision where the manager does not have such authority or charter. 
Leaders have the authority to create a vision and authority while balancing the 
management of resources and missions that come from a higher authority (Northouse, 
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2013).  Plato’s Republic uses the cave analogy to contemplate how a leader has a better 
and clearer vision (Klosko, 2006).  This may illustrate how leaders can shape vision 
based on position and authority, or are inherently different from those who remain in 
the cave in darkness (Cawthon, 2002).   
Plato offers a vision of what he envisioned to be leadership traits and desired 
traits of an effective leader, explaining the knowledge and insight that leaders have over 
followers (Akiskal, 2007).  There is a fundamental closeness in functions that leaders 
and managers share, but there is a clear distinction in that leadership demands shaping 
vision, the ability to influence followers, and possessing the authority to cause change 
within an organization (Northouse, 2013).  Northouse (2013) points out that there is a 
trait view and a process view of leadership and leaders. 
A shortfall of the management versus leadership dynamic for this study is that 
the definitions for each may not be applicable to an international organization because 
the AU that possesses a variety of cultures within one organization.  Even Plato 
addressed a single culture.    
Charismatic 
Charismatic leadership is often associated with transformational leadership.  
Observing the leadership of the AU from the perceptions of the senior US officials that 
were involved with supporting AMIS will assist in determining the charismatic aspects 
as well as the transformational aspects of the AU’s leadership.    Max Weber coined the 
term of charismatic leadership as possessing a faith in the leader’s ability (Conger & 
Kanungo, 1994, p. 440).  Transformational leadership behaviors are often described in 
the theory of charismatic leadership (Yukl, 2013, p. 53).  Northouse’s fourth 
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characteristic of a charismatic leader embodies what a leader is transmitting: 
“charismatic leaders communicate high expectations for follower…exhibit confidence 
in the follower’s abilities to meet these expectations” (Northouse, 2013, p. 193).  A 
charismatic leader articulates their transformational vision as a shared vision to what 
Boyatzis and McKee (2005) refer to as movement away from the prior life toward a life 
that talks to our dreams.  
There is a difference in charismatic and transformational leadership in that a 
leader does not need to possess charisma to be a transformational leader (Northouse, 
2013).  Kotter (1996) took this a step further and offers charismatic leaders as 
transformational figures that transform organizations.  There is evidence to suggest that 
charismatic leadership is explained through the leader-follower relationship where the 
charismatic leader has profound effects on the followers (Yukl, 2013). 
The traits of charismatic leadership are close in line with transformational 
leadership.  There are eight leader traits that are identified with charismatic leadership: 
1. Articulating an appealing vision 
2. Using strong, expressive forms of communication when articulating the 
vision 
3. Taking personal risks and making self-sacrifices to attain the vision 
4. Communicating high expectations 
5. Expressing optimism and confidence in followers 
6. Modeling behaviors consistent with the vision 
7. Managing follower impressions of the leader 
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8. Building identification with the group or organization 
9. Empowering followers (Yukl, 2013, p. 312) 
There are data to suggest positive aspects of charismatic leadership; the 
followers may experience psychological growth and development of their abilities as 
well as the organization being more likely to adapt to a dynamic environment that is 
hostile or competitive (Yukl, 2013).  Some of the negative aspects of a charismatic 
leader may include; inhibition of criticism, risky projects can fail, leader taking credit 
for success, and failure to develop successors (Yukl, 2013). 
Culture of Leadership 
The development of images is part of the culture or the sub-culture in which 
they are developed, and it depends upon all elements of that culture or sub-
culture (Boyacigillar & Adler, 1991, p. 271-272).  
Culture has been defined as “a way of life, customs and script pf a group pf 
people” (Gudykunst & Ting-Tommey as cited by Northouse, 2013, p. 384).  The AU, 
possessing 53 different nations with multiple + cultures, cannot be researched without 
examining how culture may have created a challenge for leadership. 
A dearth of data exists for examining the cultural aspects of leadership 
experienced by the AU.  The Sub-Saharan countries examined by the GLOBE project 
demonstrated that the African cultures examined demonstrated high scores on humane 
orientation and offered that Sub-Saharan cultures are sensitive to the feelings of others 
(Northouse, 2013) (See figure 7).  Sub-Saharan cultures tend to view leadership based 
on charisma, team orientation, and participative leadership as effective (Brodbeck, 
Chhokar & House (2007).  Additionally, both participative leadership and autonomous 
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leadership were shown to be tolerated for the African countries that were represented in 
the Middle-East study portion of GLOBE which differed from the Sub-Saharan 
countries examined (Brodbeck, Chhokar & House (2007). 
The GLOBE study indicated that there was a difference in how the northern 
African and Sub-Saharan cultures viewed leadership: northern Africa data suggested 
that the culture was more attuned to participative and autonomous leadership and the 
Sub-Saharan cultures suggested that the culture norm was more aligned with humane 
and charismatic leadership (Brodbeck, Chhokar & House, 2007).  In this study, the 
definitions used are:  
Participative Leadership: reflects the degree to which leaders involve others 
in making and implementing decisions.  It includes being participative and 
autonomous 
Humane-oriented leadership: emphasizes being supportive, considerate, 
compassionate, and generous.  This type of leadership includes modesty and 
sensitivity to other people (Northouse, 2013, p. 395). 
 
GLOBE deals with but a few of the 54 nations that existed in Africa in 2004 and 
the 53 member nations of the AU.  The House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman and Gupta 
study (2004) thus offered a narrow view of Africa through the representation of only 
five of the 54 African nations.  Another fault found in the GLOBE study was that all 
five African cultures studied were in sub-Saharan Africa and did not include the 
northern African nations as it might relate to the AU. 
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Figure 7. GLOBE Project Cultural Clusters 
 
Note.  GLOBE Project Cultural Clusters. Reprinted from Robert J. House et al.., 
Culture, Leadership, and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies, Sage 
Publications, 2004. 
 
The Globe study did offer two additional African nations, Egypt and Morocco, 
under the cultural rubric of the Middle East but did not address those cultures as they 
would relate to an international organization such as the AU that possesses a mix of 
diverse cultures in one organizational body.  Due to this omission, the GLOBE study 
therefore cannot offer an insight into the leadership dynamics related to international 
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cultures and their view of leadership.  Additionally, the GLOBE study did not include 
any eastern African nations and cultures, focusing on the southern countries of Namibia, 
South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe and the inclusion of only one west African 
nation, Nigeria. This convenience sample lacked controls for type of organization or 
responders.  (Yukl, 2013, p. 369).  There is a lack of universal theories that can apply to 
a wide range of cultures based on interaction of people from different cultures or a 
regionally-centric applied theory (Boyacigillar & Adler, 1991, p. 283). 
There is a weakness in the study of culture that has been observed by the 
research in the GLOBE and the review of literature.  The use of grounded theory may 
thus be of value to determine how culture might have affected the AU during AMIS.   
 
Review of Communication Theory 
There are two communication theories applied to this study: cross-cultural 
communication and organizational communication. These are related to centralization 
versus decentralization methods of communication.  These two theories are compared 
with the responses of the participants of this study.  The theory underlying cross-
cultural communication was incorporated due to the AU representing a majority of the 
African nations, each nation state having its own unique culture or cultures including 
colonial and indigenous languages not shared by every member of the AU. 
Cross-cultural communication lays the foundation for the perceptions of senior 
US officials in their responses to the question related to the challenges of 
communications of the AU in executing AMIS.  Organizational communication theory 
is vital to understanding the responses of the participants to the challenges related to the 
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AU’s organization as related by the participants of the study.  Note that Morocco was 
not a member of the AU during AMIS due to its stand on the status of the western 
Sahara (Makinda, Okumu & Mickler, 2016) See figure 1 for map of current AU 
membership. 
Cross-Cultural Communication Theory 
Some of the more interesting issues that we have [in the organization] are 
conflicts within a particular ethnic group but are from diverse backgrounds.  We 
had a situation…where there were two Vietnamese people on the same work 
team, who could not get along.  And, you know, to most Americans, you would 
say, “They are both Vietnamese, they are going to love each other!”  But, they 
did not.  One was Buddhist.  One was Catholic.  One was from an urban area. 
One was from a rural area.  One was highly educated.  The other was 
uneducated.  Yet, they performed the same tasks, so it caused a lot of conflict. 
(Personal communication, March 18, 1993 cited by Lieberman & Gurtov as 
cited in Wiseman & Shuter, 1994, p. 141)  
 
Cross-cultural communication is an important aspect of this research and 
provides the basis for identifying how a diverse group of cultures at the AU 
communicated with the representation of 53 different nations, each with their own 
identity.  Braun suggested that barriers to intercultural communication were a vital 
aspect to the future of many international organizations (2001).  This holds true for the 
AU, where 53 individual cultures were presented in one international organization 
(Maganga, 2007). 
Communication and culture have an influence on each other where the culture in 
which one is “socialized” influences the way that the individual communicates, and the 
way that an individual communicates can alter the culture over a period of time 
(Gudykunst, 1997, p. 327).  An individual adapts to a new culture by “acculturating” to 
the new host patterns of communication (Kim, 1998, p. 72).  Kim’s use of assumptions 
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and predictive theorems relate to adaptability of an individual to a host culture.  The 
assumption is that when a person adapts to a cultural environment, they form a cultural 
identity, and that an individual’s ability to communicate facilitates their ability to adapt 
to the new culture (Kim, 1998, p. 73).  Kim’s assumption of cultural adaption was used 
to analyze response from study participants.  
Non-verbal communication, can also be a barrier to communication (Samovar & 
Porter, 1991, p. 349).   An illustration of a barrier to cross-cultural communication can 
be seen in the West African interpretation of the meaning of “hand,” that a western 
African understands to be the entire arm (Jandt, 2004, p. 105).    According to Kincaid 
1988, pp. 288-289), one of the assumptions when addressing intercultural 
communication is that the initial differences in communication “between members of 
different cultures are expected to diminish over time with frequent contact.”  Kincaid 
(1988, pp. 288-289) uses a theorem to demonstrate that a “relatively closed social 
system” with unrestricted communication among its members will converge “toward a 
state of greater cultural uniformity.”  Intercultural communication can be viewed as 
communication between individuals of that have different backgrounds that has been 
shaped by their experience within a group. (Kim, 1988). 
The AU can be viewed as a host culture where 53 diverse African cultures 
converge to form an organizational culture.  In the view of Young Kim (2005) view, the 
practices of the new culture lead an individual to acculturate to the host culture through 
the external influence of the host cultural system.   Kim argues that de-culturation, or 
unlearning, of the individual culture must take place in order for acculturation to take 
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place, where an individual begins to assimilate to the new culture through enculturation 
(Kim, 1988, p. 53). (See figure 8). 
Kim (2001) provides a structural model for the factors that influence cross-
cultural adaptation (see figure 8).   Individual adaptability is based on factors such as 
their personality, host receptivity and host pressure that may lead one to transform to 
the identity of the new group (Kim, 2001).    
Figure 8. Kim’s Process Model: The Stress-Adaptation-Growth Dynamic. 
 
Note. Y. Y. Kim’s Process Model: The Stress-Adaptation-Growth Dynamic. 
Reprinted from Y. Y. Kim, 2001, p. 57. 
Stress is a factor in adapting to a new culture where ongoing imbalances in 
adapting to stress grows in a subtle fashion (Kim, 2005).   Adaptation is not linear but is 
rather caused by a series of cyclical draw-backs, leading to the individual adapting 
through “leaps-forward” in adapting and integrating to the new culture (Kim, 2005, p. 
384) (Kim, 1988, p. 57).  Kim (2005, p.394) brings together acculturation and stress 
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adaptation to theorize that the two approaches are competing yet complementary 
“psychological forces intrinsic to the adaptation process.”  The intercultural 
transformation model of acculturation and adaptation may be useful in exploring what 
happened when 53 diverse cultures formed the organizational culture of the AU (Kim, 
2001) (See figure 9). 
Figure 9. Kim’s Structural Model: Stress Adaptation. 
 
 
 
Note. Y. Y. Kim’s Structural Model: Stress Adaptation. Reprinted from Y. Y. 
Kim, 2001, p. 87. 
Cross-cultural relationships often break down not due to language but because 
of assigning a different understanding or interpretation of the communication itself 
(Hurn & Tomalin, 2014, p. 1).   Communication is formed when members of a group 
are “indoctrinated” into a shared vision (Olufowote, 2006, p. 458).  People search for a 
common means of communication and meaning in an organization (Samovar & Porter, 
1991).  A group identity is formed when members share an interpretation of reality 
through communication.   “Shorter term members may be left out of the shared vision 
(Gossett, 2002, p. 385).   Multiple visions within one organization can exist (Endres, 
1994) and E. G. Bormann holds that multiple rhetorical visions may co-exist in a group 
or organization peacefully (Zanin et al., 2016, p. 441).   Groups develop a common 
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group consciousness when members demonstrate a shared vision and develop patterns 
of communication unique to that group based on shared meanings (Bormann, 1996).  
However, Bormann is criticized by Olufowote (2006) for using a static model to address 
membership acceptance for a group identity and notes that Bormann does not take into 
account each member’s multiple identity targets (Zanin et al., 2016, p. 442).    
Figure 10 graphically demonstrates a continuum of six stages from left to right 
illustrating movement along a continuum of intercultural sensitivity (Bennett, 1986, p. 
182).  It takes time to move from denial (the ethnocentric stages) to full integration (the 
ethno-relative stages) (Bennett, 1986, p. 181).  The AU had members from 53 diverse 
states with individual cultures.  The theories related to cross-cultural adaption and 
intercultural sensitivity will be examined against the responses of this study to 
determine whether these theories are applicable to the AU during AMIS.   
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Figure 10. Bennett’s Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity. 
 
 
Note.  Bennett’s Developmental Model of Intercultural Sensitivity.  Reprinted 
from Milton J. Bennett, A Development Approach to training for Intercultural 
Sensitivity International Journal of Intercultural Relations, 1986. P. 182. 
 
 
 
All of Africa may be addressed, as Louw points out in South Africa (as cited in 
Tanno & Gonzalez, 1998, p. 149), as having conflict between pre-modern, modern and 
post-modern cultures. This has an effect on how each nation views itself culturally.   
Collective memory can be used to provide a basis of for shaping the present from a 
shared memory of the past (Drzewiecka, 2003).    Diversity may be embraced in the AU 
as the members come from so many different cultural backgrounds.   
The cross-cultural communication theory is used in this study to illuminate the 
potential challenges of communication in an organization that comprises a mix of 53 
nations and a wide variance of native and official languages within one body of 
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membership.  The adaptation of the individual to the host organization is pivotal to 
analyzing the data collected by the researcher for this study. 
Theory of Organizational Communication 
The participant’s views on the organization of the AU can provide insight to the 
challenges of organization and leadership during the period of time that the AU was 
executing AMIS.  Centralization versus decentralization of an organizational structure 
can determine the avenues of communication and the effectiveness of communication 
(Macey et al., 1989).  Macey et al. (1989) found that participation through decentralized 
communication allowed for the increased of influence exhibited by members of the 
organization at lower levels and offered a more robust involvement in decision-making 
(McPhee & Poole, 2001, p. 509).  Centralization of organizational communication, on 
the other hand “grants all decisions to the top decision maker” (Mintzberg, 1979 as 
cited in McPhee & Poole, 2001, p. 509). 
Vertical communication is the normal avenue for instructions to pass down from 
the leader to the subordinates, and information flows upward (Simpson, 1959).  
Horizontal differentiation describes the division of labor that devolves into smaller tasks 
and skills to accomplish the tasks of the organization and increases communication in 
an organization (McPhee & Poole, 2001).  The size of the organization may overwhelm 
the informal process of organizing for the need of “mechanistic organization” in an 
organization of larger size, according to Jablin (1987).  Smelter and Fann (1989) found 
that the size of an organization could lead to restrictions on the width of decision-
making within the organization (McPhee & Poole, 2001, p. 506).  Horizontal 
communication is widely seen at the lower levels of the organizational chart (Simpson, 
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1959).  Horizontal communication accomplishes five functions: task coordination, 
problem solving, sharing information, conflict resolution and building rapport (Harris & 
Nelson, 2008) and is vital to coordinating details (Harris & Nelson, 2008).  The basic 
definitions of vertical and horizontal communication are found in figure 11. The AU 
will be examined to determine whether the communication is vertical or horizontal in 
the perceptions of senior US officials. 
Figure 11 Vertical and Horizontal Communication 
 
Note.  Vertical and Horizontal Communication.  Reprinted from Applied 
Organizational Communication and Business Communication, Retrieved from 
http://communication-business.com/ search/label/ Vertical%20communication. 
Accessed 30 November 2016. 
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Jablin (1987) found that the superior-subordinate communication within an 
organization suggested the individual’s position or level within the organization’s 
hierarchical structure impacted his or her communication in the organization (McPhee 
& Poole, 2001).    McPhee and Poole (2001, p. 507) point out that Barnard (1991) found 
“that higher level employees exhibited greater reliance on peers for advice” than those 
who were occupying positions at the lower levels of the hierarchical structure. 
Organizational communication theory may prove helpful in analyzing the 
perceptions of senior US officials about the organizational challenges faced by the AU 
during the execution of AMIS.   
Review of the Research Design 
 A comprehensive review of literature for the method that was used for this 
qualitative study is contained in chapter 3 of this dissertation.  The justification for 
using a grounded theory approach was that none of the theories overviewed seemed 
applicable to this study, although they did help inform it. A qualitative study with an 
emphasis on grounded theory can be developed through the use of a case study, “where 
a … program, or event is studied in depth for a defined period of time” (Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2010, p. 137) was determined to be the best research design to address the 
perceptions of senior US officials who participated in AMIS.  Purposive sampling 
(Berg, 2007, p. 40) was used to focus the responses of participants. 
The researcher has to be aware of his own knowledge of the data and should be 
cognizant not to interject with his own viewpoint, ensuring that the data are “solely 
from the vantage point of” the participants (Lofland, et al., 2006, p. 62). A fallacy often 
arises when the researcher attempts to use quantitative methods with a nonrandom 
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sample (Feagin, 1991).  Quantitative studies often exhibit more reliable data than that 
offered through a case study using qualitative methodology but validity in qualitative 
studies is not attainable theoretically (Feagin, Orum & Sjoberg, 1991). 
The smaller samples used in qualitative research differ from a quantitative 
methodology. The researcher selects the “lens” of the study by elicitation of the 
viewpoint of the sample of the participants rather than the numeric validity methods 
used in qualitative methods (Creswell and Miller, 2000, p. 125).    A different metric is 
used in qualitative research because the data collected represent the reality according to 
the participants of the study (Bloomberg & Volpe, 2008, pp. 76-77).  The entire 
population of this research was only 12, with eight participating.  
Questions used in an interview must be developed with the end result in mind 
(Berg, 2007).  Berg reminds the researcher it is important to share the terms that are 
used in common with the researcher and the participants of the study in order to elicit 
responses that meet the objective of the research (2007).  Questions need to be open-
ended and non-leading in order to capture the actual experiences of the sample pool 
(King & Horrocks, 2010, p. 2The qualitative method uses an inductive method where 
the researcher selects the interview questions using an open-ended questioning 
technique that offers an ability to collect data from the interviewee and arrange the data 
into themes or categories (Creswell, p. 63, 2009).  The development of the inductive 
method, according to Creswell (p. 63, 2009), allows the research to analyze the data 
collected through interviews to seek out broad patterns for generalization from the past 
experiences of the participants, leading to the development of new or revised theoretical 
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understanding. This grounded theory approach was deemed suitable to address the focus 
of this study. 
Conclusion and Identification of Gap in the literature 
The researcher conducted a comprehensive review of the scholarly literature 
related to the AU, AMIS and the theories related to leadership and communication that 
were applicable to this study in order to determine the challenges that the AU faced in 
executing AMIS.  The four major themes that the researcher studied in the review of 
literature were related to the overall research question of, “What were the challenges in 
that the AU faced in conducting AMIS from 2004-2007” and the four key sub-questions 
of the research study related to the challenges that the AU faced during AMIS with 
organization, leadership, US support and communication. 
 The researcher determined that the current body of scholarly literature did not 
address the specifics of the key sub-questions that would answer the overall research 
question.  Although the current body of scholarly research did address the basics of the 
AU and AMIS through such notable authors as Murithi (2007), Cilliers (2008), Packer 
& Rukare (2002), Garrett III et al (2009), Williams (2011), Makinda, Okumu & Mickler 
(2016) and Muganga (2007), there was a gap identified by the researcher in that none of 
the literature was related to the study of what the perceptions were of the US senior 
officials who had been directly involved with supporting the AU during the time period 
of AMIS, either out in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia or at the headquarters of the US 
Department of State and the Department of Defense in Washington DC. 
 The scholarly literature found in the comprehensive review failed to provide 
data specially related to Africa and the theories of communication and leadership 
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dealing specifically with the AU and AMIS.  There was literature on a specific country 
or culture, such as South Africa and apartheid, but no literature addressed the entire 
continent of Africa or the AU as related to the perceptions of US officials or from any 
scholarly approach.  The culture cluster of the GLOBE study focused on a mere five of 
the Sub-Saharan countries and two of the North Africa countries in attempting to deal 
with culture cluster analysis (House, Hnages, Javidan, Dorfman & Gupta, 2004).  The 
GLOBE leadership study relied on broadly defined leadership behaviors that made it 
difficult to ascertain a clear picture of cross-cultural differences in behavior (Yukl, 
2013, p. 369).  
 In addition, the researcher determined that the thematic areas of US Support and 
Communications were not addressed in the current body of scholarly literature from the 
perspective of the US senior officials working directly with the AU and AMIS.  The 
researcher was able to locate a body of literature that provided the basis for interview 
questions that related to US support mechanisms using communications theory, in 
particular cross-cultural communication and organizational communication.  Kim (1995 
& 1998), Gudykunst (1983), Gudykunst & Kim (1994 & 1998), Jandt (2004), Collier 
(2002) and Katriel (1995) provided an overview of the general principles and theories 
of cross-cultural communication as applied to individuals and organizations.  However, 
the scholarly literature did not demonstrate the kinds of cross-cultural communications 
challenges that were exhibited at the AU during its peacekeeping mission in Darfur, 
Sudan, known as AMIS.  Further, the scholarly literature spearheaded by Kim (1988), 
and edited works of Gudykunst & Kim (1998) and Wiseman (1995), Hecht et al. (2005) 
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provided theories that could be applied to the collection of data through the perceptions 
of US senior officials who had been directly involved with the AU and AMIS.  
Due to the identification of a gap in the literature, a research design was 
developed to fill the gap through the use of a case study of a sample of the majority of 
the population of US senior officials that directly observed the AU and AMIS.  The 
sample population was provided a recruitment letter that offered them an opportunity to 
provide their perceptions of the challenges that the AU faced in executing AMIS 
through the organization, leadership, US support and communication.   It was 
determined by the researcher that the use of a grounded theory approach would be the 
best method of collecting the perceptions of the sample of the population to fill the gap 
that existed in the scholarly literature. 
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
Methodological Overview 
 This dissertation examines the challenges that the African Union (AU) faced in 
executing the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) peace operations from the 
perspective of senior US officials.  The study is based on responses of participants 
utilizing qualitative analysis of interviews with senior US officials directly involved 
with the AU and AMIS during the period 2004-2007, in whole or in part.  A grounded 
theory approach was developed through a case study, “where a … program, or event is 
studied in depth for a defined period of time” (Leedy & Ormrod, 2010, p. 137).  
Study Sample 
The strategy used was a “purposive sampling” technique where the researcher 
used his personal knowledge to select the participants as subjects for this study (Berg, 
1998; Berg, 2007). The population of participants selected for this study were the entire 
senior US official population involved in supporting the AU during the time period that 
the AU organized and operated AMIS.  To ensure that the US perspective was at the 
senior level, only those US senior officials who were directly involved at the General 
Services (GS)-15 and Senior Executive Level (civilians) or equal military rank (Full 
Colonel, 0-6, or above) were selected for this study.  By using the purposive sampling 
strategy of Berg (2007, p. 44), the researcher was able to garner the perspective of the 
senior US official community and limited the study to represent only the perspective of 
senior US officials who had been directly involved with the AU and AMIS.  The 
protection of the identity of the participants was paramount, given their seniority and 
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positions with the US government, in order to ensure robust and honest responses were 
provided (Lofland, et al., 2006, p.98). 
The total population was 12 senior US officials who were present at the AU or 
in Washington DC working with AMIS. Not all of the senior US officials were involved 
during the entire three years that the AU conducted AMIS but had physically visited the 
AU during AMIS and therefore had first-hand knowledge of the challenges that the AU 
faced during AMIS.  All members of the population were at a senior level within the US 
Government during the time period 2004 to 2007 and were directly involved with 
providing US support to varying degrees. 
Seven in-person semi-structured interviews and one email interview were 
conducted for a total of eight interviews.  IRB approval was obtained, and a copy of the 
Consent Form can be found in Appendix D. King and Horrocks (2011) concluded that 
when physical distance from participants or the participant’s availability is limited, this 
may necessitate the need to conduct the interviews via telephone or through remote 
video teleconferencing techniques in order to capture the option of the participant who 
cannot be interviewed in person (pp. 79-80). They point out that a researcher should 
consider ethical issues when conducting an interview through telephone or remote video 
in that the researcher should verbally remind the participant that the interview is being 
recorded (p.85).  Skype, telephone or another form of video teleconferencing were not 
used due to security concerns for the senior US personnel.  Another avenue for 
interviewing is the use of online or email interviews through asynchronous method 
where the participant has time to reflect on the response that will be provided to the 
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researcher (King and Horrocks, 2011, p. 86). For this study, one individual was 
interviewed via email due to difficulty arranging a face-to-face interview.   
Race, gender, position, location, work site or other personal identification 
factors were not reported in this study in an effort to maintain anonymity.  The 
participants were assured of anonymity so that they could feel comfortable with 
responding to the interview questions in an open and frank manner.  Had the 
participants been identifiable, it might have skewed the data that they provided in an 
effort to maintain their current positions or to mask their true perceptions of the 
challenges that the AU faced in executing AMIS. 
 All members of the population were contacted via email recruitment letters and 
provided an opportunity to participate in the study (See Appendix B).  Ten potential 
participants responded positively to the recruitment.  However, only eight followed 
through with the interview process.  Seven were interviewed face-to-face, and six of 
those were recorded using a digital recorder.  The remaining participant requested that 
the interview be conducted via email due to being at a remote location that made a face-
to-face interview impractical.  Two potential participants did not respond to the request 
to participate, although the researcher attempted contact on three occasions.  One 
potential participant was unreachable due to retirement.  The other was in a combat 
zone and not available for the interview.    Table 1 presents the distribution of the 
sample as percentages of the population. 
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Table 1. Sample as Percentage of Population 
Population In-Person Interviews Email Interviews Total Sample sample as a %  
        of Population 
          
12 
 
7 
58.3% 
1 
8.3% 
8 
66.7% 
 
 
 
Interview Procedure 
The researcher conducted an in-depth face-to-face interview with each 
participant in a private setting using a digital recording device or note-taking.  A pilot 
interview was conducted with the subject matter expert (SME) in the fall of 2014 to test 
for applicability and questioning and listening techniques.  The researcher conducted an 
informal pilot interview with a non-selected potential participant that had been an 
observer of the AU and had tangential knowledge of AMIS as a SME on Africa.  The 
individual who was the subject of the pilot interview was not a direct participant with 
the AU during AMIS and was junior in rank and therefore selected by the researcher as 
the best possible outside SME who had general knowledge of the AU and AMIS.  No 
other pilot interview was attempted with the participant population due to the small 
number of potential participants (12). 
The face-to-face interviews took place in the District of Columbia area at either 
the offices of the participants or another location, such as private home, as selected by 
the potential participant.  One interview took place at a mutually agreed location which 
was the home of a mutual friend.  For each interview, no other individual was present.  
The digital recorder was tested for acceptable recording level at the interview site prior 
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to the actual interview to test for functionality and placement for best recording results.  
Two recorders were used to ensure the data were captured when a recorder was used in 
the interviews.  One of the in-person interview participants requested that no recording 
device be used.  Therefore, the researcher took copious notes of the responses of this 
participant’s responses.  One participant was interviewed via email due to the location 
of the participant who was at a distance and unavailable to conduct an in-person or face-
to-face interview.  IRB approval was obtained to reflect a change in protocol for 
allowing email responses. 
The interviews lasted from 45 to 60 minutes with minimal discussion from the 
researcher.  A short informal greeting was made with each participant in order to make 
each participant feel comfortable and relaxed with the interview and the interviewer. A 
brief introduction of the research as well as how the interview would be conducted was 
provided to each participant before the formal portion of the interview commenced.  
The researcher received written consent from each participant prior to the interview and 
provided the participant (subject) with the overall concept and reason for the interview 
to mitigate any ambiguity.  Follow-on questioning techniques were used during the 
interview for clarity when required and the researcher annotated emotional or 
environment factors where applicable to capture the mood and non-verbal responses of 
each participant.  The brief introduction to the study and the basics of how the interview 
would proceed also served as an ice breaker to make the participant feel at ease. 
The researcher did respond to any request from the participant for clarification 
but only when requested specifically by the participant.  The researcher did chat with 
the participants at the conclusion of the interview when the participant made the 
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request.  The researcher took notes when deemed germane to the study although the 
formal interview had concluded.  The researcher took notes in front of the participant 
when any informal discussion followed the formal, recorded portion of the interview so 
that the researcher’s intent was clear to the participant. 
Adequate time was allotted after the completion of the interview to allow the 
researcher to capture the tone and personal observations that were observed during the 
interview while fresh in the mind of the researcher for inclusion into the transcription of 
the interview.  Each recorded interview was sent to a vetted transcriber at the University 
of Oklahoma immediately following the interview. Each participant was offered an 
opportunity to review the transcription of their interviews.  The offer to review the 
transcripts allowed each participant a comfort level and acted as a confirmation of 
accuracy of the responses in the transcription.  All interviews were erased following the 
verification of the transcripts.  
The majority of the participants were still in the labor force.  The researcher 
wanted to ensure that the research questions were fully and openly answered and 
therefore provided each participant anonymity to ensure the protection of each 
participant in the research study. Researcher assured each participant that their names 
and official duty title would not be used in this research study.  The researcher used 
verbatim responses from the participants of the study.  However, ums,” “you know,” 
and “right?” were removed from the transcriptions used in data analysis to streamline 
the responses without changing the intent or meaning.  
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Study Design and Analysis 
The research design for this dissertation incorporated qualitative interviews to 
derive a grounded theory through purposive sampling of subject matter experts.  Open-
ended questions (See Appendix C) were asked by the researcher, who conducted 
analyses of the responses from the study participants (Straus and Corbin, 1998, p. 1).  
The researcher listened and allowed the participants to answer a set of questions that 
elicited a response based on their perceptions without forcing them to select pre-
established responses (Lofland, et al., 2006).     Question refinement was conducted 
with the assistance of an African subject matter expert and the chair of the dissertation 
committee prior to submitting the questions for the University of Oklahoma 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval.  Each dissertation committee member was 
aware of the potential questions through the dissertation prospectus defense process.  
The chair and committee members provided valuable input during the defense of the 
dissertation prospectus in relation to question comprehensibility and clarity of questions 
as well as question applicability. As a result of the defense of the dissertation 
prospectus, questions were adjusted for clarity and applicability to the study.  The 
researcher refined questions and procedures based on the outcome of the subject matter 
expert input and the submission to the Chair of the dissertation committee. 
Leedy and Ormrod (2010), Berg (1998), King and Horrocks (2010) and Feagin, 
et al. (1991) provided the analytical framework and analysis techniques for a case study. 
Creswell (2009) offers research design techniques for the use of qualitative, quantitative 
and mixed methods approaches to conducting and designing a research product.  He 
provides an overview of how to select the proper research design for a qualitative study 
71 
along with the method to use for inquiry, such as in the case of using interviews.  The 
inductive method used in this dissertation provides a logical flow from selecting the 
interview questions that offer the researcher the ability, using open ended questions, to 
analyzing the data collected from the interviewee into themes or categories (Creswell, 
2009). The data were coded using open coding to identify concepts that emerged from 
the responses of the participants (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, p. 101).  
Research Design 
 An open-coding technique was used, then analyses were conducted and 
compiled with the aim of drawing a conclusion as to what were the perceptions of the 
participant’s in relation to the organization, leadership, US support and communications 
of the AU during the execution of AMIS 
Analytical Strategy  
The data were divided into five categories using a color code scheme.  Each 
code had a color associated with the questions asked from the in-depth semi-structured 
interviews to ensure stability, accuracy and reproducibility without changing the codes 
over time (Campbell, Quincy, Osserman & Pedersen, 2013).  The responses of the 
participants were coded according to the best fit of the 4 key sub-questions of the study 
and the fifth code was associated with responses that fell outside of the 4 key sub-
questions.  
Validity 
Qualitative methodology differs from quantitative methodology in that the 
researcher selects the “lens” based on the views of the participants and those who 
conduct the study rather than the numeric validity methods used in qualitative methods 
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(Creswell and Miller, 2000, p. 125).  Although this study was not ethnographic in the 
traditional sense of spending time observing the subjects, each participant in this study 
had been observed by the researcher in the execution of their duties, and thus the study 
follows the paradigm assumption of establishing validity of the data through prolonged 
exposure to the study topic (Creswell and Miller, 2000, p. 127).  The length of time 
between the execution of AMIS and the interview of the participants, 10 to 11 years, 
may present a threat to validity. 
Assumption and Scope 
 An assumption is that the AU will continue on its current path to develop the 
capability to conduct peace support operations based on its findings from former peace 
operations on the continent, such as AMIS.  The case study captured data not currently 
available and added to the current body of research and will be of value to future 
research for US as well as provide international knowledge of the leadership, 
organization and communication challenges that the AU faced in executing AMIS and 
the challenges of US support of an African peacekeeping mission. 
 The scope of this research was limited to AMIS for the period January 2004 to 
January 2007 that consisted of AMIS I, AMIS II, and AMIS IIE (Enhanced), 
collectively known as AMIS. It did not include the ongoing mission that now includes 
the UN, which is a hybrid force organization that is African-led due to the demands of 
the Government of Sudan. The current organizational structure and mandate is the 
African Union-UN Hybrid Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) and was not examined in this 
study. 
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Researcher as Interviewer 
The researcher for this dissertation was the sole interviewer and researcher for 
this entire dissertation, using scholarly research articles, official documents, and 
participant perceptions as the basis for this study.  No other researcher or interviewer 
was used to conduct this study.  An outside transcriber was used to transcribe the verbal 
recordings from the face-to-face interviews that were recorded on a digital recorder.  
The transcriber was not provided with the key to the identity of the participants.  The 
transcriber destroyed any paper or electronic version of the transcription after 
confirmation that the researcher had received the transcription of the recordings.  Once 
the researcher was in possession of the transcription, each digital recording was erased 
and dubbed over with silent recording in order to delete any recording trace of the 
participants.   
The researcher and interviewer for this study is a doctoral student in the 
University of Oklahoma Doctor of Philosophy program in Organizational Leadership 
housed under the university’s Advanced Programs division.  The researcher completed 
the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI) training in January 2014 and 
updated the CITI training in December 2015.   The University of Oklahoma IRB was 
initially approved in January 2015 for a series of face-to-face interviews and updated in 
December 2015 to included interviews via email when the potential participant was at a 
remote or distant location or when a potential participant made a request for an 
interview through email due to lack of time to sit for an interview.  The interviews were 
conducted by the researcher from June 2015 through March 2016. 
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Limitations of the Methodology 
The researcher found that the face-to-face interview that was not recorded 
brought forth a smaller yield of material than the interviews that were recorded.  Taking 
notes in that interview was difficult to accomplish while attempting to listen to and 
capture the exact words of the participant.   Another limitation was observed in the use 
of an email to elicit responses.  The participant who was offered an interview through 
email took much longer to respond and did not offer the same volume of response as 
those who were recorded live.  The researcher observed that there was a limitation in 
the responses of those being interviewed in that the participant often failed to directly 
answer the question posed. 
Post-interview Procedures 
The interviews that were captured through the use of a digital recorder where 
loaded onto Drop Box and sent to the graduate student in the Department of Sociology 
at the University of Oklahoma for transcription to written form.  The interviewer took 
few notes during the interviews that were recorded but did note if there were any 
emotions or facial expressions displayed by the interviewees throughout the interview.  
In the one interview where a digital recorder was not used, the interviewer immediately 
went back over his notes in order to capture the words and thoughts of the interviewee 
while his memory was fresh.    
The researcher offered each interviewee a copy of the transcription for 
authentication of accuracy.  All but one of the interviewees declined the offer to be 
provided a copy of the transcriptions.  The one participant who requested a copy of the 
transcription did not challenge or make any comment on the interview transcription. 
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The transcriptions and any notes were locked in a container located at the office 
of the researcher’s place of employment, which is located within a secure building with 
multiple layers of check points and access codes.  No other researcher or individual, 
outside of the transcriber, had access to the digital recordings or transcriptions or notes.  
Once the defense of the dissertation is completed and approved, all transcriptions and 
notes will be destroyed through a mulch shredder. 
Woven into the challenges faced by the AU from the perspective of US senior 
officials who worked AMIS is the theory of transformational and transaction leadership 
as well as cross cultural and organizational communication theory.  The researcher was 
careful not to inject his own ideas about the AU and AMIS and elicited the data “solely 
from the vantage point of” the participants (Lofland, et al., 2006, p. 62). 
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Chapter 4 
Analysis of the Data 
Study Parameters 
 This chapter uses four sections that capture the perceptions of the eight 
senior US officials who were respondents, using four key questions that address the 
main question.  The use of a testable hypothesis was not appropriate for this qualitative 
study that possessed a small population.   
Main Question and Key Sub-Questions 
The main question of the study, “What were the challenges of that the African 
Union (AU) faced in executing the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)” used the 
perspective of US senior officials who had worked directly with the AU during the time 
period of 2004-2007, either in part or during the entire time period.  The main question 
is addressed through the use of four key sub-questions dealing with the organizational 
structure, the leadership, and the communication of the AU as well as US support to the 
AU during AMIS. 
Profile of the Sample 
 In order to elicit robust and honest perceptions of the population, many of whom 
are still engaged in their careers, the participants were offered anonymity and are not 
listed by name anywhere in the study to protect their identity.  The respondents were all 
senior US officials at the time of AMIS.   The Department of State as well as the 
Department of Defense were represented in this study. Three (37.5%) respondents were 
from the Department of Defense (DoD) and five (62.5%) respondents were from the 
Department of State (DoS).  The time that each participant of this study represented the 
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US in supporting the AU (during AMIS) ranged from 1 to 3 years. Three years 
represented the entire period the AU’s execution of AMIS.  Table 2 illustrates the 
length of time spent by the US senior officials supporting the AU during AMIS that 
ranged from one year to three years (entire mission) with a mean of 2.25 years and a 
mode of 2 years (4 respondents). 
Profile of the Participants 
 Table 2 presents the time frame and parent organization of the participants of 
this study: 
 
Table 2 Participant Organization and Time with African Union 
Interview Participant Department Years working AU 
      
1 State 3 
2 State 3 
3 State 2 
4 State 2 
5 State 2 
6 Defense 3 
7 Defense 2 
8 Defense 1 
  
Four of the face-to-face interviews were conducted at the participant’s office or 
within the office complex.  Three of the face-to-face interviews were conducted at the 
residents of the participants at their request.   
Data Collection of Key Sub-Questions 
The participants of the study provided their insight relating to the challenges of 
organization facing the AU and AMIS.  The following responses were captured from 
the study participants for each key sub-question: 
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Key Sub-Question 1 
Organizational Structure: What were the challenges for the African Union 
organizational structure in executing the African Union Mission in Sudan? 
 
The Structure of the AU: 
 The challenges that the organizational structure of the AU has been examined 
through the scholarly literature and found to be lacking.  The organizational design of 
the AU was examined through the perspective of senior US officials through interviews.  
The study participants provided an overview of the organization of the AU and the 
organizational challenges faced by the AU during the time frame of AMIS. One 
participant commented: 
 
The AU was suffering from a lack of structure and a lack of, you know, history 
and skill and staff, and everything else. 
 
The participants had a view of the AU, as a multi-national organization, as a 
nascent organization.  The design of the AU was believed to have been built on the 
model of the UN and the European Union (EU), as a hybrid of those two organizations, 
whose purpose for existence was the start of new era of African independence at the end 
of the period of colonization.  The AU was seen as a 53-member organization that was 
formed so that Africa, as a continent, could determine its own fate when dealing with 
economic and political engagement. Participants in the research had the following to 
say: 
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…a multi-national organization that was comprised of 53 states. Its structure 
resembles closely to that of a hybrid between the UN and the European Union. 
Clear the organization was relatively new at that point, the outgrowth of the 
Organization of African Unity whose primary focus was liberation of colonized 
countries on the African continent with the end--with the last or next to last 
country achieving its independence roughly about 1994, South Africa, only 
leaving western Sahara under this colonized umbrella. The African Union was 
created to move forward since its prior mission had been nearly completed with 
again the exception of western Sahara 
 
Their primary purpose was to determine economic development, political 
engagement and to act as one voice when engaging primarily with the UN. The 
African countries, in particular, are noted for their block voting within the UN in 
organization. There was also a direct relationship with the EU, with the OAS, 
the Organization of American States as well, and with the Arab League. 
 
…so, it was just sort of a nascent time for AU peace operations. 
 
…I do remember them standing up the new Peace and Security Council.  
 
A lack of organizational depth was viewed as a challenge by one respondent.  The depth 
of the Peace and Security Commission was only one deep. 
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Hierarchically, the Peace and Security Commission had only one entity, the 
Peace and Security Department.   
 
Some of the respondents felt that the AU possessed structural and organizational 
flaws but that the AU should be recognized for its intervention policy in Africa, 
specifically Sudan, with launching AMIS.  However, it was pointed out, that AMIS was 
not the first mission that the AU had been involved within the continent.  One 
participant wanted to ensure that the AU was recognized for the political will that was 
demonstrated by the AU as significant: 
 
As for the AU organization structure--well it wasn't the first mission that the 
African Union had conducted a peace operation on the continent, so I think it's 
important to note the political will of the organization is significant. 
 
The study participants suggested the idea of the newness of the organization and 
that the AU was not a developed organization.  Not every participant had thought 
through the organizational challenges or faulted the organization of the AU due to the 
fact that the AU was just a young organization:  
 
There were organizational challenges but I never really thought about it …since 
the AU was just getting started. 
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It wasn't a developed organization, so it had no choice. It was going to be 
involved in such a serious matter to rely on the outside world, really. I don't 
think they could have repaired or done too much different themselves, honestly. 
 
I didn’t fault them for their organization shortfalls –I never really thought on 
how they could improve the organization per se. 
 
A respondent believed that the AU was lacking.  The lack was due to the AU not 
being a developed organization.  Given the way the organization was designed and the 
background of the staff, the participant did not see how the AU could have done a better 
job at the time of AMIS: 
 
 I mean just all around lacking really. I don't think that they could have done, 
necessarily, could have done too much more given the way they were. It's 
almost like saying if you had a developed organization what could have done 
better.  Challenges. It wasn't a developed organization, so it had no choice. It 
was going to be involved in such a serious matter to rely on the outside world, 
really. I don't think they could have repaired or done too much different 
themselves, honestly. 
 
However, the interview subjects did not see the problems faced by the AU is 
limited to that organization.  There was the perception among the participants that the 
challenges faced by the AU were believed to be an issue that every new organization 
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faces in adaptability—that of structural organization. 
 
I think because it was very brand new, really, the fact it wouldn’t have had the 
history or back ground or structure to be able to cope with something on the 
scale of trying to, you know, stop a genocide basically (laughs) on its own, and 
it’s not something that you could just create out of thin air, um you know, even 
very developed countries face challenges when they are trying to put into place 
some major operation and these guys were brand new and didn't really have any 
structure to be able to do that, and uh the staff to be able to do it. 
 
Basically, from what I recall the peace and security counsel of the African 
Union was just about to get up and running; I was there for the launch of it. So 
prior to that, of course the organization for African Unity had transitioned to the 
African Union and then it created this special peace and security counsel to deal 
with matters of peace and security of course. 
 
The AU acted unilaterally to the crisis in Sudan: 
Added to the view of the AU’s intervention in Sudan, was a participant’s belief 
that the AU acted on its own when the EU and the international community had not 
been willing to intervene in Darfur.  Despite some structural and financial challenges 
there was the attitude that the AU had accomplished on its own a mission the 
Organization of American States and the Arab League had never done as an 
organization. This participant commented: 
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The OAS, the Arab League, none of those organizations have ever intervened on 
their own in a country, and its only recently that in the last--at that point no other 
entity, including EU, had been willingly intervene. So first of all I want to 
applaud the African Union despite maybe some structural or financial 
challenges. 
 
There was also the belief that there would not have been an AMIS-style peacekeeping 
mission in western Sudan without the AU: 
 
There would have been no peacekeeping mission except for an AU 
peacekeeping mission. 
 
Not all participants agreed on the effectiveness of the AU launching AMIS and 
demonstrated that the AU possessed a challenge with executing AMIS in Sudan due to 
the Government of Sudan.  One respondent went as far as indicating the AU’s decision 
to initiate AMIS was not well thought out by the organization: 
 
Well, first of all I would start with the decision to launch AMIS is one that was 
not well thought out.  
 
Sovereignty Issues related to Organization: 
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Along with Sovereignty of a member state of the AU, the ability to exercise its 
own expertise in peacekeeping and availability of personnel and equipment, allowed 
certain countries to exercise more leverage in AMIS.  The ability of a nation to operate 
unilaterally also surfaced in regarding to operating in AMIS. 
 
I think between the sheer size of the Nigeria forces and Nigeria's experience in 
West Africa in peace keeping missions under ECOWAS and then under the AU 
umbrella. It was seen that they had the greatest amount of experience, so 
therefore at the lead. The Algerian's because of their own constitutional--this is 
where we come back to the AU and individual sovereignty does not put boots on 
the ground in other countries, but they're one of the best equipped on the 
continent in terms of airlift capability and very efficient in their ability to do 
that. 
 
So in terms of political, the Rwandan's, I think, had second in command on the 
ground. The Rwandan's were particularly instrumental in terms of their own 
historical background having undergone and been the victims of genocide at one 
point, but at the same time not only--they were the ones who rescued 
themselves, so, what irony in that sense. 
 
The challenges of the organization of the AU could have its positive aspects 
with its inclusiveness of its member states as described by the participants.  The 
sovereignty of the member states was also a challenge that was brought forth by the 
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participants.  However, some participants pointed out the challenge to reality of member 
states acting as a coalition was not a negative aspect or challenge for the AU:  
 
The AU doesn't force any nation state in this case to participate, so it is a 
coalition of the willing just like with the UN. The challenge for--and challenges 
aren't necessarily negative, and I think that's important to note. 
 
So, in this particular I think you have the best of both worlds--the AU is 
following the structure of the UN, the AU like the UN, has demonstrated the 
political will to commit troops on the ground, but like any sovereign entity it has 
the right to say what its unwilling to have to do, and the AU, like the UN, must 
get the permission of the country to enter, otherwise you--the risk of declaring 
war comes about. 
 
Sovereignty was an issue, as well, for the peacekeeping forces, as they came 
from different countries:    
 
Peacekeeping missions comes down to the sovereignty and putting their troops 
under the command of an organization, and not of a country. 
 
Along with Sovereignty of a member state of the AU, the ability to exercise its 
own expertise in peacekeeping and availability of personnel and equipment, allowed 
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certain countries to exercise more leverage in AMIS.  The ability of a nation to operate 
unilaterally also surfaced in regarding to operating in AMIS. 
 
I think between the sheer size of the Nigeria forces and Nigeria's experience in 
West Africa in peace keeping missions under ECOWAS and then under the AU 
umbrella. It was seen that they had the greatest amount of experience, so 
therefore at the lead. The Algerian's because of their own constitutional--this is 
where we come back to the AU and individual sovereignty does not put boots on 
the ground in other countries, but they're one of the best equipped on the 
continent in terms of airlift capability and very efficient in their ability to do 
that. 
 
So in terms of political, the Rwandan's, I think, had second in command on the 
ground. The Rwandan's were particularly instrumental in terms of their own 
historical background having undergone and been the victims of genocide at one 
point, but at the same time not only--they were the ones who rescued 
themselves, so, what irony in that sense. 
 
There was a challenge related to sharing the vision of the AU as opposed to the norms 
of the culture of the individual sovereign nations.  The view of the participants 
recognized that they were observing the AU and AMIS from the cultural lens of a 
western perspective. 
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I don't think there was a broad shared vision. I think each contingent region had 
their own views on how things should be done. 
 
…I mean I can be this western person saying, well this how they could have 
done it better, but when you look, they’re playing that the hand that they have 
been dealt. 
 
The sovereignty right of each nation in Africa could be an impediment and 
challenge to any peacekeeping mission, such as AMIS, that the AU must navigate.  In 
particular, the host nation or the nation that accepts a peacekeeping force has sovereign 
rights under the AU charter. Several of the interview subjects noted this: 
 
And no country to date right now is willing to give up its sovereign authority. 
 
Sudan provided and what ceiling amounts of AU and peacekeeping troops its 
willing to take on its soil with AMIS. 
 
Looking at the challenges would be, uh getting the cooperation first of all of the 
host country.  Sudan held up, unfortunately, at its port for a long time--supplies, 
equipment, vehicles, which didn't totally undermine the mission, but slowed 
setting up the mission down. 
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…given the impediments of the host country, the Sudanese government, had in 
place, I think even with the best of organizational structures this was a 
horrendous undertaking to put troops on the ground. We couldn't get a UN force, 
so I think the Sudanese government refused a UN force, so it's important to note. 
 
I don't know what the official understandings were at the high level between the 
government of Sudan and who clearly did not want us there, but compromised to 
allow the AU to come in instead of the UN. 
 
Sovereignty was an issue, as well, for the peacekeeping forces, as they came 
from different countries:    
 
Peacekeeping missions comes down to the sovereignty and putting their troops 
under the command of an organization, and not of a country. 
 
The Government of Sudan related to AMIS: 
A key issue for the AU in launching AMIS was the reluctance of the 
Government of Sudan of having any sort of intervention on its soil.  It was pointed out 
that the Government of Sudan allowed the AU to launch AMIS on its soil as a 
compromise to not having UN peacekeepers in western Sudan. 
 
AMIS is a challenging one because the Sudanese government under President 
Bashir was opposed to any kind of intervention into his country. At that 
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particular point in time, it was a compromise to have AMIS go into Darfur 
rather than a UN mission, so he was definitely opposed to a UN mission, and it 
was also shortly after the US intervention into Iraq. 
 
I don't know what the official understandings were at the high level between the 
government of Sudan and who clearly did not want us there, but compromised to 
allow the AU to come in instead of the UN. 
 
      There were more than the challenges related to sovereignty from the host nation.  
Each member state of the AU had its own sovereignty issue: 
 
Most countries are unwilling to subjugate their military force to someone else's 
command, and until nation states in general are willing to do that-- the 
Nigerian's were just like the US (laughs) in the sense that the US's role in 
peacekeeping missions is primarily as observers, and they’re unwilling to put 
their troops under anyone else's command. So the Nigerian government, as the 
hegemonic power, considers itself the hegemonic power on the continent, was 
also not willing to so easily have its troops under. 
 
The sovereignty right of each nation in Africa could be an impediment and 
challenge to any peacekeeping mission, such as AMIS, that the AU must navigate.  In 
particular, the host nation or the nation that accepts a peacekeeping force has sovereign 
rights under the AU charter. Several of the interview subjects noted this: 
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And no country to date right now is willing to give up its sovereign authority. 
 
Sudan provided and what ceiling amounts of AU and peacekeeping troops its 
willing to take on its soil with AMIS. 
 
Looking at the challenges would be, uh getting the cooperation first of all of the 
host country.  Sudan held up, unfortunately, at its port for a long time--supplies, 
equipment, vehicles, which didn't totally undermine the mission, but slowed 
setting up the mission down. 
 
…given the impediments of the host country, the Sudanese government, had in 
place, I think even with the best of organizational structures this was a 
horrendous undertaking to put troops on the ground. We couldn't get a UN force, 
so I think the Sudanese government refused a UN force, so it's important to note. 
 
I don't know what the official understandings were at the high level between the 
government of Sudan and who clearly did not want us there, but compromised to 
allow the AU to come in instead of the UN. 
 
The participants of the study also noted that progress with the establishment and 
sustainability of AMIS was often hampered by the Government of Sudan impeding the 
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movement of peacekeepers and equipment.  The local government also impeded the 
movement of the peacekeepers and denied access to certain areas. 
 
I say there was a challenge was dealing with the Sudanese government. The 
Sudanese government, they're very good at getting to “yes” diplomatically and 
never getting to “yes” administratively. So they will say yes, yes, yes at the 
diplomatic negotiation. Sure you can bring in all the people you want. We’re 
going to be happy to help you, and then when those people start to arrive...oh. 
They haven't had this immunization. They haven't had this--uh we didn't tell you 
had to have these documents. Oh, no, no you can't bring those weapons in, you 
have to have this form filled out, so the administration burden of dealing with 
the Sudanese. 
 
Because the resources for the base camps, supplies for the troops on the ground, 
supplies for the victims of the genocide on the ground were delayed by Sudan.  
Holding up personnel in the airport, detaining them for a time or confining them 
to the airport, were tactics of intimidation and threat to the foreign personnel.   
 
The fact that the local governmental structures in the Darfur region also 
provided an impediment to the progress of the mission and its mobility in the 
region. These were things again where you had a non-cooperative--they would 
probably say that they were cooperative given the fact that you were in their 
country, but they at every turn, the Sudanese government, both the national and 
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the local government, time and time again put impediments in the way. The 
point with the local government by restricting access to certain key areas with 
their local militia on the ground. 
 
There was a perception that the Government of Sudan, through bombing placed 
the local population at risk as well as the peacekeepers of AMIS.  The peacekeepers 
were also impaired by the Sudanese military and the militia that was sponsored by the 
Government of Sudan: 
 
With the national government, by continuing to bomb in key areas of the Darfur 
region, which not only put the lives of Darfurians in danger, but also put the 
lives of the peacekeepers who were there to observe them, as well as the non-
governmental organizations who were providing humanitarian support to them.  
 
So the bureaucratic structures of the Sudanese government were a major 
impediment to things as well as their use of military forces, as well as their use 
of the local militia. 
 
…the problem was getting the resources to them through the host country. No 
change in structure could have changed that. So unless the Sudanese government 
was willing to be more cooperative it wouldn't have mattered much on the 
ground the ability of them to affect. 
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The AU had a reluctance to push Sudan too far and didn’t possess the leverage 
or political process it needed to force Sudan to accept the demands of the AU and 
AMIS. 
 
I think one of the problems was that the African Union had very little leverage 
on Sudan itself other than supportive sanctions. I think part of that maybe was 
the political culture. Again, they’re just moving from non-difference to non-
interference, and so there was some reluctance to push Sudan too hard. 
 
I think one of the observations was that Darfur was part of a complicated subset 
of an even greater complex set of issues. What was Winston Churchill’s' "Every 
riddle in an enigma" or something like that. But um, you know one of the 
observations of Mr. Wan, who was then head of the peace and security 
department of the African Union and now is the Secretary General for 
Peacekeeping at the UN, was that  at the same time that the AU and international 
partners were working on Darfur there had to be implementation of the 
comprehensive peace agreement and there were a lot of north/south issues that 
hadn't been resolved, and I think we see that now with the situation in Sudan 
arguably has degraded, right?  
 
Not only do you have the concern about Darfur, but then you still have tension 
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between north and south and indeed within the South Sudan itself, it’s sort of 
imploding. I think in hindsight there were a lot of things uh in 2004 that were 
much more complicated that weren't being addressed. I think one point of it 
probably is peacekeeping is necessary, but not sufficient, right, to address 
conflict. You need to have a political process? 
 
The participants of the study also noted that progress with the establishment and 
sustainability of AMIS was often hampered by the Government of Sudan impeding the 
movement of peacekeepers and equipment.  The local government also impeded the 
movement of the peacekeepers and denied access to certain areas. 
 
I say there was a challenge was dealing with the Sudanese government. The 
Sudanese government, they're very good at getting to “yes” diplomatically and 
never getting to “yes” administratively. So, they will say yes, yes, yes at the 
diplomatic negotiation. Sure, you can bring in all the people you want. We’re 
going to be happy to help you, and then when those people start to arrive...oh. 
They haven't had this immunization. They haven't had this--uh we didn't tell you 
had to have these documents. Oh, no, no you can't bring those weapons in, you 
have to have this form filled out, so the administration burden of dealing with 
the Sudanese. 
 
Because the resources for the base camps, supplies for the troops on the ground, 
supplies for the victims of the genocide on the ground were delayed by Sudan.  
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Holding up personnel in the airport, detaining them for a time or confining them 
to the airport, were tactics of intimidation and threat to the foreign personnel.   
 
The fact that the local governmental structures in the Darfur region also 
provided an impediment to the progress of the mission and its mobility in the 
region. These were things again where you had a non-cooperative--they would 
probably say that they were cooperative given the fact that you were in their 
country, but they at every turn, the Sudanese government, both the national and 
the local government, time and time again put impediments in the way. The 
point with the local government by restricting access to certain key areas with 
their local militia on the ground. 
 
There was a perception that the Government of Sudan, through bombing placed 
the local population at risk as well as the peacekeepers of AMIS.  The peacekeepers 
were also impaired by the Sudanese military and the militia that was sponsored by the 
Government of Sudan: 
 
So, the bureaucratic structures of the Sudanese government were a major 
impediment to things as well as their use of military forces, as well as their use 
of the local militia. 
 
…the problem was getting the resources to them through the host country. No 
change in structure could have changed that. So unless the Sudanese government 
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was willing to be more cooperative it wouldn't have mattered much on the 
ground the ability of them to affect. 
 
The staffing shortage and size of the AU’s organizational structure as well as member 
state participation level: 
There was the view that the structure of the AU and being inclusive of all 
member states was both a “gift and a curse” for the AU due to the broadness of its 
structure, much like the issues related to the UN. For example, one participant 
commented: 
 
…the structure has to be so broad in order to allow countries to participate.  If 
you start to refine it even further, then many of those countries would be 
unwilling to participate. So, the structure has to have flexibility, and like the UN 
that flexibility is both a gift and a curse (laughs) at the same time. Because if 
you started to say that every country had to provide this number of troops, then 
countries would be giving up their sovereign authority. 
 
The AU had a strong diplomatic engagement within and outside of Africa.  The 
ability of the AU to engage diplomatically was seen as the avenue for the AU to 
expedite the development of AMIS: 
 
The AU's diplomatic engagement with both Africa--within the structure of the 
AU was critical to facilitate, the bringing together of the mission, as well as their 
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diplomatic engagement with non-African countries, to expedite things. 
 
Diplomatic engagement was important…I didn’t want to reorganize the AU - I 
just wanted to have input so the US was not excluded.  Input into their thinking. 
I wanted a dialogue.  Have to talk to people if you are going to influence them. 
 
The AU was challenged by its organization personnel staffing and the relatively 
small size of the organization.   The lack of a sizable personnel force with the AU 
appeared to be a challenge to the participants.  The personnel configuration of the Peace 
and Security Commission was specially mentioned as being “undermanned”: 
 
…one challenge would be the size of the personnel in the peace and security 
commission. It's a very small office. Roughly maybe a total of anywhere 
between 5 and 8 personnel total. 
 
The AU Peace and Security Council, and particularly the “permanent party” 
secretariat who were there to support the PSC fulltime, were woefully 
undermanned.   
 
I don't think for organizations of that type the staffing is appropriate because 
there were 53 countries just like UN. 
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Although there were some talented individuals within the AU, the overall lack 
of support staffing to handle “everything” was seen as a challenge to the AU in 
executing its everyday mission set as well as AMIS.  The level of expertise was 
mentioned as lacking by study participants, along with a shortage of personnel. 
 
(Long pause) yeah, I mean everything just seems very ad hoc. That's the overall 
impression I had always. Some are very ambitious and well-meaning people and 
some very talented people…but not enough people and not enough background, 
and not enough structure, not enough resources, and not enough support staff 
was a challenge.  So, there is only so much a few talented people can do and 
really that created an extreme reliance on developed countries for everything. 
 
At one point, there was this commodore, this Ethiopian commodore, and later an 
officer from, Madagascar, as the head of AMIS but again very thinly staffed. 
 
The biggest challenges as an organizational structure again, not sufficient 
number of personnel to handle everything.  Personnel who were permanent 
enough without the expertise that they needed at the time 
 
The general consensus of the participants was there was a lack of personnel to 
staff the organization, to include the Peace and Security Commission.  The “thin staff” 
and the “lack” of personnel was a challenge that the participants offered in their 
responses about the organizational challenges faced by the AU: 
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…a small organization having to handle things that they were not yet prepared 
to do. 
 
…because not just in the peace and security part of the organization, but 
throughout the larger structure, their personnel staffing is very small. That has 
provided real challenges to the level of efficiency that an organization, which 
has such great heart and political will to operate, has been challenged by. 
 
…very thinly staffed they had very thin then administrative base as well, you 
know maybe one secretary and one runner here or there. They were usually local 
Ethiopians doing those jobs and you know we we're being in a meeting with 
somebody who was supposed to be kind of starting to plan out this, you know, 
deployment you know, African forces to Darfur and at the same hand had to 
leave to actually go make a photo copy and to book his own tickets and all these 
types of things, basically just extremely thinly stretched. 
 
Telephones didn't necessarily work you know just very bare basics and didn't 
really have any type of like a crisis management structure per say, like if you 
would think of a task force; it didn't really exist. 
 
…again, at the time, I mean if you look at the other thing is the lack in the 
overarching structure of the African Union. 
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It’s just--with the new organization that's just-- I keep repeating myself--that's 
you know, thinly staffed, extremely thinly staffed has you know, of course a 
huge deal of political baggage that they have to deal with. 
 
The AU lacked personnel… 
 
The AU guidance and level of skilled personnel: 
In addition to a personnel shortage in the organization, the AU personnel had 
insufficient guidance and lacked skilled personnel to understand the scope of the 
organization.   The AU did not always have the expertise in knowledge and experienced 
personnel to launch such missions as AMIS and depended heavily on international 
partners for the technical aspects of developing plans and documents needed to for 
deploying forces into AMIS, as noted by several of the study participants: 
 
...not just personnel, but personnel who are equipped with the skills to 
understand the rest of the world's processes… 
 
Another weakness was the organization’s not having sufficient personnel to 
manage on daily basis and to understand the scope of the mission. 
 
The personnel at the AU didn’t always possess the necessary skill set to 
complete the tasks required for deploying a force into Darfur.  The international 
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partners were key in assisting the AU with the documentation and plans.   I saw 
where the US personnel would start out assisting the Africans at the AU with 
such plans and then one-by-one the AU personnel would melt away and the plan 
was completed by the US and international partners. 
 
I think AMIS was just starting and the AU didn’t have a blue print or the 
organizational structure for what the AU was trying to do. 
 
The Africans just didn’t have the organizational structure to handle the issues of 
deploying a force.  
 
The Africans assigned to the AU were in a sense African bureaucrats and not 
people with specialized knowledge and all of a sudden, they had to come up 
with things and they didn’t know how to which is why it was important to have 
the US there as advisors. They were smart and no issue with intelligence, they 
just lacked experience. 
 
The African union depends solely on international support both in day-to-day 
operation and special programs and in running any type of peace support 
operations. 
It was the quality of the personnel not the lack of organization that some participants 
found important with the structure of the AU: 
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…it’s more the quality of the people they had and whether those people most 
important how they accomplish their tasks or that they accomplish rather than 
looking at their lack of organization.  I saw in important to improve the 
implementation of the idea rather than the organization. 
 
The number of skilled personnel at the AU was another challenge to the 
organization of the AU.  The personnel and staff of the AU were seen as learning on the 
job as opposed to possessing the requisite skill set required for the AU.  There was a 
perception that there was a lack of technical expertise for managing the AU itself: 
 
So, really kind of learning and making--I wouldn't say making it up while they 
went a long, but really relying a lot on outside expertise as they went along. 
 
With regards to the AU itself, completely lacked the required personnel and 
technical expertise, facility, and material to manage the deployment mission 
called AMIS.  Small number of people without expertise, logistical, financial to 
manage AMIS and everything else, God bless them. 
 
Personnel lacked technical expertise –task responsible and didn’t possess 
logistical facility/equipment and facility with mission.   
 
Ops/Sit Center could not perform to its title mission…no material with IT, 
Audio-visual facility. 
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The skill set for the operational needs of AMIS was seen as missing in the AU.  
The participants believed that the AU member states did not provide the experienced 
planners to the AU: 
 
…was always realistic about the limited planning capability he had on his staff, 
and always asked for help there.  I remember a Malagasy Navy Captain (don’t 
recall his name) who was the Commission’s main military deputy, but the guy 
had very little experience or capability to plan a military operation on the scale 
of AMIS. 
 
The charter for the Peace and Security Commission detailed that certain AU 
member nations were supposed to provide military staff officers, planners, etc 
for any crisis.  But those guys were few and far between; and those who showed 
up had little planning experience. 
 
Planners and staff officers who did arrive at the AU were working outside of 
their fields of expertise.  The personnel of the AU had had a difficult task to learn their 
jobs at the headquarters, let alone meet the challenges running a peacekeeping mission 
in Darfur. 
 
Because I mean of course because a lot of these guys were not operating outside 
of their own field. They didn't know their jobs, so they had to learn their jobs 
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while they were setting up this mission. They had to learn their jobs while they 
were trying to do their jobs. 
 
The staff at the headquarters in AMIS--none of these guys had done this before, 
you know? So, they were incredibly challenged to learn a task while they were 
doing it and the additional challenge is you are in Darfur and there's just nothing 
out there… 
 
Well, it was definitely lacking in institutional capacity and experience.  I again, 
AMIS was one of the first, if not the first AU peace operation and so having 
experienced cadre of people on reporting, mandating. 
 
Respondents suggested that there might be a skill difference among different 
individual member militaries supporting AMIS.  The skill levels of one nation might 
have been high or low, depending on the emphasis of the leadership:  
 
That kind of tasking that the Rwandan army when those guys came to AMIS 
came from a speech made to them by their president.  They were tactically 
incredibly proficient and they were aggressive on the ground in terms of 
stopping fighting, breaking up rebel groups from attacking civilians, keeping 
them protected. They were very, very aggressive in this action because their 
president had done that.  As for the Ghanaians, I don't know what the head of the 
Ghanaian Army or the President of Ghana said to the AMIS chief of staff, a 
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colonel, when he came out. I don't know what the marching orders from their 
{Ghana} president. 
 
Even if the AU had had enough personnel they would have lacked the technical 
expertise. 
 
…context of many donors seeking an ear so capacity problem was adversely 
effected by so many donors telling to so few AU ears 
 
AU could give but inadequate because AU lacked the personnel who could do it.   
 
The skill levels of some members of the AU were seen from the standpoint of a 
lack of currency in procedures.  A participant offered that the staff was often not current 
in the tasks that were needed: 
 
And so, you had, Commodore Mesfin, doing budget and finance um, and he was 
an individual from a different era, right? I mean he was--if I recall he was a 
commodore because he was an Ethiopian Navy Officer (laughs), right? When 
Ethiopia, actually wasn't carved into several countries--you know before it 
became land locked became.  
 
Even if the AU had the skilled personnel and a strong knowledge base, there 
was a deficiency in organizational infrastructure and standard operating procedures 
106 
(SOP).  The lack of a standard method to accomplish mission and tasks led to problems 
in the view of study participants:  
 
But the African Union itself was so new to this that there wasn't a sufficient 
level of; there weren't SOPs. There wasn't sort of muscle memory, oh yeah we 
have done this a thousand times…we know how this works. There weren't 
competent administrators, they didn't exist, and there were no rules.  
 
It wasn't, not even UN standards, they didn't…sort of at the operational level 
again nobody in Addis answered the phone after 5:00, if you get a hold of the 
Ambassador who was the political leader of the African mission, African Union 
mission in Sudan. If you could get a hold of him, it was usually on a cellphone. 
 
The AU was so new to this that there wasn't a sufficient level of experience and 
there weren't SOPs. There wasn't sort of muscle memory. 
 
People were creating rules as they went along for you know, the issuance of the ID 
(Identification badge) and the issuance of the medal for the people who participated in 
the mission. The issuance of equipment. Some units showed up with more equipment 
than others. Units couldn't you know, weren't told what to bring really--a just come as 
you sort of are or think best.  So, the muscle memory, the experience, the level of 
admiration competent, rules, all those things. They were a struggle 
 
107 
The challenge of resources and training: 
Coupled with the personnel shortage, there were factors that led the organization 
personnel to not have the will to address the threat posed in AMIS.  The diverse mission 
set of the AU was mentioned by some of the participants as a diversion for the AU’s 
limited resources: 
 
Any number of factors to cause their will to address the threat less than adequate 
 
So, the primary mission of this organization was supposed to be political and 
economic development. Yes, security is a component. Unfortunately, security 
has taken up much too much of its attention, so maybe we would better to say 
that the AU could advert some of this if its resources were allowed to be 
diverted in other places, the political and economic development and social 
development of the continent. 
 
AU could give but inadequate because AU lacked the personnel who could do it. 
 
The lack of training was also a challenge brought forth by the participants.   The 
lack of training was seen as a challenge for ability of the AU to execute a peacekeeping 
mission: 
 
Not having personnel trained to effectively given the mission and any number of 
factors to cause their will to threat less than adequate. 
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…not having personnel trained to effectively given the mission. 
 
…there was no unified training. 
 
I don't think they, correct me if I'm wrong, did they get any sort of training 
before they deployed? 
 
…so the contingent some--the degrees of professionalism in training is another 
factor when you look at the sectors that they were set to and who did what. 
 
The AU and the Peace and Security Commission lacked sufficient personnel as 
well as financial resources.  The payment of dues by the member states were lacking or 
subsidized.  The AU was viewed as having over-dependence on donor countries 
external to Africa: 
 
The resources of the AU peace and security are dependent upon donor countries' 
contributions. Even donor countries within the AU as well as observer countries 
to the AU, so that presents a challenge. However, that's the same challenge that 
the UN faces on a regular basis. You're only as strong as an organization as the 
dues that are paid. 
 
…the areas where it could be more efficient would, if resources permitted, 
broadened the number of the personnel in its peace and security operation. 
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If resources permit to provide more of a, how can I say this, standing area or 
retain equipment that could be used--it's in its infancy in doing that and trying to 
do it, but like most big organizations, resources. 
 
Libya was seen as breaking the membership rules for annual contributions by 
subsidizing economically those nations that could not afford the dues levied by the AU.  
The participants saw the nations that paid dues to the organization as having “undue 
influence” beyond their normal membership over those who did not pay their fair share 
of the membership dues to the AU.  The lack of resources was also seen as not allowing 
the AU to possess autonomy from the international community. This was noted by 
several study participants: 
 
Of the 53 countries at the time, each country is assessed a particular amount of 
dues. There was only one country that bent the rules on that and that was Libya 
by subsidizing, not through the proper channels, but subsidize the payment of 
dues of many of the smaller countries that could not really afford to pay their 
dues and would have been in arrears. 
 
So that's internal challenge that I think their biggest concern about other 
countries paying dues is having undue influence in the organization. There was 
another concern about outside countries providing certain amount of revenue 
over, I would say, would be a standardized amount because then again countries 
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could have an undue influence over other countries and leverage the 
organization in. 
 
So, it’s not quite a catch-22 situation but if the AU is to have the autonomy it 
wants to have then it has to be very careful, which I think it has been in saying 
what kind of resources can be. 
 
The general resources to organize and run the AU were perceived to be lacking.   
Participants viewed the AU as not being able to fund its internal work.  The newness of 
the organization and the reliance on outside funding were seen as a challenge to the 
AU’s operation, by participants: 
 
There is a limit to it seems to budget you know, that's another issue. Not having 
any money for even things internally, you know, like getting taxis and things 
like that… 
 
There is a limit to it seems to budget you know, that's another issue.  
 
Not having any money for even things internally, you know, like getting taxis 
and things like that. I mean just all around lacking really.  I don't think that they 
could have done necessarily, could have done too much more given the way 
they were. It's almost like saying if you had a developed organization what could 
have done better, challenges.  
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Resources related to funding of AMIS in Darfur created a challenge for the AU.  
A challenge to the resources of the AU were those countries that did have the resources 
to support but would not contribute the missions of the AU: 
 
Darfur had major organizational issues related to funding. 
 
…the biggest challenge that the AU has is you have these countries who can 
contribute, but they don't. 
 
However, not every participant believed that the resource shortage experienced 
by the AU was a particular issue related to Africa alone. 
 
But I want to also say that the EU doesn't have this capability either at this time-
-to handle that with more resources and fewer countries. 
 
…the problem for the AU was getting the resources to AMIS through the host 
country 
 
…that until they have the revenue, you can change the structures all you want, 
until they have the capital to support it it’s going to continue to meet and have. 
 
Donor-nation resources: 
There was an organizational challenge processing the resources the AU 
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received. There were occasions that the AU was placed in a position of having to return 
donor financial contributions due the challenge of getting sufficient personnel for 
AMIS, according to study participants: 
 
…their ability to even process the resources they get is challenging. 
 
And until they can plus up to the numbers that they need, their ability to even 
process the resources they get is challenging. Much to my surprise, the AU has 
had to return money back to donor countries because they couldn't--their 
personnel is not sufficient to handle all of the different nation states’ 
requirements. 
 
There was also a challenge with the AU, according to the participants, that dealt 
with the insufficient knowledge possessed within the AU to understand and adhere to 
the standards demanded by donor nations to receive resources.  The lack of skilled 
personnel at the AU was an example of how the AU was deficient in having trained 
personnel to handle the intricate requirements set by donor nations. For example: 
 
 And so, unfortunately not just with AMIS mission, but with other non-peace 
keeping missions…election monitors and all, the AU has resources they can't 
effectively spend because they lack, not just personnel, but personnel who are 
equipped with the skills to understand the rest of the world's processes and how 
to do them in order to meet their standards in order to get money. That alone, 
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even without returning money, they couldn't access money because they didn't 
have enough personnel to give the kind of accountability to process to get the 
money coming in. 
 
I noticed bureaucratic layered needed knowledgeable senior personnel even 
though has the power to make decisions from US perspective were in 
organization structure. 
 
A major challenge was the extremely centralized procedures for donor nations to 
access Peace and Security Council members/officers leading to tremendous 
difficulty in country’s desire to help access. 
 
Personalities and leadership related to organization: 
There was a perception that the head of the Peace and Security Commission, 
Ambassador Djinnit, did recognize that there were limits to his staff having the planning 
capability to run AMIS.  However, Djinnit was viewed as being an optimistic individual 
toward the mission. One research participant noted: 
 
I met several times with Said Djinnit, Commissioner of the Peace and Security 
Commission, who was an impressive guy on his own.  He tended towards 
optimism, but was always realistic about the limited planning capability he had 
on his staff, and always asked for help there. 
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Standard Operating Procedures (SOP): 
In particular, the Peace and Security Commission, according to a participant, 
lacked SOP’s.  The lack of a standard procedure to handle the various tasks led to a 
sense of “discovery” for the Peace and Security Commission personnel: 
 
The Peace and Security Commission lacked Standard Operating Procedures for 
handling tasks and functions—every minor task became a “new discovery.” 
 
Yeah, the AU itself in the same time that the United Nations before DPKO 
{Department of Peacekeeping Operations} was stood up was, you know, relied 
on a series of ad hoc structures, and you know I got the sense that the AU 
commission also at that time was that way. 
 
 
The AU’s lack of a physical infrastructure for monitoring AMIS was seen as a 
challenge, as was communication between the AU and AMIS.  A challenge perceived 
by the participants was the lack of a dedicated infrastructure to handle and support a 
peace operation. Several noted: 
 
I remember once visiting the nascent operations center of the African Union and 
looking you know, forward to seeing sort of the big screens and maybe a live 
speed from Al-Fashir or something like that, and they were watching the World 
Cup, so, yeah. They had a lot of challenges. 
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Yeah, so it just, it hadn't kept up with the times. But, no, it didn't have dedicated 
communications with AMIS.  I think what was lacking was a dedicated 
infrastructure to support peace operations. 
 
You know the Alert Center, but again that was not functioning, you know it was 
rudimentary at best. So, they just lacked general communication infrastructure.  
 
 Organizational Communication: 
The lack of an organized method of communicating was also viewed by 
interview subjects as a challenge to the AU in executing AMIS.  The lack of both 
equipment and strong communication between the force commander of AMIS and the 
AU headquarters was perceived as a challenge. Several commented: 
 
And I'm not sure how they actually physically--I do know that they transmitted 
written reports I think on a weekly and daily basis, but, that is not necessarily 
the most efficient.  
 
I mean that should be one communication mechanism, but a commander should 
be participating probably in daily calls with the AU and I don't know whether 
that happened or not. 
 
…doesn't have the right kind of equipment or any kind of modern 
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communication system.  
 
…one of the things to my knowledge and this is where the United States I think 
was trying to enhance is that from a military standpoint I don't think they had the 
communications infrastructure, i.e., either HF (High Frequency) or FM 
(Frequency Modulation), you know the physical communication capability, you 
know where the field commander could communicate directly. 
 
The Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF): 
Respondents had a view that the AU had taken some positive steps as it 
progressed with AMIS and established the Darfur Integrated Task Force at the AU 
headquarters.  The establishment of the DITF allowed for interaction between the 
Africans and the international partners.  Another positive for the establishment of the 
DITF was that the African were beginning to feel a sense of having to “do it 
themselves.” 
 
AU positive step in 2005 to establish a sub-organization to handle the AMIS 
from the AU headquarters called “DITF” and yet problems didn’t go away in 
organization for the mission.  There was the organization and technical expertise 
to interpret the taxonomy each of the pieces of AMIS, policies and number of 
personnel and training and education of personnel within the organization.  
Facility –ops center lacked the material and equipment needed to be there 
greater that DITF was an improvement. 
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So, you saw these lessons learned by the African's themselves, they learned that 
if we are going to improve, then we have to do it ourselves and we have to 
enable. So, at that time frame I don't think the mindset--you know even though 
they probably could have done it better, the political institution itself was the 
impediment. 
 
I mean the Darfur Intergraded Taskforce got expanded, you know as more 
players came in. So, the UN joined at one point and we had visits from NATO 
folks and stuff like that too. 
 
…one of the mechanisms was this AU DTIF (Darfur Integrated Task Force) and 
there was Partner's Technical Support Group that comprised a lot of the EU 
representatives, NATO, UN and the United States was part of that. 
 
Although the Darfur Integrated Task Force was technically a part of the AU 
headquarters, there was a perception that the physical distance between the Task Force 
and the AU headquarters created a challenge to organization for running AMIS: 
 
The establishment of the Darfur Integrated Task Force at a location outside the 
confines of the AU headquarters caused a challenge for the two organizations in 
staying current. 
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The physical separation of the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), the 
planning cell for AMIS, from the AU headquarters was seen as a challenge for running 
an effective peacekeeping mission: 
 
I recall that the DITF was physically separated from the rest of the AU 
compound, so, obviously, that that was a problem 
 
Decision Making: 
The AU made many of its decisions at AU summits. However, some of the 
participants pointed out that the summits lacked focus and therefore not all the summits 
were able to accomplish what was on the agenda.  The summit members tended to made 
speeches rather than accomplishing the tasks: 
 
…when it came to interfacing the member states, (sigh) it seemed of times at the 
summit, the summits where they make or take decisions on a 1,001 topics, they 
weren't very focused and they could have been better at agenda setting maybe in 
part of the African Union itself because they just ran out of time basically in 
interest or maybe in pre-briefing, and I don't know what could have been done, 
you know to kind of prepare the representatives of the various member states to 
be serious when they actually came to the summits. There was a lot of 
speechifying, a lot of, you know not decisions in a way--declarations, I mean 
that's you know, not uncommon for you know, kind of political organizations to 
begin with, but yeah that happened a lot. 
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The decision making of the AU was often after consultation with the 
international partners as well as the summits.  Since the AU lacked a strong structure, 
history and a staff that was skilled, the AU organization often relied on the international 
partners who had a lot of access, according to a participant: 
 
…I mean I can't recall there being a very--I mean obviously being from the 
outside, we were not necessarily privy to everything to happened internally. We 
weren't at every single internal meeting, although I would say that probably the 
partners had a lot more access and were a much greater part of the decision 
making and agenda setting that would be the normal, but you know they had no 
other choice….(pause) they were suffering from a lack of structure and a lack 
of, you know, history and skill and staff, and everything else, so I didn't sense 
that there was a very concrete set of tasks or commands that they were ordered 
to carry out necessarily 
 
Logistics related organization: 
Logistics and the lack of equipment were mentioned as major organizational 
challenges that the AU faced in exciting AMIS.   The US was instrumental in 
establishing logistics for AMIS, particularly with the development of the base camps in 
Darfur. 
  
120 
I mean the biggest thing, and this comes to as no surprise, is the logistics. I mean 
that is the largest limiting factor to their operation. Because in order to be 
operationally effective you basically need to have strong logistics in the United 
States that wind up through the African program. 
 
You know, they had to build their base camps they had to provide the 
overarching logistics. They didn't have armored vehicles, so from, you know, 
organization from a military standpoint I don't think there was too much of a 
problem, but the biggest limitation was just logistics and sustainability and that's 
where or why they weren't effective, which was because of that. 
 
The opinion of one participant was that AMIS was not able to accomplish its 
mission to react quickly in Darfur.  The AMIS Chief of Staff lamented that the 
organization in Darfur did have the capacity to feed and house the troops.  However, a 
participant perceived that Nigeria did in fact arrive in Darfur with some basic food and 
tents, at least for a couple of days of sustainability in Darfur. 
 
I was told by, I don't remember which it was, either the AMIS chief of staff or 
the deputy, we don't have that capacity and we don't have the ability to move 
that quickly…because we can't feed people because we don't have the tents and 
stuff like that. And I found out somehow that that wasn't accurate. That one of 
the Nigerian units had brought tents with it and had brought at least basics, such 
as a few days of cooking stuff… 
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African militaries often are challenged by logistics, according to participants’ 
experience, in comparison with the US. 
 
...you have quality peacekeepers and then the logistics component as well. But, 
again most African militaries are challenged logistically. 
 
…it’s the classic peacekeeping--you have quality peacekeepers and then the 
logistics component as well...most African militaries are challenged logistically.  
 
…the hospital in Darfur got its first ambulance in 2004. I watched it being 
delivered. They were like, "wow, this is great thanks!" They didn't have an 
ambulance before that.  
 
Doctrine: 
Interoperability and knowledge of how to operate in a joint environment was a 
challenge to the AU and AMIS.  The participants had mixed reviews on how the 
Africans who participated in AMIS performed in peacekeeping and together with 
different military doctrines: 
 
I think there could have probably been better coordination between the 
Nigerians and the Rwandans, but were also bringing, just as a UN mission, two 
different militaries together. So the challenge of interoperability is there, no 
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matter whether it’s an AU force or a UN force or a Coalition of the willing force 
in Iraq, so these are just challenges which come with the territory. 
 
…there was no unified training. So, you have each country basically came with 
their doctrine and with their own perceptions and how did things. The Nigerians 
also have a history of doing peacekeeping. But, again their performances; some 
of it was good some of it is not so good. 
 
Regional challenges to the AU: 
The view point of each Regional Economic Community may be different based 
on region.  ECOWAS and SADC were more advanced in terms of organization and 
experience, observed a participant.  What worked in a region, such as West Africa may 
not have the same dynamic as the issues related to AMIS in Sudan. 
 
And again, part of it is at that time when you look at the Nigerians--if you look 
at ECOWAS at that time was the most advanced regional economic community 
followed by SADC with the East African community and ECOWAS coming in 
behind. But, again, based on the experiences of ECOWAS primarily dealing 
with Sierra Leone and Liberia, they felt, okay, well we know how to do this. 
And the dynamics in West Africa may not have been the same in Darfur. So, 
you can't necessarily say what is good for West Africa doesn't necessarily work 
in Sudan. 
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Rules of Engagement (ROE): 
The participants pointed toward the mandate in addressing the ROE {rules of 
engagement) as a challenge faced by the AU in executing the AMIS mission effectively. 
 
Standardize as much as possible amongst the countries the rules of engagement 
and the kind of the training that countries must come to the table with. 
 
The AU should have had a been given a mission commensurate with threat and 
the equipment commensurate with threat as well as the manning the mission in 
accordance with the threat provided to them with ROE appropriate with the 
threat. 
 
There was also an organizational challenge seen in the mission area of Darfur 
for AMIS, and this challenge was one of infrastructure.  The infrastructure on the 
ground in Darfur was a challenge to executing AMIS as well as the infrastructure at the 
AU headquarters, as one participant lamented about the lack of organization to monitor 
the operations of AMIS from the AU operations center. Research participants noted:     
 
I mean in western Dar province. There were three provinces: North, South, and 
West. In West Darfur there was no paved road. There was not a mere of paved 
road in the entire province. 
 
I think they {AMIS} suffered some of the same challenges that any coalition 
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force would have in infrastructure. 
 
Darfur, I remember very vaguely only that you know, I believe that there is like 
a command center and then various other kind of posts (long pause). 
 
I remember once visiting the nascent up center of the African Union and looking 
forward to seeing sort of the big screens and maybe a live speed from Al-Fashir 
or something like that, and they were watching the World Cup, so, yeah. They 
had a lot of challenges. 
 
Conducting AMIS as an organization: 
There was a challenge for the AU in having a desire to conduct AMIS alone, as 
an African solution to minimize the western influence and mitigate any western 
interference, but the AU needed the US and international donor resources.  The AU had 
an interest in allowing member states the leeway to succeed. 
 
…some of them were wanting to give the member a state a chance to breathe 
and redeem itself. Others wanted to show that the organization was very 
capable. Others wanted to make it look good…I got the sense that they had 
things under control to try and minimize the western you know, impact or 
footprint. I think they definitely had kind of competing interests in a sort of way. 
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There was a challenge related to sharing the vision of the AU as opposed to the 
norms of the culture of the individual sovereign nations.  The view of the participants 
recognized that they were observing the AU and AMIS from the cultural lens of a 
western perspective. 
 
I don't think there was a broad shared vision. I think each contingent region had 
their own views on how things should be done. 
 
…I mean I can be this western person saying, well this how they could have 
done it better, but when you look, they’re playing that the hand that they have 
been dealt. 
 
Future Peacekeeping Missions for the AU: 
  Respondents saw hope for the AU in the future, based on its experience with 
AMIS.  There were suggestions for future peacekeeping operations run by the AU.  The 
participants viewed the AU and its current mission and organization as having learned 
lessons from AMIS that they can apply today. 
 
And again, when you fast forward, when you look at AMIS as the first mission 
the lessons learned and now AMISOM is now touted as the way things should 
be done…then you look at the morphing into the EASTBRIG or the African 
Standby Force, and they have actually taken a step further where they are 
actually building a rapid response force, and in order to be a participant there, 
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you have to fund yourself. So, I mean the good news is here we are in 2016 and 
the lessons learned through AMIS, and they're getting better. 
 
I think again, the best way would have been to be a little more selective in the 
force contribution… 
 
I mean all the things that we take for granted now with the African Union or 
peacekeeping in general, didn't exist a decade ago. 
 
…for our current project on strength and cooperation to the UN secretary and 
the AU we are looking at how the UN's human rights due diligence policy can 
either be adapted or complied with by the African Union itself, and I think 
certainly 10 years ago there was not an emphasis on that sort of thing. It was 
trying to get troops to a critical location as quickly as possible 
 
AMIS transitioned to a UN mission in 2007, but with the same force.  There was 
a belief that just turning the “Green Hats” (AU) to “Blue Hats” (UN) would not address 
any issues of command and control or discipline of the peacekeeping force.  The issue 
of simply renaming a mission from the AU to the UN was viewed as not being entirely 
effective. 
 
…clear lessons learned that simply re-naming AU missions to UN missions 
creates problems with command and control and discipline. 
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But definitely, that was a big concern of you know, the UN and we were looking 
at trying to blue hat the green hats (laughs). Try to convert the AU and AMIS 
into UNAMID. 
 
…having collaboration between the African Union and the United Nations is 
more than just financing its support, so you tease those things apart, and for 
example on logistical support and human rights so this is really something for 
example that’s really just come to the attention of policymakers on UN 
peacekeeping in the last six months, arguably. And certainly a decade ago we 
didn't enough attention to this.  And that I think one of the things that the AU is 
working on now is strengthening accountability.  
 
Summary of Key Sub-Question 1 
Several participants focused on the newness of the organization and that the AU 
was not a developed organization.  The design was perceived to have been built on the 
model of the UN and the European Union (EU), as a hybrid of those two organizations, 
whose purpose for existence was the start of new era of African independence at end of 
the period of colonization.  The AU was seen as a 53-membership grouping that was 
organized so that Africa, as a continent, could determine its own fate when dealing with 
economic and political engagement.   The mission of the AU during AMIS was seen by 
the respondents as different from the mission of the OAU in previous years.  Namely, 
the OAU was designed to deal with the new-found independence of the former colonial 
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states who had won their independence from the European empires.  The AU was 
viewed as dealing with the inter-state and intra-state issues on the continent.  The AU 
made many of its decisions at AU summits. However, some of the respondents pointed 
out that the summits lacked focus and summit members tended to make speeches rather 
than accomplishing the tasks. 
   The challenge of organization facing the AU in executing AMIS encompassed 
a multitude of issues, as relayed by the respondents of the study.    There was an issue 
of infrastructure both in terms of physical environment in Darfur but also in terms of 
AU development and organization.  The mandate, as far as rules of engagement (ROE) 
under which the peacekeepers of AMIS were to operate, was seen as lacking and a 
challenge.  The participants perceived that the AU did not understand the extent of the 
threat its peacekeepers were facing in Darfur. 
The structure of the AU was found to be lacking in personnel, being “thin” on 
personnel and lacking skilled practitioners who had organizational knowledge as well as 
how to conduct a peacekeeping operation.  The organizational depth and under-manning 
were seen as an organizational challenge that the AU faced in running its internal 
organization as well as planning for AMIS.  The AU was challenged by its personnel 
staffing and the relatively small size of the organization.   The lack of a sizable 
personnel force within the AU organization appeared to the participants to be a 
challenge. The personnel configuration of the Peace and Security Commission was 
especially mentioned as being “undermanned.”   There was a perception, however, that 
the head of the Peace and Security Commission, Ambassador Djinnit, did recognize that 
there were limits to his staff having the planning capability to run AMIS. 
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The level of expertise was mentioned as lacking, along with a shortage of 
personnel.  Respondents saw the AU personnel as not having insufficient guidance and 
lacking in skilled personnel to understand the “scope” of AMIS and the organization. 
The AU didn’t always possess the expertise in knowledge and experienced personnel to 
launch such missions as AMIS.  It was the low quality of the personnel not the lack of 
organization that some participants found important about the structural challenges of 
the AU.  There were occasions that the AU was placed in a position of having to return 
donor financial contributions due the challenge of getting sufficient personnel for 
AMIS.  There was a challenge with the AU, according to the participants, that dealt 
with the insufficient knowledge possessed within the AU to understand and adhere to 
the standards demanded by donor nations to receive resources.  The personnel and staff 
of the AU was seen as learning on the job as opposed to possessing the requisite skill 
set required for the AU.  There was a perception that there was a lack of technical 
expertise for managing the AU itself.  The respondents believed that the AU member 
states did not provide the experienced planners to the AU.  Those planners and staff 
officers who did arrive at the AU were working outside of their fields of expertise.  The 
personnel that the AU had had a difficult task to learn their jobs at the headquarters let 
alone meet the challenges running a peacekeeping mission in Darfur, according to the 
respondents.   
Participants suggest that there may be a skill difference among different 
individual member military organizations supporting AMIS.  The skill levels of one 
nation may be high or low depending on the emphasis of the leadership.  There was a 
cultural aspect noticed in the skill level of the enlisted corps versus the officer corps 
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exhibited in African cultures.  One respondent offered that one of the challenges to 
operating in AMIS was the lack of the African non-commissioned officer corps to get 
things done in the field.  There was a challenge in the organization related to the lack 
currency in procedures.  Personnel within the organization lacked the institutional 
knowledge and experience, according to the participants.   
There was also a challenge for the AU in having a desire to conduct AMIS 
alone, as an African solution, and minimizing the western influence and mitigating any 
western interference while still needing the US and international donor resources.  The 
AU had an interest in allowing member states the leeway to succeed.  The AU had 
strong diplomatic engagement within and outside of Africa.  The ability of the AU to 
engage diplomatically was seen as the avenue for the AU to expedite the development 
of AMIS.  The AU depended heavily on international partners for the technical aspects 
of developing plans and documents needed for deploying forces into AMIS to make up 
for its own challenges in organization. Since the AU lacked a strong structure, history 
and a staff that was skilled, the AU organization often relied on the international 
partners who had a lot of access, according to a respondent.   
Although, there were a number of structural challenges facing the AU, there 
were respondents that felt the AU should be recognized for its invention policy in 
Africa and specifically Sudan with launching AMIS, and a respondent wanted to ensure 
that the AU was recognized for the significant political will that was demonstrated by 
the AU.  Added to the view of the AU’s intervention in Sudan was a participant’s belief 
that the AU acted on its own when the EU and the international community had not 
been willing to intervene in Darfur.    Despite some structural and financial challenges 
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there was the attitude that the AU had accomplished on its own a mission the 
Organization of American States and the Arab League had never done as an 
organization.    
Some respondents pointed out the challenges in organization were outweighed 
in that member states were acting as a coalition under the AU organization.  There was 
the view that the structure of the AU, being inclusive of all member states, was both a 
“gift and a curse” for the AU due to the broadness and lack of depth of its structure. 
Not all respondents agreed on the view that the AU should be lauded for launching 
AMIS or that the AU possessed a challenge with executing AMIS in Sudan due to the 
Government of Sudan.  One participant went as far as indicating the AU’s decision to 
initiate AMIS was not well thought out by the organization.  It was pointed out that the 
Government of Sudan allowed the AU to launch AMIS on its soil as a compromise to 
not having UN peacekeepers in western Sudan.  The respondents noted that progress 
with the establishment and sustainability of AMIS was often hampered by the 
Government of Sudan impeding the movement of peacekeepers and equipment.  The 
local government also impeded the movement of the peacekeepers and denied access to 
certain areas.  
Another challenge for the AU was in the view point and interests of each 
regional economic community in Africa having their own view point, which may be 
different based on region.  ECOWAS and SADC were more advanced in terms of 
organization and experience.  What worked in a region such as West Africa may not 
have the same dynamic as the issues related to AMIS in Sudan. 
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Resources were mentioned often as a challenge to the AU and its execution of 
AMIS.  Respondents viewed the AU as not being able to fund its internal organization.  
The newness of the organization and the reliance on outside funding were seen as a 
challenge to the AU’s operation.  The diverse mission set of the AU was mentioned by 
some of the respondents as a diversion for the AU’s limited resources.  The AU and the 
Peace and Security Commission lacked sufficient personnel resources as well as 
financial.  The payment of dues by the member states were lacking or subsidized.  The 
AU was viewed as having over-dependence on donor countries external to Africa.  The 
lack of resources was also seen as a challenge by not allowing the AU to possess 
autonomy from the international community.  The participants saw the nations that paid 
dues to the organization as having “undue influence” beyond their normal membership 
over those who did not pay their fair share of the membership dues to the AU.    A 
challenge to the resources of the AU were those member countries that did have the 
resources but would not contribute the missions of the AU.  The AU itself had to 
depend on the international community as its member states were not financially able to 
provide the financial resources as or the resources in terms of skilled personnel that 
were needed for undertaking a peacekeeping operation the size and complexity of 
AMIS. 
Training as individuals as well as collectively was lacking and presented a 
challenge to the AU and AMIS.   The lack of training was seen as a challenge for the 
ability of the AU to execute a peacekeeping mission.  The lack of skilled personnel at 
the AU was an example of how the AU was deficient in having trained personnel to 
handle the intricate requirements set by donor nations.    
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Communications were a challenge of the AU headquarters as the organizational 
communication was not running efficiently.   The communication between the AU 
headquarters and the commander of AMIS was lacking, as well as, the AU 
organizational communication with the US.  The infrastructure on the ground in Darfur 
was a challenge to executing AMIS as well as the infrastructure at the AU headquarters, 
as one participant lamented about the lack of organization to monitor the operations of 
AMIS from the AU operations center.  
Logistics and the lack of equipment were mentioned as major organizational 
challenges that the AU faced in executing AMIS.   The US was instrumental in 
establishing logistics for AMIS, particularly with the development of the base camps in 
Darfur.  African militaries often are challenged logistically, according to a participant’s 
experience, in comparison with the US.   The AMIS Chief of Staff lamented that the 
organization in Darfur did not have the capacity to feed and house the troops.   
Interoperability and knowledge how to operate in a joint environment was an 
organizational challenge for the AU and AMIS.  The respondents had mixed reviews on 
how the Africans who participated in AMIS performed in peacekeeping and together 
with different military doctrines.  The physical separation of the DITF, the planning cell 
for AMIS, from the AU headquarters was seen as a challenge for running an effective 
peacekeeping mission.  Sovereignty was an issue as well for the peacekeeping forces, as 
they came from different countries. 
 The future of the AU was seen by the respondents as one where the 
organizational challenges could be overcome through the experience of the AU with 
AMIS. There was a belief by some of the study participants that the lessons learned by 
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the AU were used in future operations such as AMISOM and the development of an 
African Standby Force.   AMIS transitioned to a UN mission in 2007 but with the same 
force.  There was a belief that just turning the “Green Hats” (AU) to “Blue Hats” (UN) 
would not address any issues of command and control or discipline of the peacekeeping 
force. The participants viewed the AU and its current mission and organization as 
having learned lessons from AMIS that they can apply today. 
  
Key Sub-Question 2 
Leadership:  What were the leadership challenges for the African Union in executing 
the African Union Mission in Sudan? 
The AU has faced challenges in leadership that have been illustrated in the 
scholarly literature and found to be lacking.  The leadership of the AU and the 
challenges it faced during the time frame that the AU was executing AMIS was 
examined through the perspective of senior US officials through the series of interviews 
for this dissertation.  The respondents provided an overview of the leadership of the AU 
and the leadership challenges: 
 
Leadership related to conducting AMIS: 
 AMIS was a new role for the AU. The AU, as a nascent organization, was trying 
to overcome the short-falls in leadership of the former OAU, and there was a desire to 
hold the leadership of the AU accountable.  The importance was that the AU got the job 
accomplished as an important aspect of leadership. Respondents noted: 
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…the AU was taking on a new role and at the same time attempting to hold the 
leadership of the AU accountable…working on making a sort of report card for 
the leadership and non-corruption and at the same time taking on this new 
mission that they hadn’t done before.   
 
Tremendously new role for the African states particularly on the peace and 
security side on the continent that never done peacekeeping like AMIS… 
 
There were participants that did not form an opinion of the leadership style of the AU.  
There was an expression of how well the job was accomplished as a challenge for the 
AU.  
 
I don’t have any impression of the leadership style of those in AMIS. 
 
I thought it was more important on how they did the job. 
 
Leadership understanding the challenge of AMIS: 
A main leadership challenge faced by the AU was not understanding to scope of 
AMIS.   There was a perception that the leadership challenge often faced in the AU and 
AMIS was a lack of understanding of the scope of AMIS and the followership ability to 
act out the leadership desires: 
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Leading leadership challenges didn’t understand the scope of the mission and 
threat. 
 
Not having personnel trained to effectively complete a given the mission and 
any number of factors to cause their will to address the threat was less than 
adequate 
 
Leading leadership challenges didn’t understand the scope of the mission and 
threat. 
 
Shortfalls of the organization: 
Although some participants perceived that the AU possessed short falls in the 
organization that impeded the mission, they also viewed the leadership of the AU as 
recognizing those shortfalls.  There was a perception that this recognition could be 
viewed as a strength in the leadership of the AU.  This lack of structure in the 
organization was a point that the AU leadership wanted to “remedy.” 
 
Strengths: clear that couple of …in all sincerity, leaders did recognize short falls 
in organization and desired to remedy the same. 
 
…getting better. And they are also realizing that if we want to really be 
effective, we need to be able to do this on our own. 
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…in all sincerity, leaders did recognize short falls in organization and desired to 
remedy the same. 
 
…if increased revenue and resources and more personnel that was what was 
missing. The heart and everything is there.  
 
Vision of a key leader—Ambassador Djinnit: 
Leadership was mentioned as possessing vision.  Ambassador Said Djinnit, 
Commissioner of the Peace and Security Commission, was mentioned as having the 
vision to be an effective leader. 
 
The AU was developing a shared vision and had been working on the continent 
before in ways other than security. 
 
I met several times with Said Djinnit, Commissioner of the PSC (Peace and 
Security Commission), who was an impressive guy on his own.  
 
In addition to possessing vision, some participants saw Djinnit as an impressive leader 
who was able to push forward some agendas in the AU. 
…I thought Said Djinnit was an impressive guy.  Articulate, thoughtful, 
educated, fluent in Arabic, French and English…but pretty much overwhelmed 
with the task at hand when it came to Darfur, which was only one of several 
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conflicts the PSC was trying to deal with at the time.  I don’t think he had any 
military experience, though his diplomatic experience was quite extensive. 
Djinnit pushed the concept of the African Standby Force very hard, but the ASF 
was just a paper concept at the time and had no real structure or resources on the 
ground anywhere. 
So, while yes, there were challenges, they were not insurmountable, and it was 
that level of the head of the peace and security commission, Ambassador 
Djinnit.  Djinnit was the quintessential ambassador.  Djinnit was the 
quintessential diplomat, as well as practitioner…his leadership allowed him to 
overcome some of the difficult structural impediments that came about. And 
they weren't there designed not to have things to work, but like any large 
bureaucratic organization those things are put into place as checks and balances. 
So, I would say, while the institutional structures sometimes presented 
challenges, the leadership of Ambassador Djinnit allowed them to overcome 
those in order to deploy the mission as expeditiously as possible. 
 
It was that diplomatic engagement from Djinnit, Ambassador Djinnit, who also 
came from Algeria and Algeria Status and that--its role in quote, its one foot or I 
would probably say, the Algerian's say one toe in the Middle East (laughs). The 
whole foot is solidly in the African continent, but they could push back…that 
leadership having the conversation under the AU umbrella with Bashir was the 
leverage, and you bring in the Arab League. So I think the success of being able 
to get a peacekeeping mission on the ground belongs to the diplomatic expertise 
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and the gravitas of the AU. 
 
Although Djinnit is described above as a visionary leader and impressive guy, 
there were a number of dissenting viewpoints of Ambassador Djinnit’s role as the 
leader of the Peace and Security Commission.  
 
Djinnit was the guy who--now he was a piece of work.  
 
And I would say Djinnit might not have been the most effective because he's 
about Djinnit. 
 
I think he (Djinnit)--again I didn't have much interaction, but from what I saw. I 
don't see-- it’s almost like, okay we've been told we have to do this, so we are 
going do the bear minimum. I don't see him trying to increase the effectiveness 
of the institution. 
 
Djinnit--he's the consummate African diplomat. And I had also heard that you 
know that some of the funding he didn't actually use to the benefit of the forces 
to because he was patting his own you know, little rice bowl.  
 
There was another view of Ambassador Djinnit in not believing he was aggressive 
enough and that he did not empower anyone at the AU or AMIS. 
Djinnit, like I said before. I don't think - I mean he was more of diplomat. I don't 
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think that he was very aggressive. I mean he was doing the bare minimum to 
support the mission, but to try enhance it and improve it, you know. It’s like 
alright. I've got this. I've got to do it. I'm going to do it, but I'm not going to go 
out of my way to make it--you know to be a champion if you will  
 
I don't think Djinnit empowered anyone else to complete the mission of AMIS.  
 
The commissioner of the AU Peace and Security Commission (Ambassador 
Djinnit) exhibited a style of leadership that offered him a level of respect with the 
leaders of the member states within reach region.  Djinnit demonstrated a sense of 
listening that was a skill that he was seen as possessing. 
 
Then by region going to region to region to see where the final decision would 
be made. And this is where I would say Ambassador Djinnit was very skilled at 
doing this, and had the respect because you don't get anywhere in that 
organization, and I will say in life in particular, but really in this organization if 
you hadn't had the respect. 
 
Even though many might had disagreed with him (Djinnit), they respected him 
and his ability to listen. 
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President Konaré and Ambassador Djinnit were mentioned as having “vision” in 
their leadership style.   However, there was the view that the AU leadership did not 
provide a broad shared vision for the AU. 
 
I don't think there was a broad shared vision. 
 
Leadership of the chairperson the AU Commission—President Konaré:  
President Kanaré was mentioned as having a strong leadership role based on his 
positive relationship with the Heads of State and not being a deposed leader but a 
successful leader in Mali.  His Muslim roots were seen as positive and influential with 
the Muslim populations and predominately Muslim countries that were member states 
of the AU.  His academic background was also viewed as a positive.  His successor, 
according to a participant, could be another successful Head of State, such as one from 
Botswana. 
 
…Alpha Konaré’s [who was the Chairperson of the AU] relationship with the 
heads of state. There were times when it was a huge plus, but there were some 
times where they had to gently remind him he was no longer a president, so I 
think it was at that point--I think he was the right person to start the organization 
because you needed the gravitas of a head of state, and a head of state who had 
not been over-thrown. 
 
A head of state who had been duly elected and I thought it was very interesting, 
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and I don't know if this was a factor in their decision-making process, but the 
fact that he was a Muslim who headed a large Muslim population when the 
continent also has one of the largest Muslim populations in the world. So, I don't 
know if that was calculated, but there were other former heads of state, so I 
think he's an academic scholar so that comes in as another component. So he 
was the total package at the time, and I fundamentally believe the right person to 
lift, but I also think it was also prudent to have led this into the foreign minister 
as someone who would defer to the heads of state and then when you looked at 
some- I think the one who would come to mind if you were going to have a 
successor as a former president would have been the former president of 
Botswana--I can see his face. His name just went right out of my head, he's the 
third president of Botswana (laughs) that much I still remember, but he would 
have been the one who would have stepped in. 
 
There was the participant who believed that although Konaré should be 
applauded for his vision of creating a rapid force, it might be better to start looking at 
the leadership of the AU from a more business-oriented perspective, such as a CEO. 
 
So while I applaud President Konaré for the concept, the fact to have a 
permanently positioned set of forces was, I would have to say, not realistic and 
not do-able, which might explain the shift from a former president holding to 
that position to moving it to more a CEO-type like the foreign minister from 
Gabon, you know minister Ping, was the next individual to take that position, 
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and then the foreign minister of South Africa.  Zuma, was the next individual to 
take that position. 
 
The chairperson of the African Union and that person at the time was quite 
idealistic, had a lot of vision, a lot of grand speeches and things like that…then 
there were kind of (long pause), I can't remember what the exact title was it was 
the peace and security director maybe? 
 
Bureaucracy challenge: 
Bureaucracy of the AU caused delays for the Peace and Security Commission to 
make decisions on AMIS.  Even minor decisions needed to be referred to the senior 
leadership of the Executive Council of the AU that caused delays in action.    
Complicated decision-making bureaucracy was a leadership issue and difficult 
to overcome within the AU as well.  
My impression from Djinnit and his deputy was that even some of the most 
routine decisions had to be referred from the PSC up to the Executive Council 
for decisions, which resulted in lengthy delays, 
Combining foreign military challenges:  
There was also a perception that the leadership challenges in Darfur were the 
same challenges of that at the AU headquarters.  The melding of foreign military is a 
challenge faced by many nations. Study participants noted: 
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I would say, for the leadership in Darfur the same challenges that AU leadership 
and any peace keeping mission whether it’s a coalition of the willing, whether 
it’s the UN, the challenges you have troops from different countries. 
 
Leadership knowledge: 
The AU as an institution was growing at the same time that AMIS was being 
executed through the AU headquarters.  The experience and knowledge of the 
leadership was mentioned as well as the need to understand the mission. 
 
I do remember Mosamaka, who was I think number two at the AU during 
AMIS…from Rwanda. He possessed institutional knowledge of what a genocide 
was. 
 
The Rwandans were viewed as posing the will to act and fight in Darfur given their 
history of genocide and the failed UN peacekeeping mission during the Rwandan 
genocide.  
 
Yeah, I mean so was Nigeria and Rwanda as well. But, again the Rwandans, you 
know, they felt the pain of a failed UN mission and so they understand what it is 
to you know--if peacekeepers don't do their job. 
 
…then not only that my understanding was that Kagami (President of Rwanda) 
basically briefed his contingence before they deployed. He basically told them, 
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"Look guys, you guys are being sent on a mission the reputation of our country 
is important." Not only that, but Kagami used it as a way to change the 
perception of the RDF (Rwandan Defense Force) because they had been on the 
defense force under this because of their engagement in Democratic Republican 
of Congo the world had a very negative perception of the RPA (Rwandan 
Patriotic Army) and then the RDF (Rwandan Defense Force). But, because of 
their performance in Darfur, starting with AMIS, that has changed. 
They're in Central African Republic and the Rwandans have really done well, 
and part of it is because they would fight to change their way. They would fight 
whom ever, it didn't who. You know, they're not going to take sides. You know, 
their job is to protect the innocence as you will and they took their mandate very 
seriously. 
 
Challenges of language: 
The lack of training and the multi-national complexion of the nations in the area 
of languages was perceived as not being unique for the AU and AMIS.  Due to the 
differences in national languages of the 53 member states of the AU, a participant felt 
there was a language barrier “across the board” in AMIS. 
 
 …you had language barriers across the board, so AMIS is not unique. This is 
textbook case in the sense that any time you bring a coalition of the willing 
together of nations with different language, different training structures. 
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Training challenge: 
There was also a perception that the lack of training over extended periods of 
time was a challenging factor for AMIS and the AMIS chain of command.  
 
If there's not the opportunity to train together for an extended period of time 
before you deploy, then you are going to have challenges with chain of 
command. 
 
Government of Sudan: 
Some of the challenges related to leadership for the AU and AMIS were due to 
the host nation of Sudan.  This was exhibited in the challenges of organization for 
AMIS and the AU. 
 
You’re going to have leadership challenges with ability to execute and also if 
you are like AMIS and you are in a hostile environment where the host nation 
state doesn't want you there. 
 
Resource challenge: 
The lack of resources was also listed as a leadership challenge.  The bulk of the 
resources for AMIS was perceived as coming from the US and the EU, both 
international partners of the AU but not the member states themselves.  
 
No matter how great the structure you’re going to have leadership challenges. 
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Now, if AMIS had had a great abundance of resources, I think those resources 
were supplemented to a large extent by the US and some of the EU countries. 
 
…try and do what they could with our limited resources. 
 
Personnel challenge: 
One of the participants viewed the leadership of the AU as recognizing that the 
AU possessed a personnel shortage—seeing the leadership’s recognition of the shortage 
as a strength. 
 
Strengths…clear that couple of …in all sincerity, leaders did recognize short 
falls in organization and desired to remedy the same. 
 
Cultural challenge: 
There was a cultural challenge that the participants perceived with the AU and 
AMIS, both facing a leadership chain of command challenge in the way that each nation 
designed their leadership structure.  The UN standards were not observed for AMIS and 
getting in touch with the AMIS leadership was a challenge after 5 p.m. except on a 
cellphone.  
 
It wasn't, not even UN standards, they didn't. follow… sort of at the operational 
level again nobody in Addis (AU Headquarters) answered the phone after 
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5:00…if you could get the political leader of the African mission, African Union 
Mission in Sudan. If you could get a hold of him, it was usually on a cellphone. 
 
There was a cultural challenge in that the absence of enlisted leadership existed 
in most of the African military. The leadership aspects of the African nations involved 
with AMIS often exhibited a lack of junior leaders in the form of a non-commissioned 
officer corps. 
 
There were no non-commissioned officers in the J6 office.  So, that work wasn't 
going to be done. One of the Westerns went in and plugged everything up.  So, 
that sort of cultural thing was a real hold back, and these guys, I think they were 
Nigerians…they were Anglophones from--they may have been Gambians, but I 
think they were Nigerians. So this absence of a strong non-commissioned officer 
core and tradition is an enormous problem or was an enormous problem I don't 
know maybe it’s been solved in the years since I've been there…that lack of 
respect for the competence of the enlisted soldiers. 
 
…one of the real challenges is the absence of the strong non-commissioned 
officer core in many of these African armies…the Nigerians had a pretty good, 
pretty strong traditional NCO corps, the South Africans did, but it started to fall 
off really quickly after that…in some of these armies there's still the idea exists 
that officers don't do physical work, right?  
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…the J6 communication shop…the guys who technically knew how to set up 
the satellite gear and how to make the computers work were officers. They had 
college degrees and they had been educated, but you could not get them to walk 
outside, put their hands on the antenna and plug things in because that wasn't 
what officers did. And then there was no non-commissioned officer who you 
could say, "Hey sergeant do this." so the work just wasn't going to be done 
because the privates didn't know how to do it, the sergeants did not know how to 
do it, only the officers knew how. 
 
Skill level challenge: 
The leaders of AMIS in Darfur were seen as possessing both leadership skills 
and diplomatic skills in order to accomplish the mission.  This was critical to mission 
accomplishment to any degree despite a number of impediments to the mission. One 
respondent noted: 
 
I would like to add that the AMIS leadership on the ground, both the Nigerian 
and Rwandan deputy commanders, were not only soldiers. They had to be 
diplomats on the ground. I think it was the combined skills of both that were 
instrumental in AMIS being as successful as it was despite all of the 
impediments. They also demonstrated the courage, both Nigerians and 
Rwandans. 
 
Decision-Making process: 
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The participants offered that the decision-making process of the AU was based 
on a centralized leadership decision model.   The Heads of State made the decisions that 
were implemented by the AU commissioners and staff.  The countries of Algeria, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal South Africa and Tanzania were seen as the member 
state leaders who possessed the most influence. 
 
The leadership in general--you got to look at the tiers, the heads of states, no 
decision is made final without the African heads of state. So, those two meetings 
that are held annually, bi-annually, are fundamentally the decision-making 
process. 
 
The next tier would be the foreign ministers and that is dependent upon each 
country, so I will tell you that the foreign ministers of Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopian, 
Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, those are the core, leveraging, and 
countries on the continent. 
 
 The leadership of the Peace and Security Commission had the span of one 
entity, the PSOD (Peace and Security Operations Department).  Noticed 
bureaucratic layered needed senior leadership even though has the power to 
make decisions from US perspective were in the organizational structure. 
 
The leadership of AMIS was at such a distance from the AU headquarters that 
leadership decisions were perceived by some to be made by the local leadership. 
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The leadership in AMIS was more or less autonomous from the AU, being at 
such a distance along the leadership in AMIS did travel to the headquarters of 
the AU on occasion to report and receive guidance.  
 
I don't know what the official understandings were at the high level between the 
government of Sudan and who clearly did not want us there, but compromised to 
allow the AU to come in instead of the UN. I don't know what was happening at 
that level. We don't know--I don't know what Kingabay, I’m sorry, Major 
General Festus Okafor, I don't know what his instructions were. I do know that 
there was an attack going on--there was an attack scheduled--we were watching 
the Sudanese in South Darfur move brigades from just South of Nyala in a series 
of villages moving towards the East along a road um, it was a dirt road that ran 
all the way out of Darfur and into Khartoum and all the way to the Nile to the 
river and then into Khartoum. And sorry I can't remember the names of some of 
this 
 
...we went on the ground and talked to this brigade commander, and we said, 
"What are your orders?" He said, "Clear the road to Khartoum?" And we were 
like, "Whoa that's a long way." And he said, "That's the task." And we said, 
"What are your sort of your rules of engagement?" And he said, "I have the 
force of the Sudanese government behind me. 
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I don't know what Okonko's original orders were, don't be aggressive? Don't piss 
off the Sudanese government? I don't know I'm not privy to that, but I know that 
with sufficient level of pushing, of interest, of suggestion, you know, we were 
able to get things done. That problem would not have been done otherwise. 
 
The structure of the AU also created obstacles. The decision making at the AU 
tended to follow a block voting system by the leadership within regions.  Research 
participants commented on how this affected the mission: 
 
…which countries had the greatest leverage?  I saw regional blocks were 
fundamentally important. I haven't seen any other continent or group vote in that 
way to date, whether they vote in the AU as regional blocks or whether they 
vote in the UN as regional blocks, and rarely do they break rank.  
 
…they do it better than anybody else in terms of communications on issues. 
 
Division of labor also was noted. The ambassadors of the individual countries 
attended the committee meetings and did the ground work for the decision-makers, but 
the Head of States were the decision makers and attended the larger meeting where 
there were decisions to be made. 
 
 …in terms of heads of states directly engaging with each other. In terms of the 
African ambassadors and the foreign ministers, or weld an enormous amount of 
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influence and they're doing the heavy lifting at those two, you know, biannual 
meetings but the ambassadors do the ground work, the committees. 
 
…I mean peace and security counsel in of itself which also had a political 
component as well, if I recall correctly it wasn't just a physical body. It also you 
know, and convened meetings of various heads of state, who were at a high 
level, meetings of heads of states and foreign ministers from all other countries 
as well to make political decisions that would impact the kind of on the ground 
work 
 
Regional Economic Community: 
The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) as well as the individual nations 
were mentioned as having leadership aspects based on their individual strengths and 
influence on the continent.  Angola was mentioned as having a “pivotal” leadership role 
of influence as well as being geographically pivotal, based on its location on the 
continent.  Uganda, Rwanda, and Botswana were also seen as having important key 
leadership roles on the continent and with the AU.  
 
There's also with leadership it’s important to look at the five regional 
organizations (Regional Economic Regions of Africa). 
 
…so the power of West Africa to leverage has to be taken into consideration. 
North Africa the key players are Algeria and Egypt. In Southern African the key 
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players are South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Angola. Angola actually plays on two 
fronts (laughs) it plays in the West--well three, it plays in West Africa as part of 
ECOWAS (Economic Community of the Western States). It plays in central 
Africa as part of that central Africa grouping, and it plays in Southern Africa, so 
Angola not only geographically pivotal, but also politically plays a pivotal role, 
so I will add Angola into that mix. This becomes the key deciding factors in 
leadership. 
 
…while not big countries Uganda and Rwanda played major roles in the 
decision-making process, and they leverage very effectively. Botswana also 
played a key role, not always in the peacekeeping components, but in the 
economic development and the democratization process as well. So Senegal put 
in that top tier because you go back and look at the countries that played 
important roles in the formation of OAU.  
 
However, each contingent (Troops Contributing Country) had their own vision 
of how AMIS should be executed based on their membership in a regional economic 
community. This was viewed as problematic on occasion: 
 
I think each contingent region had their own views on how things should be 
done. And you know again, part of it is at that time when you look at the 
Nigerians--if you look at ECOWAS (Economic Community of Western African 
States) at that time was the most advanced regional economic community 
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followed by SADC (Southern African Development Community) with the East 
African community and Central coming in behind…but, again based on the 
experiences of ECOWAS primarily dealing with Sierra Leone and Liberia, they 
felt okay, well, we know how to do this. And the dynamics in West Africa may 
not have been the same in Darfur. So, you can't necessarily say what is good for 
West Africa doesn't necessarily work in Sudan. 
 
One of the participants saw Angola and South Africa in a different light than the 
pivotal role envisaged above.   Along with Zimbabwe, Angola and South Africa were 
viewed as having to “push themselves into the room” due to their late independence.  
 
The new comers to the table because they didn't receive their independence till 
the 70s and the 80s are Angola and Zimbabwe, and South Africa. Those players 
come much later and South Africa not until the 1990s, which we start to see as 
they come to the table there was some concern by some member states whether 
they were going to push themselves into the room because they didn't have the 
long history that the other countries had… 
 
Certain countries led in Africa and the AU decision process and certain leaders 
at the AU were more influential than others.  
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The ambassadors in the structure reflect the larger countries and big players who 
are on the ground. I think if the ambassador has the ear of their foreign minister, 
the ear of the president, then you noted their ability to play.  
 
The roles of the chairperson and deputy chairperson of the AU commission were 
mentioned for their leadership position and decision-making position.  The chairperson 
was seen as possessing “ideas” and “vision” for the continent and the deputy 
chairperson was viewed as being able to “get things done.” 
 
…the chair person I would say was very big on kind of ideas and visions for the 
whole continent I would say less concrete in hand on for other things but of 
course he is the chair person.  
 
…the deputy chair person, as far as I recall, kind of handled a lot of more of the 
almost like a DC Embassy in a way, you know, getting stuff done more. 
 
Personnel and Staffing: 
Another major challenge for the leadership of the AU was the support staff and 
the personnel at the mid and lower levels.  At the strategic level of leadership, the 
leaders were mentioned as being “motivated” and “very strategic.”  However, the 
personnel and staff of the AU was one of the leadership challenges faced by the 
strategic level leaders and was seen as a “weak link” at the AU.  The AU was viewed as 
overall being “thinly staffed.” 
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… if you are talking about the strategic leadership then I would say very 
motivated and very strategic. I think where their biggest challenge is in their 
personnel and staff is probably their weakest link because--and this has 
happened in the UN, too, but less now in the UN because it’s had more years to 
evolve and more resources to staff its bureaucratic structure. 
 
…there's several commissioners…and then under--for so we mostly dealt with 
obviously the peace and security commission when it came to Darfur and under 
that there was I think a crisis management division and there was a director--
there was a commissioner for peace and security and a director for peace and 
security, and there was also a crisis management division that also had its own 
director…but very thinly staffed basically was the kind of the overall. 
 
Resources: 
The time frame of organization also created a challenge for the AU as opposed 
to a more mature organization, such as the UN.  The AU was relatively a newer 
organization in 2004 that did not have the resources and time to recruit a talented set of 
personnel within the AU. 
 
And one might argue with the UN it’s so well staffed in its bureaucratic 
structure that it hasn't gotten to the mission, but in the case of the AU, which one 
at that time in 2004 was three years old. So, I think we have to contextualize in 
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2000 because it only came into existence, and correct me if I'm wrong in 2000, 
either 1999 they were starting the formation--but 2000 we see the trend, yep, it 
was 2000…So, at 2004 to deploy, even though it transitioned from OAU, to 
deploy troops on the ground was huge. So, it has not had sufficient time I would 
say as well to staff itself, and to be able to screen out the kinds of people and the 
money and the resources to bring the talent you want. 
 
…there is some good talent because there is political will and heart, but there's 
also at this juncture, it’s too small in terms of its staffing, but doesn't have the 
resources to expand. 
 
The leadership of the AU has the authority to hire and fire personnel, but a 
challenge to the leadership for the AU was the lack of revenue to compete with the likes 
of the UN which has a more robust budget for hiring.  The payment of dues created a 
challenge for the AU to operate and to have the revenue to attract quality personnel.  
Since the fall of Gadhafi, who covered a lot of the African dues, only countries such as 
Nigeria and South Africa were fully paying their membership dues to the AU. 
 
The AU does have the authority to hire in its personnel structure and to fire, but 
in terms of its revenue--its base is still pretty small. So, if you are competing 
with a UN position and AU position the ability of the UN to pay a higher salary 
and provide better accommodations - living and all those kinds of expenses, and 
perks, and health care that come with the job - then if you are up for an AU job 
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then up for a UN job and you get the offer from the UN it—you’re probably not 
going to turn the UN down, and with probably a great retirement plan. So, it's 
like anything, it’s a great organization, but its packages and competing with a 
UN makes it kind of hard to compete in these early stages, so either it’s not clear 
to me if they have other than the dues how those dues are, how can I say it, 
revenue generating--if they have a structure, that's not clear. If they put the 
money or the resources in the market, or if they're not at that stage yet to have 
something of an endowment that allows them to become more independent--at 
this stage I'm not sure that that is in place. 
 
…Nigeria, of course pays its dues, the South African pays his dues, but right 
now in the last few years, and I think it is two or three since Gaddafi's fall, 
they're probably anywhere from 8 to 15 countries who aren't paying their dues. 
And so, the subsidy, even though it was back door through Gaddafi, is gone. So, 
that is going to impact your ability to hire more personnel to set up for your 
security purposes, you dispose and maintain them, and to attract the kind of 
people you would really like to attract. 
 
Personnel:  
There is a challenge exhibited in that the lower echelons of the AU were 
perceived as being staffed with inferior individuals due to a lack of resources that the 
leadership could access with certainty. Participants in the project noted: 
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…I would say that those people who are there now are there because they are 
committed, not because they couldn't have gotten better jobs elsewhere. There's 
a small group at the bottom who probably, you know, should I dare say should 
be fired, but getting other to deal with those challenges 
 
The AU does have the authority to hire in its personnel structure and to fire, but 
in terms of its revenue--its base is still pretty small. 
 
Personnel to come in you know, it’s just one of those situations. That's what 
they're got. 
 
There weren't competent administrators, they didn't exist, and there were no 
rules. People were creating rules as they went along.  
 
Lessons Learned: 
AMIS produced leadership challenges that the AU did not repeat in their 
mission in Somalia (AMISOM-African Union Mission in Somalia) which came after 
AMIS due to a US effort to provide a “lessons learned” approach on leadership of the 
mission that the AU experienced in Darfur with AMIS to the leadership of the Peace 
and Security Commission.  This was noted by several of the participants: 
 
…in the case of I know AMIS, but in the case of the mission in Somalia the 
Ugandan's gave a general with experience, paid his salary, continued to take care 
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of his family, to provide the expertise that were needed to do the strategic 
planning for the mission, countries would in order to supplemented AMIS, 
would have needed to have done the same thing. 
 
I will say that for Somalia it was through direct US negotiation to ask the Peace 
and Security Commission to give a general in order to not repeat some of the 
challenges that AMIS had, so there were lessons learned. 
 
Lessons learned from AMIS are paying dividends for the AU leadership in 
implementing changes to address future peacekeeping missions based on what 
they learned in AMIS. 
 
When you fast forward when you look at AMIS as the first mission the lessons 
learned and now AMISOM is now tatted as the way things should be done, and 
then you look at the morphing into the east brigade or the African Standby 
Force, and they have actually taken a step further where they are actually 
building a rapid response force, and in order to be a participant there you have to 
fund yourself. So, I mean the good news is here we are in 2016 and the lessons 
learned through AMIS and they're getting better. And they are also realizing that 
if we want to really be effective, we need to be able to do this on our own. But 
during that time frame, there clearly was a mindset within African Union, oh 
well, we will just the United States to do it, we will get the Brits, we will get 
everybody else to do it and they weren't ponying up. The only thing they were 
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ponying up were the troops. Again, some of the limiting factors are the 
contingents, and who you send on missions. You know, some countries do better 
than other countries, but again when you are looking for forces and to go into 
bad places, beggars can't be choosers so again, again I would probably say the 
weakest aspect was the logistical support. And then again training. 
 
Characteristics of Leadership: 
Listening and dealing with the issues before the final decision was made was a 
characteristic of the leadership style within the AU.  The African leadership style is one 
of listening and considering the arguments before a decision is made. The Africans were 
viewed as “less hasty” in the decision-making process: 
 
 
It's easy for outsiders to say, "Oh, well I don't think they are doing anything." 
But, without dialogue, there's nothing. I would say my two years’ experience on 
the ground just further highlighted the importance of the dialogue.  
 
The western countries--I think we take for granted the, or we've had a quick 
conversation in 5 minutes, but I found the African's doing the due diligence, of 
listening to the other. You might--one country might have disagreed with the 
other country, but they do diligence, to listen and to go back and forth, I was 
impressed with that. So, that you just didn't there was less of a hasty decision. 
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We didn't have to like their decisions but they were their decisions, and they had 
done the due diligence to get there, so the committee’s work extremely hard and 
because of a good relationship with key players like Djinnit and some of the 
other ambassadors, I was privy to some of those internal dynamics uh, that 
meant building trust, and also listening. So as an American I had to learn to 
listen a little bit closer. 
 
It wasn't just that they were a different group of people coming together, but the 
seriousness of understanding the issues and looking at all the options first and 
then coming to a conclusion that okay maybe these are the three we have, this is 
what we are going to leverage. 
 
Government of Sudan: 
Launching AMIS also created a challenge for the leadership of the AU in Africa.  
The decision to launch AMIS was mentioned as being “well thought out” by the 
Africans.  It was the Government of Sudan, under its president, Bashir, that was 
opposed to AMIS.  However, Sudan preferred the AU over the UN or western 
intervention. In contrast, others lauded the decision. 
 
Well, first of all I would start with the decision to launch AMIS is one that was 
well thought out. AMIS was a challenging one because the Sudanese 
government under President Bashir was opposed to any kind of intervention into 
his country. At that particular point in time, it was a compromise to have AMIS 
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go into Darfur rather than a UN mission, so he (Bashir) was definitely opposed 
to a UN mission, and it was also shortly after the intervention into Iraq that also 
made many of the African heads of states clearly against of a US intervention 
into Sudan. 
 
Their own in a country, and its only recently that in the last--at that point no 
other entity, including EC, had been willingly to intervene. So first of all I want 
to applaud the African Union despite maybe some structural or financial 
challenges. It demonstrated the political will has historically since its inception, 
in what 2000, to intervene into another country. So with that said--and to date 
other than the OAS (Organization of American States) who I think have only 
really talked about, so I would stand corrected. If they haven't we are only now 
seeing in 2015 the Arab League, or certain members of the Arab League, now 
intervening into other countries within their region? 
 
…I think the success of being able to get a peacekeeping mission on the ground 
belongs to the diplomatic expertise and the gravitas of the AU 
 
So without that diplomatic gravitas of AU there would have been no mission. So 
that negotiation took place outside of the realm of the European leadership, the 
US, the Canadian leadership. 
 
Diplomatic: 
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The leadership of the AU had a strong need for diplomatic engagement within 
Africa and externally to Africa that expedited AMIS.  The Arab League was viewed as 
an influential player and one of players needed to overcome the challenge of getting 
AMIS to deal diplomatically with Sudan. 
 
The AU's diplomatic engagement with both Africa--within the structure of the 
AU was critical to facilitate, the bringing together of the mission, as well as their 
diplomatic engagement with non-African countries, that expedited AMIS. 
 
We had probably some indirect support from the Arab League you had the 
blessings of we would say because the Arab League is an influential player with 
the AU that it took the blessings of both of those entities to have an AMIS 
mission allowed to be on the ground at all. 
 
I think at the forefront for AMIS to have been created at all; for AMIS to get 
permission to get boots on the ground, even though there were impediments and 
obstacles put in the way.  
 
The countries that provided the most personnel as a troop contributing country 
(TCC) were allocated the force command position for AMIS. 
 
The Nigeria's were able in the initial stages to have the highest-ranking officer 
within the structure on the ground due to the size of their contribution of troops. 
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There was the perception that the AU could have been more selective in which 
countries were allowed to contribute to their troops to AMIS. 
 
I think again, the best way would have been to be a little more selective in the 
force contribution… 
 
Training: 
Executing AMIS created challenges to the leadership in Darfur.  The first force 
commander, General Okono, a Nigerian, and his subordinate leadership staff, were not 
trained or prepared to handle the threats posed in Darfur.   The senior leadership of the 
AU was viewed as failing to grasp the “seriousness” of the threat that was present in 
Darfur. 
 
Fundamentally two problems. Question about the will of the mission to execute 
the mission—especially protection of civilians –observers at first and they 
did…frequently indicators of will and leadership.  Okono went to Darfur he 
wasn’t prepared, nor subordinates by training or expertise in the mission set. Not 
likely structured, postured or by mission to efficiently engage the threats in 
Darfur.  They (AMIS) were organized/structure for mission task far more benign 
then they faced. 
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I would say the AU commission itself - the senior leaders - may have failed to 
grasp the seriousness of the threat in terms of geography scope and willingness 
for brutality. 
 
I think the structure in terms of the leadership structure on the ground--this 
happens whether you're a UN peacekeeping mission. And the UN has had a 
longer history of experience with peacekeeping missions, but we still find the 
same challenges 
Personnel: 
Others saw the leadership of the AU as not being well-qualified, other than 
Konaré (Head of the AU Commission) and Djinnit (Commissioner of the Peace and 
Security Commission).  This was reported by several of the research participants. 
 
…if you look at the other thing is the overarching structure of the African 
Union. I mean I had heard that the African diplomats sent to the African Union 
were not the A-Team for countries. 
 
…if they wanted to get rid of somebody a lot of countries would send the has-
beens.  
 
So, when you look at--here you have this overarching organization that is 
supposed to better African, but you have people who are not the best and the 
brightest, and you throw into that the most aggressive. The African's got what 
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they got.  
 
You know, they created that own institution, but you know, again they realized, 
hey if we want to be effective--and you are starting to see more effective 
diplomats, you know. And I saw this as I was leaving Ethiopia when Uganda 
was brought in Eda Simpalo, who was one of their--she had been the 
Ambassador to the United States, you know clear ambassador--and Zephanie 
kind of he got it. He said, "Okay you know we are only going to be as good as 
we can." And then even sent General Burraro to go work with peace and 
security commission. And Burraro is probably one of the smartest Ugandan 
officers.  
 
…you saw these lessons learned by the African's themselves, they learned that if 
we are going to improve, then we have to do it ourselves and we have to enable. 
At that time frame, I don't think the mindset--you know even though they 
probably could have done it better, the political institution itself was the 
impediment. 
 
…well but also the extent to which various personalities in the African Union 
would have been susceptible to that type of pressure, you know, so that goes a 
little bit leisure…it is just very, very thin, if somebody wasn't there and neither 
nothing got done, or there is nobody to meet with, or somebody at a probably 
inappropriate level was just calling the shots is what happened. 
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…I didn't sense that there was a very concrete set of tasks or commands that 
they were ordered to carry out necessarily. 
 
That they were given what they were given.  Some of it again was political, you 
know? We need to show some certain member state will want to show that they 
are contributing somehow so they get some kind of slot that maybe that person 
wasn't the best suited for. I mean that type of thing happening. I don't remember 
the specific names or anything like that. Definitely politics played a part in it, 
you know. Where the chief contributors are going to come from, who’s going to 
be commanding, who’s going to be inserted in a post inside the African Union 
itself, um, and it wasn't always--I would say probably not necessarily the most 
qualified folks that various countries had to offer. I am not sure honestly how 
desirable a posting was; I don't know and that could have played into it  
 
Multi-national leadership: 
One of the leadership challenges of the AU, as seen by participants, dealt with 
establishing a multi-national force under one commander.  One aspect that was 
mentioned was the difficulty of placing a nation’s troops under the command of an 
organization.  Another issue was that the AU wanted to establish a standing force that 
would be under the control of the AU, an organization, and therefore under the 
command of a nation other than the nation providing the troops.  The idea that the even 
the US doesn’t have such a force seemed impractical for the AU at the time of AMIS. 
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Participants in the study noted this repeatedly: 
 
The same challenges that AMIS experienced in the peacekeeping missions in 
Congo.  The peacekeeping missions in Sierra Leone and throughout West Africa 
faced because it comes down to the constitutional constraints of a multinational 
and a multilateral organization that anyone faces no matter whether you are 
African or not 
 
Peacekeeping missions comes down to the sovereignty and putting their troops 
under the command of an organization, and not of a country.  
 
…one of the things that President Konaré did when we came to his position was 
he wanted to create a rapid reaction force, a standing--and the fear was a 
standing army and what country wanted to give their troops to be placed under 
the direct command in someone else's country? 
 
Because the AU is not a country it resides in Ethiopia the same way the UN 
resides in New York. That small bit of land is sovereign territory, but if you are 
Nigeria or your Botswana and are giving up a company for or a battalion; none 
of these countries can afford to give up a company or a battalion and financially 
support it.  
 
The US government has yet to create a rapid reaction force with all its wealth 
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and resources, and size. If you want to say the marines are that, but that's not the 
marines mission to be a rapid reaction force, to be deployed just for 
peacekeeping missions, so that amount of resources in today's world or 
yesterday's world at the time of AMIS are impractical. And at this point no 
country no matter how great it's wealth was going to give up that resource or 
finance that resource and relinquish command of vital resources too.  
 
Certain country leaders that were present in Darfur were viewed as leading their 
troops based on their own leadership strengths. The Rwandans and the Nigerians were 
perceived as leading their countries’ contingents based on their own leadership skills 
even in the face of a lack of equipment and authority.  
 
…well I will say the Rwandans in particular in putting themselves in harm’s 
way when did not have the equipment or the authority to return fire against the 
Sudanese in order to protect Darfurians. So, I would say it was that kind of 
courage in a hostile--very hostile environment that both the Nigerians and the 
Rwandans leadership and it was their leadership that was critical to their troops 
following them in a situation where they could have said, "Not my mission." So, 
I think we as the world need to acknowledge that under such incredible 
conditions that they would with so little resources both in terms of personnel and 
equipment and those kinds of things that these troops were willing to be on the 
ground and those leaders willing to stay. 
OAU transition to the peacekeeping role of the AU: 
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The research participants also viewed the AU leadership in light of having 
accomplished the mission of the OAU and now needing to come together to address the 
leadership that was needed, such as peacekeeping. 
 
So, I think the lessons are learned from the--relatively new organization with a 
new charter. It is--should be applauded for what they accomplished because 
their primary mission as the OAU, and that's where I will bring you back in 
history, was designed to decolonize the continent. 
  
…the leadership came together and said, "We have completed the mission 
except for one, so we're going to move forward and what are the needs of the 
continent today 
Missions of the AU: 
The AU has a multitude of missions including political and economic 
development as well as security.  Since security has taken such a toll on the leadership 
and the attention of the AU, the other missions of the AU have not received the 
attention of the leadership. Study participants commented on this: 
 
The primary mission of this organization was supposed to be political and 
economic development. Yes, security is a component. Unfortunately, security 
has taken up much too much of its attention, so maybe we would better to say 
that the AU could advert some of this if its resources were allowed to be 
diverted in other places, uh the political and economic development and social 
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development of the continent. And the AU has had to step in where the UN 
refused, with better resources, more personal, and a historic mission.  I think it’s 
important to acknowledge that the AU has done what the UN mission has failed 
to do 
  
…commission, there were various commissions dealing with all different topics 
like health and um security, and various issues around the continent… 
 
Western Involvement: 
The Africans did show a reluctance to have the western world involved with the 
AU outside of the need for resources to support AMIS.  One of the greatest leadership 
challenges that the AU faced was in how to organize AMIS so there would be support 
from the member states of the AU as well as the funding support of the western nations.  
The US president gave his support of an intervention in Darfur but not with the 
commitment of the US military. 
 
…did get the sense that there is a lot of external influence and a lot of influence 
especially from maybe some of the northern African countries not wanting too 
much involvement from the western world in African, and in dealing with this 
issue… 
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Greatest challenges to leadership was how to organize AMIS in a way that 
would support by member states that provided manpower and western partners 
that would provide funding and still meet the threats in Darfur. 
 
President George W. Bush, the 43rd president of the United States, had said that 
there would not be a genocide on his watch and he was not willing to put as we 
say in quotes, "Boots on the ground into Darfur."…after careful consultation 
with the president of South Africa and the president of Nigeria, and then several 
other consultations with President Mubarak of Egypt. The Algerian's had also 
weighed in that they didn't believe, given the intervention in Iraq that it was 
prudent to have an intervention. So all of the African heads of states, including 
also President of Senegal, with the Muslim population of almost 98 percent and 
others at that time. 
 
There was an attempt by the AU leadership to transform the AU.  However, the 
lack of resources often muted the energetic attempts of the leadership to establish, for 
example, a conflict management center at the AU.   
 
I mean there were definitely some attempts of the leadership to transform the 
creditability of the organization, as I said having gone from like the OAU to AU, 
trying to be taken more seriously I definitely saw that like, you know, look at a 
short piece of security, particular was quite energetic and you know the director 
for the Conflict Management Center was also equally energetic and try and do 
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what they could with limited resources. 
 
Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF): 
The AU senior leadership could have improved its leadership through engaging 
directly with the individuals working the Darfur Integrated Task Force.  There was a 
perception that the leadership at the AU did not demonstrate their vision to the 
leadership of AMIS in the field and the DITF leadership.  The leadership of the AU was 
viewed as not always clear on what type of force was permissible with the AMIS 
leadership. 
 
…the high-level folks engage directly with the Darfur Intergraded Task Force 
and the officers that they had running that, maybe convening you know, 
conference calls if they had the capability, which they probably didn't; things 
like that with the field with AMIS in the field. And just kind of having a better-- 
making sure that their teams were better oriented with any type of vision of 
where they wanted all of this to go, and that they were more well aware of the 
various challenges, and what it took to get the job done. 
 
The participants who dealt with the AU headquarters but had little knowledge of 
the leadership aspects of AMIS located in Darfur. 
 
I mean I wasn't too familiar with that. I mean I just you know was privy to 
reports back because I joined conference calls that had you know, people out in 
176 
the field on them.  
 
I remember there being every now and again confusion about commands and 
you know whether or not discerning types of use of force were allowed and 
things like that…again, more logistic issues, that kind of they seemed to some 
extent be operating a little bit on their own…obviously not clear where they 
were getting their orders from. I don't know. Maybe it's because I wasn't part of 
that (laughs). 
 
Understanding scope of AMIS: 
The leadership of the AU was also not perceived as understanding the scope of 
the mission to execute AMIS.  The threat posed in Darfur was mentioned as exceeding 
the understanding of the leadership of the AU.  There was a lack of trained personnel up 
to handling the threat posed in Darfur and a lack of understanding of the limitations of 
deploying a force. For improvement, participants suggested the leadership of AU could 
have developed a vison that was commensurate with the threat in Darfur as well as 
demonstrating courage and the ability to gain support from the western powers and the 
UN for AMIS.   There was a perception that the leadership of the AU did not share its 
vision with the key stake holders. Their vision was viewed as not always equal to the 
threat the leadership in AMIS faced. 
 
Leading leadership challenges didn’t understand the scope of the mission and 
threat  
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Leading leadership challenges didn’t understand the scope of the mission and 
threat 1. Not having personnel trained to effectively given the mission 2. Any 
number of factors to cause their will to address the threat less than adequate. 3. 
Same political and others sober relations of the limitation of deploying an AU 
force. 
 
Improved leadership-AU could have if they had leaders at the AU who had a 
vision commensurate with the threat and courage and ability to gain support for 
that vision from key stake holders. Especially the member states and the 
west…I’m thinking UN and developed world. 
 
The leadership style in Darfur was perceived as cautious, with a desire to avoid 
conflict of any kind with the AU member states or to upset the government of Sudan.  
The Government of Sudan was viewed as not wanting the US on its soil but 
compromised to allow the AU in Darfur in lieu of the UN.  Respondents commented on 
this: 
 
Leadership style Darfur…cautious—strong desire to avoid anything that the 
members state of the AU or West objected to –and conflict parties in 
Darfur…Government of Sudan groups conflict party—leave as cautious. 
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…. I don't know what the official understandings were at the high level between 
the government of Sudan and who clearly did not want us there, but 
compromised to allow the AU to come in instead of the UN 
 
Mandate: 
There was a sense that the AU could have improved AMIS through the 
development of a solid mandate that was communicated and monitored by the AU for 
successes and failures.  Other ways the AU could have improved AMIS was through the 
training of the leaders and observers prior to deployment and setting up viable 
communications between the AU and AMIS by providing assistance to the leadership of 
AMIS with guidance and decision making capability:  
 
If AU had direction for the mission and a solid mandate for such a mission 
that was communicated effectively and monitored for success and failures. 
 
Training and education of leadership (Darfur) before deployment. 
 
More defined tactics of objective/observation oriented on more effective 
Observers and particular techniques on how to observe. 
 
Have better communication gear through a strong tactical force and 
communication available to assist leadership in Darfur with decision making 
and guidance from AU leadership. 
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Nigerians, who provided the largest force for AMIS, secured the leadership 
position.  The AMIS force commander was perceived as not wanting to engage in 
fighting as opposed to the Rwandans.  The Rwandans and the Senegalese were seen as 
the best performers in AMIS, according to the participants: 
 
I mean if you look at the Nigerians themselves and it’s clearly…you know they 
see themselves as a regional if not a continental power. I mean they are legends 
in their own minds.  But when you look at their actual capabilities of their 
forces, you know they don't necessarily want to fight. I mean that said, there are 
good Nigerian units and good Nigerian officers.  By and by, in large, I would 
say their performance in AMIS was lackluster, you know, especially if you stack 
them up again the Rwandans 
 
I think with the Senegalese did pretty well. And again the Senegalese have a 
long history of UN peacekeeping and by in large their forces tend to do fairly 
well. 
 
That kind of tasking the Rwandan army when those guys came in they were 
tactically were incredibly proficient and they were aggressive on the ground in 
terms of stopping fighting, breaking up rebel groups from attacking civilians, 
keeping them protected. They were very, very aggressive in this action because 
their president had done that. I don't know what the Chief of the Ghanaian Army 
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or the president of Ghana said to the chief of staff, a colonel when he came out. I 
don't know what the marching orders from the president of the AU were to the 
Political head of AMIS were. 
Style of Leadership: 
The AU style of leadership was perceived by some of the participants as being 
one of consensus.    
 
…the African Union style of leadership it falls into the African style of 
leadership, which is consensus  
 
And the idea, I mean and this you know, through most African cultures, 
traditional leadership. Even though you had a chief or a paramount chief, there 
was a small counsel around him and again this falls back--I mean you could 
argue that African traditional politics is democracy.  It may not be Westminster 
Parliamentarian democracy, but consensus is a critical node intendent of 
decision-making and this would fall in, you know.  
 
You see military operations it’s not very good to lead by consensus. But, again 
and you could say that this is probably one of the negative aspects of the 
mission, but that's what they did. 
 
…if you are faced with a very difficult situation. If one member disagrees, then 
it's not going to happen. And so, on the surface people would say it’s ineffective, 
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but that is how they do things. And it’s about--it factors in to different aspects of 
the situation so in that sense instead of having a big man dictating what’s going 
to happen, you get this consideration of different aspects.  
 
Because on the surface you know, if you are about immediate response or 
whatever by factoring in a consensus building and factoring in these different 
points of view, you may get a more positive solution that is better for the long 
term as to something that may be good on the surface and short term, but you 
are not looking at third and fourth order of factors. And as we have seen third 
and fourth order of facts are very critical. 
 
A participant lamented about how the western model allowed for the 
degradation of Libya where the AU was more cautious about the aftermath and would 
consider the aftermath in its calculus whether to intervene, especially where genocide 
was not a major factor. 
 
No, we haven't learned it. That's why we undone tens of years’ worth of work by 
getting rid of Kaddafi.  Now, we have AQIM we have Boko Haram and we have 
all this stuff and we {the US} created it whether we want to admit it or not. 
 
 
The senior leadership below the Head of the AU is mentioned as leaning toward 
stronger engagement with partners and the potential involvement of NATO and the EU. 
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Yeah, I mean people who were very active on discussions in AMIS at the time 
from the AU Commission...he was always a strong proponent of greater 
engagement by the African Union partners.  
 
Djinnit was one of the string of AU Peace and Security Commissioners who was 
a very strong advocate.   President Kagame and the government in Rwanda was 
also very active. I recall Masomhaka personally being very much in favor of 
NATO and possibly EU and definitely possibly NATO involvement in 
AMIS…a view that didn't necessarily reflect the sort of AU's corporate position, 
but he personally very much an advocate, at least in his conversations with US 
officials…and I think you know, that might influence the Rwandan interest in 
peacekeeping.  
 
Task-Oriented: 
The AU leadership was seen as more task-oriented during AMIS.  There is a 
new initiative at the UN to form a senior leadership position at a deputy chairperson 
level to handle peacekeeping.  The AU is forming its own study that may be modeled 
after the UN study for increased leadership for peacekeeping at the senior level.  It 
should be noted that the new measures now being taken by the UN to form a deputy did 
not exist at the UN or at the AU during AMIS. 
 
When you look at studies of peacekeeping now, so you have to so-called 
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HIPPO, report the High-level Panel on Peace Operations that were issued by the 
United Nations in September of last year (2015), there is a similar study now 
being done by the African Union Commission.  In the African Union's Study, 
which is draft, there was a recommendation, a draft recommendation that echoes 
a recommendation HIPPO that is to create a deputy chairperson for peace 
operations. So, in the UN now you have a UN Deputy Secretary General who 
doesn't just do peace operations, but there is much more infrastructure 
institutionally now to deal with the peacekeeping, so with the UN just having the 
DBKO (Department for Peacekeeping Operations) wasn't sufficient. And so the 
AU I think is lagging behind a little bit, but trying to follow that model. And you 
know all of the things that are being proposed now didn't exist obviously in 2004 
 
 
Well, the commander and the deputy commander both made regular trips back 
to Addis (AU headquarters) to debrief with Ambassador Djinnit and President 
Kanuri and to provide them with an overview of what was taking place. 
 
I mean pretty standard levels of communication they turned in reports of 
accountability, of challenges they faced in the field, so AU is no different than 
any other peacekeeping organization in that stand point. Again, the difference is 
the sheer--that they were small. 
 
Planning: 
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Some participants felt that the AU should communicate the strategic views with 
the AMIS leadership.  There was a view that the leadership in AMIS did not do 
strategic level planning—that was done at the AU headquarters. 
 
And that doesn't make either one of them wrong, but means that it was important for 
them to share those views, which from my perspective they did, and to communicate 
them, and at the end of the day the commander on the ground executes and doesn't do 
the strategic planning. 
 
Government of Sudan: 
Sudan’s sovereignty was taken into account by the AU leadership that may have 
wanted to provide Sudan with the room to deal with changing its attitude toward the 
issues ion Darfur while limiting the western foot print. 
 
…some of them were wanting to give the member a state a chance to breathe 
and redeem itself. Others wanted to show that the organization was very 
capable. Others wanted to make it look-- I got the sense that they had things 
under control to try and minimize the western you know, impact or footprint.  I 
think they definitely had kind of competing interests in a sort of way. 
 
I don't know what Okonko's original orders were, don't be aggressive? Don't piss 
off the Sudanese government? I don't know I'm not privy to that, but I know that 
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with sufficient level of pushing, of interest, of suggestion, you know, we were 
able to get things done. 
Summary of Key Sub-Question 2 
  The participants of the study offered their view of the leadership challenges 
faced by the AU and AMIS.   The AU, as a nascent organization, was trying to 
overcome the short-falls in leadership of the former OAU and there was a desire to hold 
the leadership of the AU accountable. 
The leadership of the AU was lauded for its intervention in Darfur and the 
establishment of AMIS.  The President of Sudan was against any intervention 
peacekeeping force but preferred that the AU establish AMIS over any type of UN or 
western intervention.  The impediments put in place by the Government of Sudan 
caused a challenge for the implementation of AMIS and the leadership at the AU and in 
AMIS.  The perceived leadership style in Darfur was cautious with a desire to avoid 
conflict of any kind with the AU member states or to upset the government of Sudan. 
It was noted that the northern African states were strongly against western 
intervention in Sudan.  A leading challenge of leadership for the AU was in how to 
organize AMIS so that its member states would support the mission with peacekeepers 
and at the same time organize AMIS so that the western nations would offer funding 
support. 
There were individual leaders who exhibited energy and wanted to transform the 
newly established AU into a responsive organization, away from the perception the 
world had of the OAU.  However, the lack of resources often muted the ability to carry 
out some of the basic leadership challenges for organization, such as the establishment 
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of a viable conflict management center located at the AU headquarters.  Another 
challenge of leadership was the view that the AU followed the African style of 
leadership as one of consensus. 
The AU leadership was cognizant that there were organizational shortfalls at the 
AU headquarters but did not understand the limitations of deploying a force.  The 
leadership of the AU was not perceived as understanding the scope of the mission to 
execute AMIS or the threat posed in Darfur.  The AU leadership also was not able to 
recognize the lack of training its personnel required to complete AMIS effectively, but 
some leaders did recognize there was a shortfall in personnel but that resources held 
those leaders back from making the necessary changes.  The AU could have improved 
its leadership by developing a vison that was commensurate with the threat in Darfur 
and sharing that vision with the western donors and the UN for support of AMIS. 
Ambassador Said Djinnit, Commissioner of the Peace and Security 
Commission, was mentioned as having the vision to be an effective leader.  Djinnit was 
seen as a visionary and an “impressive guy” while some described him as filling “his 
own rice bowl” and not being aggressive enough.   The former President of Mali, Alpha 
Konaré, who served as the President of the AU Commission, was viewed as having the 
respect of the Heads of State of the member nations due to his former successful 
presidency that was not overthrown.  Other leaders of the AU were mentioned as being 
respected due to their former positions as leaders of their countries.   
  The lack of decision making at the Peace and Security Commission was seen as 
a challenge to for the AU’s leadership to operate effectively. Even the most minor 
decisions often had to be made by the most senior leaders at the Executive Council 
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level.  The fact the AU was a new organization in the early 2000’s and therefore the 
staff was seen as too thin and not enough depth to handle the leadership complexities of 
the AU and AMIS.   
The AU senior leadership could have improved its leadership through engaging 
directly with the leadership of AMIS and the leaders of the DITF.  The leadership at the 
AU was not always clear in sharing its vision for the mission, as in the use of what type 
of force was acceptable in AMIS.  The AU could have improved AMIS through the 
development of a solid mandate that was communicated and monitored for successes 
and failures.  Other ways the AU could have improved AMIS were through the training 
of the leaders and military observers prior to deployment.   There was a need for viable 
communication link between the AU headquarters and AMIS that would have assisted 
the leadership of AMIS with providing guidance and their decision-making capability. 
 The Nigerians had knowledgeable leaders while the Rwandans were seen as 
aggressive and lauded for their experience of genocide that gave them a keener sense of 
purpose.   The TCC that contributed the greatest size contingent, Nigeria, was allocated 
the force commander position, Nigeria provided the most troops to AMIS and therefore 
was allocated the main leadership position of force commander followed by the 
Rwandan who were given the second leadership position; that of the deputy force 
commander.  The Nigerian leadership was viewed as not wanting to engage in an actual 
fight in Darfur as opposed to the Rwandan leaders, who were more willing to engage in 
a fight.  The Senegalese were also perceived as a positive force in AMIS.   Rwanda was 
mentioned as having an interest in supporting the intervention in a genocide, given its 
history and the leadership of its president, who was up for re-election.  
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 The RECs were perceived by the participants to hold leadership decision-
making positions as were the key nations of Angola, South Africa, Nigeria, Ethiopia, 
Egypt and Algeria.  Member countries of the AU tend to vote in regional blocks which 
give the regions more power.  The actual leadership decisions were made at the annual 
conferences by the Heads of State which means that very little decision making is made 
at the lower levels of leadership in the AU. 
 The AU faced challenges in having the revenue to hire talented personnel.  The 
UN has a more robust budget and is able to compete for higher quality personnel and 
staff.  The lack of a quality staff is a challenge faced by the leadership of the AU.  The 
revenue generated by the AU for membership in the form of dues has diminished since 
the fall of Gadhafi who was covering the membership dues of the less economically 
viable nations of Africa during the time of AMIS.  Therefore, the AU is perceived as 
bring staffed with inferior personnel that the AU will not fire staff and leaders for fear 
of not being able to replace due to a lack of resources. 
 The chairperson of the AU commission, President Konaré, wanted to set up a 
standing force but faced the challenge of nations not wishing to have their forces under 
the leadership of an organization or the leadership of another nation.  Another issue was 
whether an African nation could afford to provide a dedicated company or battalion to 
the AU for a standby force. 
One of the positive outcomes of AMIS was that the AU was able to avoid the 
mistakes of leadership of AMIS in later peacekeeping operations, namely AMISOM.   
The AU leadership of the peace and Security Commission was able to exercise the 
lessons learned from AMIS in AMISOM. 
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Key Sub-Question 3 
US Support:  What were the challenges of US support to the African Union during the 
African Union Mission in Sudan? 
The AU has faced challenges in receiving and requesting US support.  There 
was a dearth of data provided in the scholarly literature referencing US support for the 
AU during AMIS.  The study participants provided an overview of the US support as a 
challenge to the AU and in the context of international engagement.   
 
US reaction time to AU requests: 
There was a challenge on the US side of not being able to react quickly on some 
requests for equipment.  A participant found the US military more helpful than other 
parts of the US Government as a whole. 
 
There was a big challenge in getting a request for equipment to the AU 
processed in a timely manner.  Sometimes it took 6 months to make a request 
through the normal US procurement channels.  
 
The US can’t react quickly on equipment… 
  
US timeline for support: 
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US support did not come at first as there was no monetary or resources provided 
by the US at the outset of AMIS.  The US military involvement sped up the process of 
proving US support engagement. 
 
US Support between Washington and the AU was slow…once the US military 
engaged then things began to move quicker. 
 
Resources: No monetary or resources initially 
 
Airlift was one challenge that the US was able to meet in a rapid manner 
through the US military.  Since most African nations did not possess airlift capability, 
the US and NATO did most of the airlift for AMIS. 
 
…but perhaps faster on things like airlift.   
 
The African countries didn’t possess organic airlift capability so I remember 
more of the US providing airlift on a fairly quick turnaround. 
 
I found the US military more helpful than other parts of the US government that 
were a little slower to respond. 
 
Regional Economic Communities: 
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At the beginning of AMIS, the Africans had the establishment of some structure, 
through the regional communities.  There was some political participation through the 
regional communities but the AU was viewed as “feeling their way.” 
 
They already had certain regional economic communities which were mainly 
economic but had some political overcast.  They were all really feeling their 
way.    
 
The AU and the US had decided that it was not in the best interest of the US to 
intervene directly in Darfur.  US support has evolved over the years since AMIS and is 
working with the AU and the UN to strengthen the role of the UN in assisting the AU 
with logistics and finances. 
 
They urged that this would not be in the best interest of the continent nor the 
best interest of the United States at that time. So, with that said, the African 
heads of states agreed to deploy a peace-keeping force into Darfur with the 
support of the United States, and with the support of the EU, and with the 
blessings of the UN. 
 
I think as I noted the United States is now working on a project with the African 
Union to build a new partnership between the UN secretary at specifically DBQ 
(document based question on genocide) and DFS (department of field service 
for peacekeeping) on the one hand and the African Union Commission on the 
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other to strengthen cooperation on peacekeeping on both logistical support and 
financing.  
 
US view of the AU: 
A major challenge described by a participant was the lack of knowledge of the 
structure of the AU in order for the US and other international parties to provide any 
form of resource or assistance.  There tended to be an ethnocentric view of the AU from 
the perspective of the US and the Europeans. 
 
…I think what from an outsider’s perspective, an observer country's 
perspective…that we still don't have as good as an understanding of the whole 
institutional structure of the AU the way we have an understanding of the UN, 
and I think that is fundamentally important to helping to facilitate how well we 
engage with them and how successful they can be in terms of how we put 
resources forward. The Europeans, I think have it somewhat better but I also 
found a bit of ethnocentrism in play and wanting them to do things and 
forgetting about the structure and the constraints of the constitution. I think the 
Chinese have also attempted to leverage but also find themselves facing some of 
the same similar constraints because the AU wants to remain as autonomous. 
 
In the beginning, the AU was viewed by Washington as a by-product of the old 
OAU with the same view of the new organization as wanting to de-colonize Africa.   
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That caused Washington to give instructions to the senior personnel on the ground in 
Ethiopia to stay clear of the AU in the early days of the AU establishment. 
 
Frankly speaking, I think Washington was mired in its thinking that the AU was 
the same old organization of the OAU which in their point of view was 
ineffectual and basically support de-colonialization of the continent.  We had 
mixed view in our US foreign policy as far as de-colonialization and the 
freedom of South Africa.  So, I am not sure if the US was organized out in 
Ethiopia that we would have had a forward looking, leaning outward posture.   
 
Washington was working off of old information and would have continued to 
inhibit the free flow of information. 
 
Washington can have a bureaucratic way of telling those Americas working with 
the AU in Ethiopia what to do and not to do that can be a hindrance.  …didn’t 
want the US to give too many instructions… 
 
AU resource and assistance requirements: 
Not understanding the way, the AU operated and the Africans planned was a 
challenge for US support.  The AU itself was not sure what it needed, as the US had 
expected, but was not reticent to ask for help due to the engagement that the US 
Embassy had with the AU.  Both the US and the AU were challenged in learning each 
other’s needs and capabilities. 
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But again, they weren’t sure what they needed.  This was new to them; a new 
experience for them.  This is why I wanted the AU to have US advisers rather 
than expecting them to be fully set up and ready to run that is usually our 
expectation (laughs). 
 
It was a learning challenge on both sides because frankly they would have never 
asked us if we weren’t forward learning through the US Embassy. 
 
A challenge for the AU was that it did not always know what to request from the 
US. The US personnel engaging with the AU had to be careful not to commit the US to 
anything until Washington agreed. 
 
There challenge at the AU was them no knowing to ask for and what the US was 
willing to provide.  They weren’t sure so you had to go meet with them and 
figure out what they might need and go back and check with Washington 
without making an obligation on the part of the US and go back and see if we 
were willing to do it.  
 
There was a lot of tiptoeing around in terms of not extending the US too far out 
in front; going back to our agencies to see what they were willing to do 
something. 
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US support challenges: 
The US could have improved its support challenges with the AU through 
developing a better way to coordinate its support mechanism.  Another challenge that 
the US faced was not having high level visits from Washington to the AU, especially at 
the start of AMIS. 
 
Washington can always improve its coordination and development—it doesn’t 
do it too well any more. 
 
The visit by high level US officials would have been more effective at the outset 
of AMIS.  Washington began to understand that the AU was a different 
organization from the OAU after the Embassy began to report on the dynamics 
at the AU and the start of AMIS. 
 
Although Washington was hesitant at first, the US personnel on the ground in 
Ethiopia began to forge relationships with the AU.  These initial contacts turned out to 
be critical at the start of AMIS as the US had already developed a relationship with the 
AU. Washington was thankful for any reporting after their initial reluctance for 
engagement with the AU by US Embassy personnel. 
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The State department told me to keep AU at arm’s length…however I saw the 
Europeans engaging and since the instructions were verbal and not in writing I 
engaged with the AU and started meeting AU personnel.    
 
We are the US so we had to get involved with the AU and establish contacts. 
 
When Darfur broke out the US had was already having a dialogue with the AU 
so it was easy to get access. 
 
Washington didn’t help or give instructions at the beginning.  
 
Washington was happy with any reporting that it received at the outbreak of the 
Darfur conflict and the start of AMIS. 
 
The US did not have difficulty getting appointments with the AU officials.  One 
participant offered that the US sought ways to approach the AU with the suggestion of 
idea but that the way the “ideas” were transmitted to the AU were carefully couched to 
ensure the AU was leveraging the assets of the international partners.   
 
It was easy get an appointment and see the senior official at the AU and give 
them “ideas” and then consult with partners and come up with a consensus to 
leverage the assets that the US could provide and the support that the Europeans 
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could support.  Talking and perhaps give them ideas and consult with Europeans 
to get an organized approach. 
 
Some diplomatic efforts seen as being fruitful by extending ideas to the AU and 
the African ambassadors supporting the AU.  The act of diplomacy was the avenue that 
began to push for the US to provide support to the AU.  Sometimes that means 
intellectual capital though diplomatic interaction to influence the thinking of the 
Africans. 
 
The US on the ground maybe encouraged them to look in certain direction 
though direct dialogue with the African Ambassadors and maybe your idea 
would pop up a year down the road.  That’s all diplomacy, that’s what it is. 
 
The act of diplomacy is planting a seed and hope it works out. 
 
I was looking at the intellectual capital and to have US influence on there 
thinking. 
 
…you could give them some ideas through their African ambassadors who were 
accredited to the AU to give them some ideas, some sense of an idea that cold 
get some support at the AU.  
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The diplomatic engagement of the US support mechanism provided an avenue 
for the AU not to repeat the challenges it had experienced with AMIS.  The US wanted 
the AU to learn the lessons from AMIS and apply them to AMISOM.   A US, as well as 
an AU, initiative that the US desired is that the AU develop a closer working 
relationship with the UN; a relationship that did not exist during the time of AMIS. 
 
I will say that for Somalia it was through direct US negotiation to ask the AU to 
give a general in order to not repeat some of the challenges that AMIS had, so 
there were lessons learned.  
 
…through the US auspices working with Ambassador Janet as the head of peace 
and security, we were able to secure that, so there were lessons learned, creative-
-this is where I say that diplomatic engagement was fundamentally important to 
overcome. 
 
Communications was an area that the US provided assistance to the AU.  One 
US initiative was the improvement of the AU internal communications through 
development of an operations center at the AU that could communicate with AMIS and 
other operational requirements. 
 
I know big, if I recall correctly, a big initiative by the United States at that time 
and following in the next few years, was trying to set up sort of an operations 
center for the African Union and improve its sort of internal communications 
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and communications with missions in the field.  
 
One of the many of the issues that the US assisted the AU with was in setting up 
a command and control center at AU Headquarters centered on computers and 
communication infrastructure, not just compatible hardware between the 
headquarters and the field, but also general IT capability of AU staff 
officers.  Most had little to no experience with computers or the basics of the 
internet. 
 
The US did show support for the AU and AMIS by providing individuals to sit 
in on open AU open meetings as an observer country. 
 
I think it’s a dynamic one as I was able to um, there were many open meetings 
where we [the US] were able to sit in as observe countries to observe that 
dynamic. 
 
The US provided the AU with personnel to assist in their planning and 
management mechanisms and was the top international contributor to support AMIS. 
The US provided financial support (in kind) for the deployments and the sustainability 
of AMIS. 
 
The US provided personnel to aid in planning and management of AMIS…US 
provided financial support for actual deployment and employment and 
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sustainment of AMIS. The US was the top international contributor.   
 
How did AU request US Support?  AU requested in 2 bi-lateral through our US 
Embassy Mission and EU parties in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia partners.  Multi-
lateral formally hand-over through actual AU donors. 
 
The United States and the EU were also critical, observer countries who 
provided expertise in terms of practical strategic planning. They also provided 
the resources that were critical to the AU in terms of setting up the base camps, 
providing military personnel with expertise that were invaluable 
 
       One of the challenges seen with US support was with the contractors that 
were acting on the behalf of the US.   There was a view that some of the contractors 
may not have taken the mission as seriously as they should have and therefore there 
were shortcomings experienced in AMIS due to the contractors not adhering to the 
standards.  The US was not always able to fulfill its stated obligation since it was using 
contract work and depended on the company hired to fulfill its obligation in a time 
agreed upon. 
 
Well, I think it was critical. I mean we provided the base camps. We provided 
logistic support. I think part of some of the downfalls were within some of the 
contractors themselves. 
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… to my knowledge there were PAE and DynaCorp both had the contracts to do 
that and some of DynaCorp's own shortcomings in not adhering to standards and 
timelines had a negative impact on the AMIS mission…the AU could not have 
done it without us. With that said, some of the contractors provided by the US 
just didn't take the mission as seriously as it needed to be. 
 
And this is where I am able to make my criticisms of DynCorp because they did 
not think they were supposed to build thirty camps and they were behind the 
eight ball much to the dismay to our government and the AU.  I believe the 
mechanism was that AU went directly to State and then State would levy the 
requirement. 
 
There were other contractors outside of AMIS that the US supplied to the AU 
headquarters for support. Although, there was the view that there were but a few US 
contractors supporting the AU headquarters where the AU lacked expertise. 
 
…we only provided a couple of individuals to my knowledge, you know. I think 
they needed some expertise and I think we provided it again through contract 
support. 
 
The lack of a US mission to the AU during AMIS was seen as a huge challenge 
and disadvantage for the US in providing support to the AU.  During most of AMIS, the 
role of the US was handled by the local US Embassy staff and information from 
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Washington.  There was some assistance the US military sent but it was challenged by 
short duration work that lacked continuity and expertise. 
 
…not having a mission with the AU kind of hampered the mission of the US. 
We didn't--Washington didn't really deploy permanent staff.   
 
Every now and then we got some military liaisons at major levels as well on rotations, 
only on really like really quick rotations as another challenge--not having much 
continuity, not everybody actually understanding the importance of the mission or not 
necessarily having the background for that type of mission. We had a meteorologist 
who was a really great guy and I'm sure he's-- I mean I remember a lot of times where 
we were like planning an organization that he didn’t understand.  It was kind of ad hoc 
also who we got to be able to support the African Union. 
 
US support mechanisms: 
The US department of State and the White House were involved with 
developing support mechanism for the AU with the bi-partisan support of the US 
Congress. There was an interagency cooperative effort under way with the US congress 
to provide funding for the AU and AMIS. 
 
The AU requested support directly through both the US State Department and 
the White House. 
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There was bi-partisan support in Congress, so this made it much easier to 
provide that kind of situation in terms of funding for AMIS. There was on this 
particular case the state department played a critical role. The interagency as a 
whole, NSC (National Security Council) as well, this was one of those issues 
where it really took interagency cooperation as well as cooperation with 
congress in order to be able to execute US assistance with AMIS.  
 
 
…I think that's a bureaucratic thing and really wasn't that important, in all 
honestly…the beauty and the course of bureaucracies is that these decisions 
were strategic decisions. The paper work is important to get the movement down 
at the bottom to get things in. It goes back to what I said, they don't have 
sufficient personnel. They don't know the American system very well. They 
know the European system very well, so we as the US have not done a very 
good job on our part to understand their mechanisms. The problem isn't with the 
AU. The problem is with the US, wanting things to happen the way that we are 
comfortable, not taking time to understand the mechanisms of an organization. 
So it isn't a problem in their structure it’s a problem in the US failure to 
understand how the AU mechanisms work and to work through their time frame 
and their schedule  
 
The US provided support for AMIS through the establishment of base camps 
and the use of a contract company such as Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) in 
204 
Darfur as one of the resources offered and used by the AU.  A challenge was observed 
in the US contractors being able to access resources in Sudan. 
 
…we built the camps in Darfur. 
 
It got to the point where you know, there is a lot of oil produced, a lot of oil 
taken out of the ground in Sudan, and they have refineries. So you would think 
that fuel would not be an issue, but it was cheaper for PAE, the contractors, to 
fly fuel from Kuwait and fill bladders than it was to have fuel trucked from the 
refineries into Sudan. So I mean that's the level of non-cooperation and friction 
that the Sudanese government was able to put in. 
 
The US was cognizant that the AU needed assistance and that the way the US 
ran its normal speed had to be adjust to the bureaucratic speed of operation of the AU.  
The lack of structure was mentioned as a challenge to supplying US support.  There was 
a perception that it was sometimes easier to deal with the troop-contributing countries 
themselves rather than the AU headquarters. 
 
…we seemed willing to support.  But again, you know--no I think you know 
from a US Government standpoint, we were in certain aspects we were more 
forward leaning because we would see things and try provide suggestions in the 
AU at times, you know. It’s like, "Well, wait a minute guys. This is ours. You 
need to wait for us 
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I would say yeah out of efficiencies, you know we wanted to help improve, but 
the Africans were like, "Well, wait a minute." And they tended to be very 
bureaucratic in their approach. 
 
I think what perhaps might have been frustrating more for the US and the EU 
countries was not having the elaborate structure. But, it was a bit ironic because 
neither does the EU have this structure in place (laughs) to deploy forces, to 
handle resources, and has to rely on its NATO partners to do that kind of peace 
keeping engagement. It was easier for the US to directly engage with the AU or 
to directly engage with the country's-- contributing countries to the AMIS 
mission 
 
The US had supplied the AU with some vehicles and communications 
equipment prior to AMIS.  The equipment was in poor repair and the US was able to 
inspect the equipment and offer some level of support in ordering spare parts through a 
US Combined Joint Task Force in the Horn of Africa located nearby in the country of 
Djibouti. 
The US did have some US HMMWVs (8 or 10, I think) and other peripheral 
military equipment (including some communications equipment) that had been 
provided to the AU some years before under a security assistance case.  The 
vehicles and other equipment were in a poor state of repair, but we were able to 
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get logistics soldiers from CJTF-HOA in Djibouti to come and inspect the 
vehicles and equipment in order to order spare parts and get them into 
operational condition, with an eye towards possibly shipping them eventually to 
Darfur for AMIS.   
 
The US was the major contributor to AMIS and Darfur.  Through the US 
Department of State’s Agency for International Development (USAID), the US was 
perceived to have placed more money support and assets to Darfur than any other donor 
nation.  The US built all the AMIS base-camps through US funding and US hired 
contractors. 
 
Well, I can tell you what, you know the US support--the US put more money in 
terms of humanitarian aid into Darfur than everybody else put together was I 
think the standard response to that. The US money built all of those camps. The 
US construction teams or the US contractors, PAE, funded by the US 
Department of State built all of those camps…our support was noticeable our 
interest both at the international development level through USAID (US Aid 
International Development) it was a huge number. I don't have those numbers in 
my head anymore, but if I remember correctly the standard response was that the 
United States is putting more development money and assets into Darfur than 
everyone else put together. 
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The USAID International Development office was in Kenya handling Darfur 
issues rather than located in Khartoum due to the refusal of the staff to relocate to 
Sudan.   Due to the lack of staff and senior level personnel located in Sudan, the US was 
impacted by this challenge of locality in providing US assistance through the US 
Department of State. 
 
…there was a US office, a USAID office in Khartoum but yet a lot of the Sudan 
operations were stilling running out of Nairobi for political reasons within 
USAID.  Some of the USAID people said I will never move to Khartoum, you 
know, because they have been fighting--they had been working with South 
Sudan for 20 years under Operation Life Line Sudan. They literally had a little 
revolt in their office, "We won't go." We had the deputy secretary come out to 
Darfur, the Deputy Secretary State Zoellick came out to Darfur. There was high 
level interest on the part of the US State Department.  I am trying to remember if 
we had any senior military people come to Darfur. 
 
Future of Peacekeeping: 
The adoption in 2015 of the Kigali Principles laid out the policy that a 
peacekeeping mission’s responsibility is the protection of civilians.  These types of 
principles did not exist during AMIS. 
 
…was sort of a clear lessons learned that simply re-hatting AU missions to UN 
missions creates problems with command and control, and discipline. And that 
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you know I think one of the things that the UN is working on now is 
strengthening accountability…so for our current project on strength and 
cooperation to the UN secretary and the AU we are looking at how the UN's 
human rights due diligence policy can either be adapted or complied with by the 
African Union itself, and I think certainly 10 years ago, there was not an 
emphasis on that sort of thing. It was, you know trying to get troops to a critical 
location as quickly as possible. 
 
…so, one of the big priorities for the United States now for example is having 
countries to adopt the so-called Kigali Principles and so after the UN 
peacekeeping summit in September 2015, which was co-hosted by Obama, 
President Kagame, the President of Rwanda, and a few others…it had been a 
series of international conferences in peacekeeping. And so one last year was in 
Kigali and one of the main results outcomes of that conferences was the 
adoption of the Kigali Principles, which is essentially a focus on the protection 
of civilians. 
 
The right for the AU to intervene: 
  The right to intervene was an issue that the AU faced in executing AMIS.  The 
Government of Sudan’s impediments would not be an issue for the peacekeepers of 
today.  
 
The United States…adopted the Kigali Principles…so 10 years after Darfur 
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there's now a recognition formally that one of the key reasons you have 
peacekeeping is to protect civilians and I think that was certainly an argument 
that wasn't made as strongly back then. There was a lot of difficulty in getting in 
the--there's a lot of deference in the government of Sudan on what could or 
could not have been done by AMIS by UNIMID a lot of issues related to the 
transition from the AU to the UN for example, there was a debate on whether 
the different UN or peacekeepers wearing the UN insignia. There was always a 
continual reliance on the government of Sudan in trying to but they would deny 
visa for people going and so, you know there was just a lot of things that we just 
would not stand for now 
 
US policy: 
The US had a policy of “no genocide on my watch’ during AMIS and the US 
Administration.  The US was developing policies toward Sudan that included Darfur as 
well as the issues related to Sudan.  The US was exerting pressure on the diplomatic 
front to resolve the issue in Darfur. 
  
…from a policy level, it was first and foremost the commitment of the president 
not to have genocide on his watch, and the administration as a whole was very 
forward leaning in developing a Sudanese policy. A multipronged Sudanese 
policy--one that dealt with Darfur, one that dealt with Juba and the other that 
dealt with Khartoum in terms of a civil war simultaneously taking place, while 
you had genocide on going in the Darfur region. 
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Tremendous diplomatic support from the US to try and resolve crisis. 
 
The US had a special envoy in Sudan to address the north-south issue.  There 
were a number of issues in Sudan to include Darfur and the peace mission of the AU 
and AMIS that was not on the agenda of the US Special Envoy to Sudan. 
 
…from that prospective it was having a special convoy to handle the civil war 
component which was between north and south. That commitment to a special 
convoy allowed the US government and the admiration to have at least a two-
pronged approach to the issue.  There was also unrest in parts of northern Sudan 
as well going on… 
 
…with an ongoing civil war taking place the thought of having a peace keeping 
mission in Darfur was unthinkable for the Sudanese government. So, from a 
standpoint of the US you had to look at all of the parameters. You had 
humanitarian crisis taking place in the south (laughs) you know with the civil 
war. You had the potential for regional conflict to take place with the 
neighboring states. You had from the intervention of Chad into Darfur at times, 
or the Sudanese intervening into Chad to overthrow the current regime there.  
 
You had the Central Africa Republic on the other side, you had the influence of 
refuges into Kenya as well. 
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…the United States itself has had a series of US special envoys for 
Sudan…most recently Donald Booth, but at the time of AMIS, Darfur was not 
on the agenda of the US Envoy, I think--there was certainly a time when it did 
not have one and the AU itself I recall, if recall correctly, was not very active 
politically as well.  I think that was definitely was a problem. 
 
The lack of interest from the US military in supporting missions outside of those 
missions it had in Afghanistan and Iraq was also seen as a challenge exhibited by the 
US.  The US military was heavily engaged with Iraq and Afghanistan at the time of 
AMIS.  CENTCOM demonstrated little interest in supporting the AU or placing AMIS 
as a priority. 
 
...US bosses had little to no interest in supporting any AU mission in 
Darfur.  Obviously, at the time, OEF and OIF were both in high 
gear.  CENTCOM was stretched very thin and completely focused on al Qaeda, 
other radical Islamist groups in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen.  Darfur 
was absolutely not a priority. 
…through my experience, I quite often I had to play the hand that I got dealt. So 
I am used to, you know, being under resourced because no one gets two shits 
even in our own military about Africa.  
 
CENTCOM was obviously focused on Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, 
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etc.  They were not interested in providing resources or staff officers for an AU 
mission in Darfur. 
 
The US election also impacted the US military level of involvement with AMIS 
and Darfur.  The Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US Department of Defense 
was briefed daily on the number of US military personnel in Sudan. There was a 
perception that the US military was limited to five personnel on the ground in Sudan for 
US political reasons.  
 
And so, there was a US election coming up and the person sitting at the head of 
the table said, "We just have to keep a lid on this till November." Meaning that 
there was a slide presented to the chairman regularly on the exact count of US 
service personnel in Darfur and that number was never officially supposed to get 
more than five, but yet there could be a few people brought in from Juba. So, the 
exact size of the US Defense Liaison Office was five and that's what the 
chairman said, "That's as big as we are going to get," based on I'm sure 
instructions from the civilian side. So, there wasn't a lot of military interest in 
being there but USAID and the State Department really wanted to sort this out. 
 
AU resources: 
To overcome the issues that AMIS faced, there is now a move to get involved 
before the introduction of peacekeeping forces by the UN.  However, the AU still 
remains poorly resourced to handle peace intervention before a peacekeeping force is 
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introduced to address the problem. 
 
I think the greater sort of discussion globally now and peacekeeping recognizes 
that there's a lot of discussion now within the UN Security Council on peace 
building and peace building architecture on that it’s obviously better to get 
involved before you have to get to a peacekeeping situation to prevent conflict. 
There is a greater emphasis on conflict prevention now and I think a lot of 
rhetoric is paid to that although the AU is still resourced very poorly.  
 
Interference of Sudan: 
Sudan often stepped in the way of the AU to exercise its peacekeeping mission, 
slowing the progress of AMIS.  The US along with the EU had difficulty in getting 
support personnel into Sudan and Darfur to offer expertise to AMIS. 
 
I recall spending hours of meetings discussing things as mundane as you know 
people not being able to get visas…where you would have partners from the 
United States, from the European Union who were critical to AMIS who simply 
couldn't get there because of the Sudanese host government.  
 
Training: 
Training was another aspect of how the US provided support to the AU and 
AMIS.  There was an effort by the US to expedite training when needed.   Training was 
a challenge for the AU and those African countries supporting AMIS but not 
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insurmountable since the US was attempting to provide training through its 
peacekeeping training initiative.   
 
…we did the training of the troops--the peace keeping training of the troops was 
fundamentally a major contribution. 
  
For some it was immediate--there were refresher courses to be given for the 
Nigerians. 
 
I think an important factor too is the countries were trained through our peace 
keeping--through the US peacekeeping program that really added to the quality 
of the troops that were going to be placed on the ground, and the US was 
instrumental in providing. I would say not quite overnight training for those who 
hadn't had the training yet, but the political will to make that training available 
in as expeditious amount of time that could be done. So, the challenges, while 
clear, were not insurmountable for the AU. 
 
The US African Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) and the 
US International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs were force 
multipliers for the troops that populated AMIS. 
 
 …all of the militaries that were involved, the Senegalese, the South Africans, the 
Nigerians, the Rwandans, IMET was a positive aspect for AMIS. 
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…what I would say though is there has been a positive impact of the US IMET 
program because we have seen over time an enhanced African professionalism 
of the voluntaries. 
 
I think it contributed to it and then you throw in the ACOTA as things you know 
when they morphed--you the original AMIS mission didn't have the benefit of 
the ACOTA. But, subsequent because the lessons learned from the first AMIS--
clearly when you look at the improvement of the forces because of the ACOTA 
training part of deployment. 
 
For the French, there was some level of animosity toward the US training former 
French colonial nations, such as Rwanda.  However, the training for the Rwandans was 
a straight forward effort for the US. 
 
For the Rwandans, that presented a much bigger change because for one the 
French were not supportive. Now, why would the French have anything to do 
with our process? Well, they were interfering a little bit with the AU process in 
terms of not wanting Rwanda peacekeepers…not outwardly stating, but that 
animosity was there…our training of the Rwandan peacekeepers was pretty 
straight forward. 
 
One view was the avenue for training was not seen as being hindered by the US.  
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The US tended to act swiftly to provide the training. 
 
There was very little resistance within our own systems. That was just simply 
bureaucratic mechanisms of nominating them for it and moving them forward.  
   
There were other views on how swiftly the US could react to the training 
requirements of African troops for peacekeeping.   One of the challenges for US support 
came in the form of accountability for the training form the Department of Defense and 
the Department of State. 
  
But those mechanisms again come back to the US doing a better job of our own 
mechanisms are not well put into place, so it's not about the AU (laughs) with 
that it’s about the US.   Our own bureaucratic challenges between you know 
ACOTA (Africa Contingency and Operations Assistant) and IO (Information 
Operations) and who controls it, between the Defense Department and the State 
Department--those were some of the biggest impediments to getting people 
trained and moved, and money moved, and who would lift them and who would 
authorize it.  
 
…despite the sheer enormity of our bureaucracy, we were at times the biggest 
impediment of getting things done. The contracts, that wasn't part of my 
portfolio so you know those are things that I think internally the US would have 
to look at but there are legal impediments to what we can and cannot do, but 
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there are legal impediments to what the AU can and cannot do…until someone 
takes the time--some really smart bureaucratic, who does the due diligence--and 
we did have some who helped make it work overtime, but those were patch 
work things, we haven't go back to reduce those.  
 
I think with having US and AU on board we are better able now, we were better 
able to do it for AMISOM because there was a team on the ground. We had 
wonderful people who had been placed on the ground for AMIS to help us, but 
that was Ad hoc. 
 
…because we didn't have a joint US and AU, mission things with AMIS were 
harder. 
 
One of the challenges for the AU and the US was the lack of a multinational 
training availability to train multinational African forces—the type of training that was 
viewed as invaluable for African peacekeeping force for integration in AMIS.  US 
training for the African troop contributing countries was based on a bi-lateral basis.   
 
The US ACOTA (Africa Contingency and Operations Assistance) training was 
governed on a bi-lateral training basis.  Thus, the US could not provide multi-
national peacekeeping training to multinational peacekeeping forces destined for 
AMIS. 
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US interest in the AU and AMIS: 
During the bulk of AMIS, the US did not have an accredited Ambassador or 
official military advisor to the AU.  The Ambassador to Ethiopia and the Defense 
Attaché Office took on the responsibility of being the senior US representatives, but 
their involvement was more a function of desire on their part and not sanctioned as an 
official US Embassy mission by the US Department of State. 
 
There wasn’t much interest in the Central Command leadership with 
involvement with the AU at the beginning. 
 
The Department of State did not place the AU and AMIS as a mission associated 
with the US Embassy at the start of AMIS. 
 
The AU even engaging with us was very kind because we did not have 
diplomatic status at the time. So, it's very interesting that it wasn't until very late 
in 2006 did we have diplomatic relations formalize. We had a courtesy, we had a 
gentleperson's agreement to work, but didn't have diplomatic privileges  
 
…we were fortunate enough to have DOD to dedicate at least two personnel 
overtime during AMIS to facilitate the airlift requirements because our 
Ambassador to Ethiopia was not accredited as an ambassador to the AU, and we 
had a wonderful ambassador, but the ambassador didn't have that authority. 
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…it was very much sort of an ad hoc working level arrangement. We didn't have 
people fully dedicated to the African Union. We had junior political officers 
who did a great job, but you know nevertheless they had other responsibilities, 
and so. And the African Union itself was sort of an adjunct responsibility for the 
United States Embassy at the time. 
 
...and finally, on the diplomatic side, that was a time when the US mission to the 
African Union was first established, you know that carved out of the bilateral 
mission at the US Embassy in Addis Ababa. 
 
The US did not want to provide direct monetary support and opted to provide 
goods in-kind as well as providing US personnel to support such challenges as logistics. 
 
We didn't want to give money per say, so was support was going to be in kind 
because we didn’t' think that there was enough people in capacity for the 
African Union to handle money transparently. I think that's where most of the 
partners tended to go as well to go support in kind. Um, I don't recall the various 
exact things we provided them honestly at this stage  
 
And of course, personnel provided, for instance logistics…military personnel 
were kind at a major level at one stage initially to help out with logistic 
planning. 
 
220 
Ability of the AU to receive US support: 
The AU had a lack of expertise to handle the paperwork and documentation it 
took to receive US support.  The AU did not use the US system for request for support, 
rather the AU used telephonic or a simple letter for requests.  One participant believed 
that the US should have simplified our system for requests rather than the one 
mentioned above.  There was the view that the US could streamline its bureaucratic 
process for the AU.   In addition, the perception was that the US Representative can 
now “translate” the requests for the AU and place the request for support in the US 
system. 
 
Right of the top I can't think of anything in particular. I mean there biggest--one 
their biggest concern was the enormity of the amount of paper work, which they 
could not handle because of personnel go through and have the expertise on. 
 
AU requests for US Support were haphazard and generally passed simply by 
voice or simple letter to State political officers from the Embassy.  I’m unaware 
if other avenues of communication from the AU to Washington were open or 
operating. 
I would say streamline bureaucratic processes for requests, you know making 
your requests 
So, it would be important for us to simply our process before you go to 
understand their structure. The diligence is not on the organization there to 
understand your entire--they do have some responsibility, but recognize that 
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they have 53 of their own countries to understand and then they have rest of the 
world. So, I think that we could be far more efficient if we would take the time 
to have now with our embassy on our ground, dedicated personnel to understand 
the structure there, and then communicate that back so we could begin to look at 
how we do business with the AU, and then it would truly be a win-win situation. 
 
The lack of qualified and experienced personnel at the AU who could handle the 
intricate paperwork for accessing US support was also seen as a challenge to the AU.  
The perception was that the AU could have improved its request mechanism for the 
support of the US by increasing the number of personnel handling such requests at the 
AU.  There was also the perception that the US could have had a more rapid response 
time to the AU requests. 
 
Challenges AU had in seeking US Support?  AU had difficulty clearly 
articulating requirements in detail for US to react to the requests 
 
How could US have improved the request mechanism for US support for AMIS?  
The AU needed more personnel with ability to identify/interpret/transmit request 
for support—US could have been more available and able to react quicker. 
 
Several participants were not familiar with how the AU personnel requested US 
support.  There was a perception that the US most likely overwhelmed the AU system.  
The DITF was a way to get the AU into the US request system. 
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I'm not familiar with that mechanism, so I don't know to be honest. 
 
Oh (pause), you know, I'm trying to think. I am trying to remember the exact 
nature of the request. I think it was-- I mean obviously certainly the US was 
extremely interested in, I would say probably quickly overwhelmed the capacity 
of the African Union too (laughs), to deal with our extreme desire to have them 
to request assistance (laughs) as how I would put it (laughs). 
 
I do not know how that worked.   There were very few times that I was privy to 
or that I was asked to relay messages to the government for direct support. I 
think all of that was sort of handled at the African Union level dealing with the 
office of International Organizations--the Bureau of International Organizations 
at the State Department. 
 
I don't recall how they did that. I know one of the mechanisms was through the 
partners in the--there was a partner’s meeting that meet weekly in Addis Ababa 
that was chaired by working level members of the African Union Commission. 
And maybe that was the problem that uh, often it would be uh the so-called AU 
DITF (Darfur Integrated Taskforce) as opposed to say the Vice Chairperson, 
someone of a higher level--the peace and security commissioner who would 
make direct request to partners. 
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The US wanted to have visibility for assisting, although there was reluctance in 
Washington on how to engage with the AU on Darfur and AMIS.  There was the idea 
that stronger diplomatic push by the AU at a higher level would have been an avenue 
for the AU to engage with the US. 
 
…definitely there is this desire to be seen, as I mentioned before, as a relevant 
actor and a real organization, and to get accredited even in Washington, you 
know…it was kind slow in coming to terms with that higher level of diplomacy, 
and part of it was probably due to the fact that you know, Washington was still 
skeptical of what this organization is and where it's heading and what it 
represented. Is it in contrast to what we are trying to achieve on the continent, 
but on the other hand, realizing that there's this genocide happening and we can't 
go in ourselves, so we need that organization to be capable. I think maybe a 
higher level of diplomacy on the part of the African Union could have been 
called for as well; a lot was done at lower levels (laughs). 
 
African member and international partner support: 
There was, in many cases, a complete reliance on international partners, such as 
the US to provide many of the logistical, training and monetary resources for AMIS.  
Most African countries supporting AMIS were challenged with basic clothing and 
equipment with a few exceptions.  Inoperability of equipment was a concern for the US 
and the support it could offer. 
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There were a million and one basically because they relied fully on the partners, 
so called…with the US, UK, Canada, European Union, and so on and so forth 
and France to be able to provide everything they that they needed…and were 
very clearly about what kind of equipment and trying to prioritize and we just 
get lists and lists and lists from the various countries that were going to 
contribute to AMIS.  South Africa didn't require too much, but some other 
countries even asked for like underwear. Fruit of the loom (laughs), you know, 
that's what we were given because they literally had nothing to be able to send to 
help make sure that these forces were deployed properly.   
 
They relied on outsiders for vehicles, which of course took a long time to get 
there…for satellite and other kind of communications. Again, making sure that 
their equipment was compatible with each other that was another issue…waiting 
for it to get there, clearing it through customs, and I mean every single bit, you 
know (pause), was a challenge (laughs). 
 
The African Union has not been able to project itself logistically and depends 
solely on international partner. 
…caused the African Union to depend solely of international funding support 
and financial accounting. 
 
The AU had to depend on member nations to volunteer to provide peacekeeping 
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forces.  The AU could not involuntarily commit a sovereign nation’s troops to 
peacekeeping in AMIS. 
 
Again, I mean I think the AU itself probably did just about as much as it could 
have given its capabilities at the time, and given the fact that they we're relying 
on you know, force contributors from various countries of with very different 
capabilities in it of themselves (laughs). 
 
US contributions through NATO was another avenue that the US demonstrated 
support to the AU for executing AMIS.  The view was that the AU could not have 
executed AMIS on their own without outside assistance.  
 
I think that you know, once the UN got involved and you know, NATO as well 
that that was basically what was needed. I don't think necessarily that they could 
have done it on their own, and I don't know what they could have done at that 
point in time to improve apart from being a little more organized (laughs), 
maybe calling convenient task force something of nerve center that would be 
really dedicated to the issue. 
 
There were issues related to the colonial period with the EU and NATO that the 
US did not necessarily have to deal with in supporting the AU.  The African member 
states may have viewed NATO as having members that were former colonizers fighting 
against the liberation of several African nations through its membership. 
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…the AU has always been reliant on partners. The United States played a 
critical role at that point in providing assistance with planning. The EU did as 
well. NATO had an office in Addis Ababa that also that contributed, but I think 
one that’s not worth noting now.  
 
One thing that is worth noting that is perhaps different 10 years ago, was that 
NATO in 2004 I got the impression still had some stigma from Cold War Era. 
That you still had some Africans who recalled NATO fighting against the Wars 
of Liberation, and so I think now obviously maybe that stigma is not so strong 
but it was always more palatable politically to propose that EU would do 
something as opposed to NATO even if it was the same countries. 
I think in hindsight, the African Union welcomed American engagement and 
involvement obviously as a non-European country we did not have the baggage 
of the colonial past in Africa, and I think it is relevant.  
 
…I do recall some reticence of dealing with NATO for example, as opposed to 
the European Union because of this perception that they were, you know, 
colonial powers trying to exert influence in African. 
 
There was also a need to establish an international partners group.  At the start 
of AMIS, every international partner was working independently of the other partners, 
and the AU was becoming overwhelmed attempted to answer the questions and requests 
227 
from the international partners, one by one. 
 
…an attempt at that type of once stop shopping to convene, you know 
representatives from the African Union together with the partner countries--they 
didn't like the donor countries, so partner countries of the African Union to try 
access what the needs were and to get answers back more quickly in a real 
time…but again that was basically an outside creation member meetings at the 
US embassy--well we initially had our own kind of partner coordination group 
that then involved the African Union and we were kind of going one by one, you 
know the American's are calling the same the folks, the Canadians were calling 
the same folks and the other international partners were calling the same folks at 
the AU.  The AU became over tasked with all the phone calls… 
 
There was an effort to stream line the process between the AU and the 
international partners, the US looked at what type of international partners group could 
work most efficiently without interfering with any one partner.  
 
…so, that's why we set up--we basically decided that they needed to have a 
system that better handled all our queries in one place.  I remember meeting at 
the embassy, the US embassy, where we had some folks out from Washington to 
try and look at what-- okay what kind of structure could be effective for the 
African Union to use. Is it interfaced with a partner’s? And to try to coordinate 
things a bit better and that's how the integrative task force was born. 
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The international partners group sent representatives to the DITF.  The four 
representatives of the partner’s group. The US, UK, Canada and the EU represented the 
whole with interaction and questions for the AU related to AMIS. Later, the UN and 
NATO began to participant in the DITF meeting. 
 
So, the Darfur Intergraded Taskforce was this basically (sighs)…we had (sighs)-
-we had one sometimes usually one civilian and one military sometimes a 
member from like the African Union meeting together with representatives of 
partner of countries: US, UK, Canada and the European Commissioner were 
core members, and then every now and again we invited like some other AU 
member state to come and sit in on a rotating basis 
 
I mean the Darfur Intergraded Taskforce got expanded, you know as more 
players came in. So, the UN joined at one point and we had visits from NATO 
folks and stuff like that too. 
 
There was a challenge at the AU in planning for US and international partner 
support.  The International partners and the US filled the planning gap themselves to 
assist the AU with AMIS. 
 
The international partners themselves decided to create a structure to field 
requests and to harmonize and de-conflict.  We basically again, we meaning the 
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partners, kind of realized that as a gap and sort of created that structure for them 
to help them organize themselves.  They were basically working ad hoc.  Just 
kind of allowing various partners to be taking up all their time and meetings and 
not really being able to plan. There's a huge planning deficit, which again is a 
challenge. 
 
I remember we were going to be contributing I remember tents like lodging 
basically; not simple tents but lodging.  We played a huge kind of a coordinating 
role in terms of daily in some cases and in many cases conference calls with the 
various capitals, to make sure that the capitals were in sync with what the 
various embassies were hearing.   
 
As the AU was in the process of transferring AMIS to UNAMID in early 2007, 
the US established a full-time US Representative to the AU (USAU) with 
Ambassadorial rank.  The USAU was installed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in order to 
provide more direct US high level support to the AU. 
 
…what we take for granted now just didn't exist more than a decade ago and so 
when the US mission to the African Union was first stood up, I think for several 
months there was no there who was actually was a foreign service officer. You 
had US personnel assigned in temporary assignments…civil servants from 
Washington and some basic ways of engaging with things just didn't exist. For 
example, now we have the equivalent of a DATT (defense Attaché) that the 
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defense had to share with the defense liaison office to engage with the African 
Union on peacekeeping planning and a whole gamut of issues. But, back then it 
was much more ad hoc. 
 
The US was the first country to have provided a direct representative to the 
African Union. The EU followed suit about a year later, year fourteen months, 
but it was an EU representative. So, the US to date still remains the only non-
observer country who has a dedicated representative to it. 
 
The US was allowed access to the AU headquarters that some of the other non-
member states did not have due to the relationship that the US had established with the 
AU prior to and during the start of AMIS. 
 
 The relationship between the US and the AU, a very positive one, allowed for 
some areas of access that some of the other non-African countries would not 
have had.  
 
At first the US and the international partners did not have direct access to the 
AU and therefore much of the US work was completed at the US Embassy.  In high-
level meetings, the US Ambassador would meet with the AU to provide strength to the 
US position. 
 
Well, again we didn't have admission to the African Union, so we were dealing 
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with everything out of the embassy, which is a challenge (laughs). We didn't 
have enough gas to the African Union even, um many other countries did. Um, 
we again, um, you know, um (pause) while definitely the ambassadors ceased 
and you know, the secretary of state would busy with what was happening in 
Darfur and the African Union response. 
 
It was what it came down to in coordination with Washington by telephone of 
course and daily situation reports.  I definitely wouldn't say that higher levels 
weren't at ease with that matter because they were, and definitely we could count 
on the ambassador and others to meet with their counterpart or whatever 
necessary.  
 
At times, there was a competition between the international partners in 
supporting AMIS.  Some partners would attempt to support AMIS through their 
missions in other countries, such as the Australians who were located in Kenya.  There 
was the perception there were challenges due to the lack of senior people around the 
table taking the requests and that there was a measure of ad hoc planning and support 
from the AU for accessing support, such as the US and western partners. 
 
Well, I mean apart from of course there is always this kind of competition from 
with the partner countries as well and who's going to give a lot, and how that's 
played to their public, and you know the Europeans wanting to "Okay--We will 
air lift these folks because they-- we had a closer relationship with them, and 
232 
kind of all of those little interests played into it as well.  
 
I remember that the Australian’s didn't have any mission there either. They were 
covering it with their mission in Kenya. I mean just there's a lot of ad hoc, a lot 
of telephone calls…we had these structures to help coordinate these things a bit 
better but most of the people around the table were fairly junior most of the 
time. 
 
Challenge of AU with AMIS: 
The AU did recognize that AMIS was a huge undertaking and that the AU 
required outside assistance from the US and the west.  However, there was a reticence 
to get the west involved, especially the African didn’t want the US or western troops on 
the ground and US didn’t want to send in US troops. 
 
So, I don't know that they necessarily… because again going back to you know, 
the influence of you know, Libya and others and not desiring too much-- 
definitely no western boots on the ground, um but even any type of meddling as 
they may see it on the part of the United States and some European countries. 
Um, I would say the fact that they needed help was made apparently clear--
abundantly (laughs) clear to them rather than necessarily realizing themselves. I 
don't know that they really had the capability to assess exactly this huge task that 
was in front of them, and probably they would tentative had a much smaller 
scale reaction that would not satisfied at all--kind of western expectations… 
233 
That's definitely a challenge for AMIS. 
 
…from a US prospective, in order to support AMIS, after direct consultation 
with the key African heads of state, in this case with the Ethiopians, with the 
Nigerians, with the Senegalese, with the South Africans, with the Algerians, 
with the Tanzanians, as well as in this case the Egyptians it was fundamentally 
important and at their urging--and I go back to what I said earlier the political 
decision was not US boots on the ground, but there would be African boots on 
the ground and we would support. 
 
The AU may not have recognized what western and US support it actually 
required to run AMIS and did not know how to organize itself to request support.  The 
US may have had a perception that the AU was able to act “above its weight” and 
therefore had an expectation of a more sophisticated method of requesting US support. 
 
…as good as despite the fact that (pause) I don't think they necessarily had the 
where with all to realize what type of support they needed or to organize or to 
realize the type of mission they would have required.  So that's why I think that 
maybe they didn't necessarily request support as such but I think they--our desire 
to have them make an impact and to plunge above their weight, kind of met their 
desire to be taken seriously (laughs) to some extent. 
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There were also competing US interests in Sudan, between the North-South 
issue and Darfur that split the attention of the US Department of State. 
 
I fully suspect that State’s interests were equally balanced between keeping the 
CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement) between North and South from falling 
apart and stopping the fighting. I think those two things were probably equal. 
 
The perception was that the US could have been a stronger supporter of the AU 
during AMIS.  There was a cable sent back to Washington in 2006 outlining how an 
intervention by the US military could succeed but there was not the political will of the 
US Government regardless of the fact that two US presidents and three Secretaries of 
State called Darfur a genocide—something that was not to be tolerated by the US. 
 
We absolutely could have done more. A cable was written in 2006 from an 
individual to the Department of State that was intended to be a decent channel 
cable back to Washington explaining that the ongoing peace agreement, peace 
talks in Abuja were not going to be successful…the cable explained why…If we 
really want to stop the war here this is what we have to do…basically it was a 
call for intervention, a military intervention. Had we wanted to do that and had 
that been politically acceptable, we could have very easily have done so.  I say 
very easily with the fact that we had what 300,000 troops deployed at that point 
because the surge was on going or the surge was ending…71 brigades and 47 of 
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them were deployed at exact moment…a third of the army is prepping to go, a 
third of the army is there, and a third of the army recovering.  
 
You could not have sent a lot of US troops, but you could have very easily using 
special operations taken out the Sudanese Air force, you know get some NATO 
help. 
 
There were any number of ways that the United States could have done more to 
stop what two presidents, three secretaries of state, have called genocide, right?  
 
But it’s an incredibly difficult thing to do.  We would have had to have gone to 
get approval from the UN and China or Russia would have never allowed that, 
right? China gets way, way, way too much oil from the Sudanese. Russia was 
just never going to support that.  So, we would have had to find some why to 
have an authorization. We would have never gotten it through NATO, right? 
Although there was some talk about the European Union and the African Union 
coming together into a support role, so maybe this would have been a mission. 
But could we have done more?  
 
Yeah! Did the political will exist? No. Did the authorization from the 
international community exist? No. Would it have been incredibly hard? 
Absolutely. But, you know the cable that was written at the end of the April 
titled, "Darfur who will apologize?" Because in 1996 I guess after the genocide 
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in Rwanda President Clinton flew to Rwanda, was he president then? Whatever. 
He was still there. He flew to Rwanda and you know on the tarmac gave a 
speech and he said, "We didn't know. You know, we didn't understand."  
 
And he more or less apologized as diplomats do to the people to Rwanda. And I 
asked the rhetorical question, "If we don't solve this problem in Darfur who will 
apologize to the people of Darfur? You know the dead of Darfur?" Because at 
that point we had probably upwards of 350,000 approaching 400,000 dead with 
2.5 million displaced; two presidents, three secretaries of state have called it 
genocide, and under the responsibility to protect, which the agreement came in 
2005, the international community is duty bound to respond to this.  Under--we 
have already gone through pillars 1 and 2 and we now have to go to pillar 3, 
intervention, and we were not intervening…we could have done more. I don't 
think it would have been easy.  I mean it would have been incredibly hard, but 
we could have done more 
 
A shortfall in resources and funding were a major challenge for the AU during 
AMIS.  The US provide resources such as base-camps, logistics and airlift support 
rather than direct monetary support to the AU. 
 
I think one thing that the United States did a lot was we provided a lot of in-kind 
support and continued to do so, and you know in terms of airlift, construction of 
camps and so for, we did a lot of support in that way. I think one of the 
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challenges then that remains a challenge today is that the African Union simply 
has very poor financial resources. 
 
…so in getting financing for peace operations remains a significant challenge 
and the United States uh you know always provided strategic direction in kind 
support, but you know we did not provide funds that were fundable per se. 
 
A reliable funding stream for the AU during AMIS was not available.  There is 
an effort by the AU to have a reliable funding of 25 percent of the cost of any 
peacekeeping mission in hand.  However, the reality was that the AU only has a current 
seven percent level of funding available and most of that seven percent came from the 
international donor source of the EU. 
 
So, I think, as I mentioned, you know one of the current projects now is to make 
African Union peace operations have a more reliable funding stream…the 
African Union Peace and Security Council have pledged in a September 
Communique from last year, 2015, to fund to 25 percent of the cost of the AU 
peace operations by the year 2020. In January, it appointed Donald Kaberuka, 
the former head of the African Development Bank and by the way the Rwanda's 
finance minister when they were first sending troops to Darfur, as an AU high 
representative for the peace fund with the mandate to mobilize resources for AU 
peace operations. 
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I think that's a recognition by the AU that financing remains a serious challenge. 
And just to put in perspective of if the goal of the AU is to get to 25 percent in 
the year 2020 where they are at now? Well, they're at about 7 percent. And that 
7 percent includes significant funding from the European Union, which in 2004 
and even now remains the single largest donor to the African Union 
 
Airlift for transporting AU peacekeepers in and out of AMIS was critical to the 
AU as the African countries did not have the airlift capability that the US and western 
nations had available to transport peacekeepers. 
Airlift I think in the initial stages were: US, Australia, and Algeria were the 
major airlift countries I think in place at the time. The Nigerians also did some 
of their airlift in, but some of their C130's were not operational at the time, so 
that was the primary way of bringing troops in 
 
And then along with the US, the UK, and the Australians we were able to 
coordinate with AMIS and most importantly with the larger umbrella of AU, the 
lift.  
 
The US was one of several donor countries, or international partners, that were 
supporting AMIS.  The African nations did not come to AMIS prepared with equipment 
and support organic to its force that the donor countries were able to provide. 
The observer countries, in there were a couple, which was the coalition of the 
willing, which included uh the US, Australia, the UK, and I think those were the 
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three primary ones that were in place. There were some smaller Scandinavia 
countries who gave some resources, which were usually non-lethal. Japan 
probably gave some non-lethal resources as well, medical support to it. I don't 
remember that the French were contributors in this particular case, but if they 
were then I stand corrected. But UK--Australia might have initially provided 
some type of support. 
 
 …when you go back to the Darfur mission, you know the biggest thing is--here 
you have this African Union mission where you have African militaries, and 
again you've heard the term 'the naked African,' you know the troops show up 
and the donors pay. You know, mainly the United States provides everything 
except for the weapons 
 
So, you had 500 infantry guys show up to become the area security for the 
peacekeeping mission, and yet they had no ground transportation. They had no 
way of feeding themselves. They had no communications. They had no medical. 
They had nothing to maintain any of this. So, the international community had 
to fund all of this, so aviation assets were held at the force level, the major 
general force commander controlled the aviation assets. They consisted of 
primarily of six MI17 helicopters who were contracted I think--who, the 
Canadians contracted them, they were both Russian or Ukrainian pilots…and 
they kind of came with their own maintenance teams I guess.  
 
240 
The communications were contracted by the Brits. The Brits paid to have radios 
installed in all the vehicles. And the Brits paid for all the force level 
communications.  Medical teams at force level and at sector level, there were six 
sectors, I think?   At the sector level, there would be sort of an independent duty 
core man level medic…maybe nurse practitioner level. I think at the force level 
there was a PA or maybe a doctor…food service, um controlled at force level 
paid for I think by the Americans? Construction of the camps paid for by the 
Americans and it was contractors--you had these contractors living out on the 
sector bases providing these services for the Senegalese, or Rwandan, or the 
South African infantry battalion. We base there--or accompany them, we base 
there or whatever depending on the size of the post, but these things are real 
short comings because the logistics, the communications aren't integrated into 
the unit so it just doesn't work very well. 
 
The AU had to depend on the donor countries outside of Africa and that made 
the AU vulnerable to the limitation of resource and financial support in a timely 
manner.  Another challenge for the AU was the influence that the donor nations were 
able to exert. 
 
You rely on donor support, so you know, when you relying on donors you are 
beholden to the donors, and not only that the money doesn't come very fast, so 
you wind up being very limited in what you can do. 
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We weren't at every single internal meeting, although I would say that probably 
the partners had a lot more access and were a much greater part of the decision 
making and agenda setting that would be the normal, but you know they had no 
other choice. 
 
The US would have had a different method of executing AMIS.  A major 
challenge for the AU was the lack of a staff that had planning experience and some 
could not operate a computer. 
 
If this had been a US operation, we would have had dozens of planners with 
every conceivable expertise working 24/7 for weeks or months on end.  They 
had a handful of guys, most of whom had little planning experience, couldn’t 
operate a computer, and some of whom were not fluent in a common 
language.  I think I remember an AMIS planning conference at the AU (late 
2004?), but it was mostly lots of promises which went unfulfilled.  Other 
western nations tried to help, the Brits and Germans.  I think the EU sent a 
liaison officer (Brit?) for a while who tried to help as well.   
 
The US provided its assistance to the AU as services and in-kind contributions, 
rather than straight US dollars.  The lack of direct monetary contributions by the US 
was a disappointment to the AU but it did not cause a rift between the AU and the US.  
The EU was able to react much quicker when it came to monetary infusion and short 
suspense items. 
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You know I think there was a perception that the United States as a super power 
would provide more financial aid to the African Union. There is always that 
hope perhaps. And in that regard, we disappointed the African Union 
Commission because again most of our assistance was assistance in-kind. But I 
don’t know it was a clash between the United States and the African Union. 
 
The US could be slow in its providing in-kind support for certain items.  The 
AU was often able to go with a shopping list to the EU and the EU would 
provide the money to purchase these items where the US had its own 
bureaucratic tail to content with that could slow the process down. 
 
…mainly the United States provides everything except for the weapons. 
 
Construction of the camps paid for by the Americans through direct contracts. 
 
Future of African peacekeeping: 
There was a perceived difference between the US and the AU in how the 
Government of Sudan’s sovereignty was viewed.  There have been several initiatives 
for the US to get more involved with supporting the African nations with peacekeeping 
where lives ae are stake.  These initiatives did not exist during AMIS but the genocide 
in Rwanda and Darfur were the catalyst for the US’s view of today. 
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…looking back to where we were in 2004 with where we are in peacekeeping in 
2016, you know, a key difference now is a recognition that states sovereignty is 
not paramount to the US as it was with the AU. 
 
That there are times when because of the imperative of protecting civilians there 
needs to be greater action. You know, I think the promulgation of these Kagali 
Principles is today the whole right to protect movement…which didn't exist 10 
years ago or perhaps just nascent then as really taken hold, so you know the 
culture in which we conduct peacekeeping is very different now.  
 
And I think also there is a recognition that perhaps, I think, there is more 
openness now maybe doing things without side partners. You see in one of the 
debates with AMIS was trying to preserve the African nature of the mission and 
so while that is a nice goal it means that you’re not going to have support from 
say Nepal or a western country for airlift and you know those things are 
absolutely essential.  
 
…one of the things that the United States is doing now, and this goes back to 
two years ago when it had the US Africa Summit in Washington one of the 
outcomes of that was APREP, the African Peacekeeping Record Response 
Partnership, and it was identifying five or six African countries explicitly that 
would get targeted US assistance to deploy rapidly for a situation in which 
civilian's lives are at risk. And I think in another part of the US institutional 
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framework, that didn't exist then, was the Atrocity Prevention Board, and so at 
largely was a result of Rwanda and possibly Darfur, and now you have an 
Atrocity Prevention Board who proceedings are not public as far as I know, but 
it is an interagency effect at looking at the next Darfur and what is the next. 
 
During AMIS, there was not as much support to the AU as there is today.  
Today there are 35 non-African nations accredited to the AU where the US was not 
accredited to the AU until early 2007, the tail end of AMIS.   There are currently 
additional non-African countries that have been engaging with the AU such as China, 
Japan, Turkey and South Korea that did not exist at the current level during AMIS and 
are seen as competitors of the US for engagement in Africa. 
 
I think as the African Union evolves--I there are more than 35 countries that are 
not part of the African Union's 53 members that I think are accredited to the 
African Union…another big difference I think over the last 10 years is the 
degree to which non-traditional partners have become more active in the African 
Union and Africa itself, so countries like Turkey, China, Japan, and South 
Korea.  
 
You know every major power now has a huge Pan-African event. And so where 
as the United States has continued to have a US-Africa forum to promote trade 
between the United States and Africa.  
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Tokyo has TEKAD (Tokyo International conference on Agricultural and 
development) which is Africa focused…its being held for the first time this year 
in Africa. It used to be held in Tokyo every 5 years. The Japanese plan is to do it 
now every 3 years I believe.  China has a similar thing in Beijing and you have a 
number of other things such as the recent establishment of the Chinese logistic 
based in Djibouti highlights the degree to which these non-traditional partners 
are becoming more and more active in Africa and a competitor to the US’s 
involvement. 
 
The relationship that the US enjoys with the AU now was different at the start of 
AMIS.  Historically the perception was that the US was at a nascent level attempting to 
support the AU in the period of time of AMIS.  The US was becoming more engaged in 
Africa with the advent of PEPFAR and the planning for the establishment of the new 
COCOM, AFRICOM.   
 
I guess one of the other things, that may be very obvious, is that it was the 
beginning of the United States of the formal relationship between African Union 
and the United States at that time, and so it is sort of taken for granted right now, 
but you know 2004 to 2007 was a time when the United States was actively 
trying to become more engaged with Africa.  And so, you know in defense, 
African, was stowed up as a separate command…on the health development side 
you had PEPFAR (President’s Plan for AIDS Relief), launched by President 
Bush, which is now global, but obviously the President's emergency plan for 
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AIDS really focused great, in a large part, on African countries. I think 
Condoleezza Rice, actually no, in Bush's autobiography he talks about the 
genesis of this and how with Condoleezza Rice--the genesis of PEPFAR was 
trying to do more for Africa. 
 
I think it was useful looking at our involvement in the African Union that it was 
part of the broader engagement in African and the establishment of the US 
African Command, with the establishment of the presence of the emergency 
plan for AIDS relief…the United States was doing a great deal on Africa to be 
more engaged and I think it was well received. 
 
Summary of Key Sub-Question 3 
A shortfall in resources and funding were a major challenge for the AU during 
AMIS.   Another challenge for the AU was the lack of a staff that had planning 
experience and some could not operate a computer.  The African nations did not come 
to AMIS prepared with equipment and support organic to its force that the donor 
countries were able to provide.  The US was determined to be the top international 
donor country to the AU during AMIS after initially little interest in supporting the AU.  
The influence that the donor nations were able to exert were seen as a challenge for the 
AU since it lacked its own funding stream and resources. 
The US was not a major support contributor to the AU at the beginning of 
AMIS.   There was the idea that the US Department of State and the US Department of 
Defense, specifically CENTCOM, were not interested in supporting the AU at the 
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outset of AMIS due to the legacy of the former OAU.  Through the efforts and reporting 
by the US embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the State Department began to view the 
AU in different eyes.   
There was a challenge on the US side throughout AMIS in not being able to 
react quickly on some requests for equipment.   The support that did come from 
Washington was assessed as slow in the beginning.  Conversely, the mechanism that the 
US had put in place was difficult for the AU to configure their requests for US support.  
There was the view that the US military was more helpful than other parts of the US 
Government as a whole and that once the US military engaged with the AU the US 
support mechanism sped up the support process. 
The US determined early on in the Darfur crisis not to intervene directly.   There 
was the view that the Africans did not want the western nations to intervene as well.  It 
was the Government of Sudan that chose the AU’s intervention as Sudan did not want 
western intervention on its soil.   The Africans wanted to see African problems as being 
solved by the Africans.  However, the AU was desperately in need of US support, as an 
international donor country, for airlift, logistics, skilled advisers, and resources that the 
AU did not possess.  The view was that the AU could not have executed AMIS on their 
own without outside assistance.  There was, in many cases, a complete reliance on the 
international partners, such as the US, to provide many of the logistical, training and 
monetary resources for AMIS.  Most African countries supporting AMIS were 
challenged with providing basic clothing and equipment with a few exceptions.  
Inoperability of equipment was a concern for the US and the support it could offer.  The 
US ACOTA program did provide support equipment for African peacekeepers that 
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were destined for AMIS. 
Through the US Department of State’s Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the US was perceived to have placed more money support and assets to 
Darfur than any other donor nation.  The US provided financial support (in kind) for the 
deployments and the sustainability of AMIS.  The US Department of State and the 
White House were involved with developing support mechanism for the AU with the 
bi-partisan support of the US Congress. There was an interagency cooperative effort 
under way with the US Congress to provide funding for the AU and AMIS.  The US 
provided resources such as base-camps, logistics and airlift support rather than direct 
monetary support to the AU. 
There was a demonstrated need to establish an international partners group to 
streamline support to the AU.  At the start of AMIS, every international partner was 
working independently of the other partners and the AU was becoming overwhelmed 
attempting to answer the questions and requests from the international partners, one by 
one.  In an effort to stream line the process between the AU and the international 
partners, the US looked at what type of international partners group could work most 
efficiently without interfering with any one partner.   The international partners group 
sent representatives to the DITF.  The four representatives of the partner’s group, the 
US, UK, Canada and the EU, represented the whole with interaction and questions for 
the AU related to AMIS. Later, the UN and NATO began to participant in the DITF 
meeting.  There was a challenge at the AU in planning for US and international partner 
support.  The international partners, including the US, filled the planning gap 
themselves to assist the AU with AMIS. 
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A major challenge for US Support was the lack of knowledge of the structure of 
the AU and the manner in which Africans operated in order for the US and other 
international parties to provide any form of resource or assistance.  The US personnel 
that were providing support to the AU had no difficulty with accessing the officials of 
the AU.  In order to not overwhelm the AU, the US and other international partners set 
up a partners group to provide support to the AU.   The US was able to demonstrate its 
support for the AU and AMIS by being present at AU open meetings as an observer 
country. 
There was a lack of expertise at the AU to handle the paperwork and 
documentation it took to receive US support.  This ca be viewed as a cross-cultural 
issue of African not being cognizant of the way that US as a western nation operated.  
The AU did not use the US system for request for support, rather the AU used 
telephonic or a simple letter for requesting US support that was contrary to the western 
culture way of conducting business.  There was the belief that the US should have 
simplified the American system for requests rather than the complex system the AU 
faced in attempting to access US support.  The AU may not have recognized what 
western and US support it actually required to run AMIS and did not know how to 
organize itself to request support.  The US may have had a perception that the AU was 
able to act “above its weight” and therefore had an expectation of a more sophisticated 
method of requesting US support.  There was a perception that it was sometimes easier 
to deal with the troop-contributing countries themselves rather than the AU 
headquarters. 
The US was exerting pressure on the diplomatic front within the UN and Sudan 
250 
to resolve the issue in Darfur.  The US had a special envoy in Sudan to address the 
north-south issue.  There were a number of issues in Sudan to include Darfur and the 
peace mission of the AU and AMIS that was not on the agenda of the US Special Envoy 
to Sudan. 
 The lack of a US mission to the AU during AMIS was seen as a huge challenge 
and disadvantage for the US in providing support to the AU.  The US during most of 
AMIS was handled by the local US Embassy staff and information from Washington.  
There was some assistance the US military sent but it was challenged by short duration 
work that lacked continuity and lack of expertise. 
 Airlift of TCC peacekeepers was seen as one of the more rapid responses that 
the US possessed in supporting the AU and AMIS.  It was noted that most African 
nations do not possess organic airlift capability. The US, as well as, NATO supplied 
most of the airlift for AMIS.  US contributions through NATO was another avenue that 
the US demonstrated support to the AU for executing AMIS.   
Another vital area in which the US supported AU was through the establishment 
of base camps in Darfur and the use of a contract companies to support the logistics of 
AMIS.  A challenge was observed in the US contractors being able to access resources 
in Sudan.  One of the challenges seen with US support was with the contractors 
themselves that were acting on the behalf of the US.   The US was not always able to 
fulfill its stated obligation since it was using contract work and depended on the 
company hired to fulfill its obligation in a time agreed upon. 
Training was another area that the US demonstrated support to the AU and 
AMIS.  There was an effort by the US to expedite training when needed through the US 
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ACOTA program.   Training was a challenge for the AU and those African countries 
supporting AMIS but not insurmountable since the US was attempting to provide 
training through its peacekeeping training initiative.  The US ACOTA training program 
and the US IMET programs were seen as force multipliers for the troops that populated 
AMIS.   Although the US acted swiftly in providing training support to the AU, there 
was a challenge observed that the US lacked the availability of multi-national training 
on a multi-national basis for the African troops that were assigned to AMIS.  US 
training for the African troop contributing countries was based on a bi-lateral basis. 
Organizational communications was also an area that the US provided assistance 
to the AU.  A US initiative to support the AU in the area of communications was 
through the development of an operations center located at the AU headquarters for 
internal communication as well as communication with AMIS. 
As the AU was in the process of transferring AMIS to UNAMID in early 2007, 
the US established a full-time US Representative to the AU (USAU) with 
Ambassadorial rank.  The USAU was installed in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in order to 
provide more direct US high level support to the AU. 
The diplomatic engagement of the US support mechanism provided an avenue 
for the AU not to repeat the challenges it had experienced with AMIS.  The US wanted 
the AU to learn the lessons from AMIS and apply them to AMISOM.   A US, as well as 
an AU, initiative that the US desired was for the AU to develop a closer working 
relationship with the UN - a relationship that did not exist during the time of AMIS.   
During AMIS, there was not as much support to the AU as there is today.  
Today there are 35 non-African nations accredited to the AU where the US was not 
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accredited to the AU until early 2007, the tail end of AMIS.   There are currently 
additional non-African countries that have been engaging with the AU such as China, 
Japan, Turkey and South Korea that didn’t exist at the current level during AMIS and 
are seen as competitors of the US for engagement in Africa. 
 
Key Sub-Question 4 
Communications:  What were the communications challenges in executing the African 
Union Mission in Sudan, to include cultural communication?” 
Key sub-question 4 addresses the challenges of communication focusing on 
cross-cultural communication challenges exhibited by the AU during the time frame 
through the lens of senior US officials who worked with the AU during AMIS.  This 
study provides the perspective of US senior officials through an interview process 
conducted by the researcher.  Cross-cultural communication was observed by the study 
participants, and each had their own view of how the AU members working in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia at the headquarters of the AU dealt with the challenges brought forth 
with communicating.   
 
Language communication: 
A challenge faced by the AU in the execution of AMIS in Darfur, Sudan was 
related to the communication of language.  There are approximately 2,100 native 
languages used throughout the continent of Africa (Childs, 2003).  The use of one 
language for overall communications as well as the use of native languages when 
applicable was brought forth in the interviews. 
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There were several accounts in the interviews related to the effectiveness of 
language.  The use of English as the primary language of peacekeeping was emphasized 
in the interviews for internal communication and in the four official languages of the 
AU for external communication; English, French, Arabic and Portuguese: 
 
…I can only assume that communication was as effective as one could be given 
that the main language used was English among the commanders and the staffs 
in AMIS. 
 
I mean pretty standard levels of communication through communiques using 
English from AMIS to the AU and externally the AU would use communiques 
written in the four official languages of the AU.  They turned in reports of 
accountability, of challenges they faced in the field to the AU. 
 
The AU, as well as AMIS, used the method of communiques to communicate 
internally and externally. The communiques coming from AMIS were written in 
English as a common language for AU peacekeeping missions.  However, the 
interviews demonstrated that the external communiques from the AU 
headquarters were always provided in the four official languages of the AU; 
Arabic, English, French and Portuguese. 
  
There were a number of challenges brought forth by the participants that ran 
contrary to the effectiveness of the use of English as the primary language used in 
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executing AMIS.  However, the participants noted that the use of English may have 
caused some misunderstanding, but it did not have a negative impact on the 
accomplishment of the overall AMIS peacekeeping mission.  The use of translators at 
the AU assisted in any misunderstanding due to any language difference. 
 
…there were occasional misunderstandings I guess between native Arabic 
speakers, native speakers of other African languages, of other languages, people 
for whom French or English was a second or third language something they 
learned for this job, for a job…but that is to be expected in any kind of 
international mission. I didn't see anything that sort of held the mission back 
because of you know, linguistic communication errors or problems. 
 
Kagame (President of Rwanda) on this film--this video that we saw of him you 
know addressing the diplomats that are there, and he's doing this in English, and 
he addressing whoever else is around in French, he speaks some French for a 
while, and his French isn't that good because he grew up speaking English in 
Uganda. And then he just sort of addresses the troops in Ki-Swahili and he 
basically says to them, "You know we have a long experience with the United 
Nations in this country since 1994. This is ours first international peacekeeping 
mission.”  He told the Rwandan troops to lean forward and protect civilians and 
don't do anything to embarrass this country or yourself. 
 
I don’t have any particular insight into internal communication within the AU, 
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other than it was an understandable challenge.  Common languages versus 
mother tongues, and levels of education were always a challenge among 
contributing countries… 
 
There weren't any real language issues. The missions were conducted in English 
and there were a few Francophone countries represented but I don't remember 
there really being any real issues. Some of the traffic was done in Arabic, but 
there were plenty of translators around. 
 
There was the occasional misunderstanding due to language, but the perception 
was that the mission, such as AMIS, was not hampered by the diverse languages spoken 
on the African continent.  Rwanda was mentioned as a population that spoke at least 
three languages, and the President spoke in a mutual understood language of Ki-
Rwandan when addressing the troops since there was a mix and French and English, but 
all troops spoke the native language of Ki-Rwandan. 
 
…there were occasional misunderstandings I guess between native Arabic 
speakers, native speakers of other African languages, of other languages, people 
for whom French or English was a second or third language something they 
learned for this job, for a job…but that is to be expected in any kind of 
international mission. I didn't see anything that sort of held the mission back 
because of you know, linguistic communication errors or problems 
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…there were political issues…one never knows what a national contingent has 
been told by their national military leadership command or their national 
command, right? 
 
I had seen a video of President Paul Kagame addressing the Rwandan troops just 
as they are boarding the Illusionist to fly from Kegali up to Darfur. And there 
was a big ceremony out on the tarmac at the airport um, and in Rwanda--okay, 
let’s remember that Paul Kagame is Major General Paul Kagame, right? When 
he was in Uganda as a young man in the refugee camps he joined the rebellion 
with Mosetami. He became the intelligence chief of Mosetami's rebel force and 
later the intelligence chief of the Ugandan army, plus he was trained in the 
United States. Then when Fredrick Gamel was killed in the early days of the 
RPF coming across the border in 1990 I guess that was Paul Kagame came back 
from the United States and took charge of the RPF July of 1994, Major General 
Paul Kagame becomes Vice President and Minister of Defense of Rwanda, so 
Kagame then as President is a trained military officer and he's addressing as the 
President of Rwanda this contingent of Rwandan soldiers. Now, it’s interesting 
the Rwandan army, you know there's the native language Ki-Rwanda; there's 
Anglophones that grew up outside the country; there are Francophones that grew 
up inside the country. So, to avoid all of this the orders language for the 
Rwandan army is Ki-Swahili. So, everybody speaks three languages at least, 
right? 
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One participant had the perception that the use of different languages such as 
French and English was a challenge for communication in the AU. 
 
The language between French and English was a problem in communication 
was a challenge in some areas. 
 
Cultural impact on communication: 
The cultural aspect of staffing was an AU structural design that proved to be a 
challenge perceived by a participant.  The AU did not have anyone available during the 
weekend as a part of the African culture. 
 
…on the weekends, nobody's around, at night nobody's answering the phone 
because the offices are not staffed, and that's just not a part of their culture. 
 
There were no issues observed with a cultural issue due to languages for those 
who came from Anglophone nations versus those who came from Francophone nations.  
The mix of Muslim cultures did not pose a challenge to the AU or AMIS.  There did not 
appear to be any issues related to the language barrier. Or the lack of language 
adaptation related to cross-cultural communication. 
 
I didn’t see any difference in the cultural communication between the 
Francophone and Anglophone countries participating in the AU or AMIS.  Not 
really, no. Even a lot of the nationals that were traditionally Anglophone there 
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were a lot of Muslims in there. In the Anglo nations not so much, the Guyana’s, 
the South Africans, the Rwandans…but remember we had the Egyptians we had 
the Senegalese, we had Chadians, and then you know the Darfur rebels were 
represented on the ceasefire mission and on all the investigating teams. The 
Chadians were called mediators, so the Chadians mediators would come on. 
And you know, I never saw any--I don't remember seeing any issues with sort of 
culturally, no. 
 
However, cultural variations did have an impact. The culture of the AU is a mix 
of 53 member nations, all possessing their own culture as well as the culture of the 
continent of Africa. 
 
And again, that stems from the whole AU culture if you will. Culture in 
parentheses, this whole notion--here you have 54 countries, actually its 53 
because Morocco is not a member…a lot of them are very rich, but no one really 
contributed. 
 
There were some cross-cultural issues related to the African versus the western 
way of operating due to the experience of working the western model.  The west had 
certain cultural expectations that were not met by the Africans, such as a 24-Hour 
running operations center, the reporting from units in the field and the development of 
procedures that the African staff followed. 
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There was some real cultural differences and again western and European 
expectations and experience were dramatically different from the experience of 
the African commanders 
 
…well culturally you know our expectations were very high. We wanted to see a 
24-hour operation center, units calling in, SOPs, you know nine line forms--this 
is what this type of report is for, this is the time you send it--all the things that 
normal American and NATO military operations standards require, and they just 
culturally that's not something these guys did. 
 
African Culture: 
Africans were seen as having a shared common understanding of consensus on 
how to conduct diplomacy and a shared commonality in cultural that was respected at 
the AU and the individual nations.  The AU was cross-cultural in design where each 
leadership and staff role had a different cultural background. There was a perception 
that there was a shared message between the senior officials as they had the same 
message.  The lower levels were not observed. 
 
I would say highlighting the diplomacy component; that one I think for non-
Africans is all too often overlooked. The art of diplomacy under--of all the 
African heads of states, so we know for the Sudanese they know that it was the 
consensus because they are a consensus organization. 
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…obviously, there were various individuals in these positions were from 
different member countries of the African Union…the Chairperson was from a 
different country than the deputy chairperson. There is a deputy chair person 
who I remember from one point was from Rwanda and his own experience I 
think background and dealing with the genocide there and he had been a refuge 
as a child, in Rwanda as well as in Uganda. Yeah, but he had been living in a 
refugee camp Uganda as a child is the point, that kind of colored his thinking to 
some extent, and you know conviction that we had to do something in Darfur 
and be serious. The commissioner for peace and security is from Algeria, and 
the director of the crisis management branch was from Mauritania. So yeah, all 
different--yeah, most of them were civilians and then there's a small military 
component as well. 
 
I guess similarly at top of AU commissions and head of the AU seemed to have 
the same messages and so they seemed to be consulting each other with the 
same messages…I didn’t see at the lower levels given as I engaged at the senior 
level. 
 
The main forces in AMIS were Rwandan and Nigerian where the perception was 
one of cultural cooperation.  There was the view that the Rwandan and the Nigerians we 
able to relate to the populations although there were West Africans operating in East 
Africa; from very diverse cultural backgrounds. 
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I will applaud the Rwandans who are a much smaller force, and but also very 
experienced, but not to the same extent as the Nigerians, engaged very 
cooperatively. And their expertise in their own cultural as well as historic 
experience with genocide I think balanced out the differences between the two 
forces.  
 
Their ability to relate to population I think was a critical component. We tend to 
as westerners look at Africa as one homogeneous society. Sometimes referring 
to Africa the continent almost as if it were one nation state. But the complexity 
of having West Africans in East Africa.  
 
Culture of communication based on religion: 
Another cultural challenge that the members of AMIS were perceived as 
overcoming was the fact that the Rwandans, although East Africans, were not Muslim.  
Those who were Muslim from Nigeria had a major cultural difference from the 
Muslims of Sudan.  The idea was that the Africans, regardless of nationality or religious 
background, were couched under the flag of the AU and therefore brought a cultural 
sensitivity that a non-African nation might not have brought.  The umbrella of Africans 
entering Sudan gave the Sudanese a comfort level. 
 
To have Rwandans who are East African, but not a Muslim population also 
presents challenges. So, it would have been the same had we sent in a UN 
peacekeeping force and the troops were from Honduras and El Salvador or 
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Canada the same challenges persist, and both organizations are so close in 
structure. So, I think the fact that-- the cultural sensitivity of AU mission 
brought more to the table than the culture sensitivity I think you would have had 
from Latin American, but note there are cultural differences. So, the big 
umbrella of being Africans gave the Sudanese some comfort. 
 
…even though the Nigerians have a sizable Muslim population, there are major 
cultural differences between the two. 
 
Communication with the US: 
There was a belief that the AU level of communication was good with the US as 
an external partner.  The communications between the AU and the US was seen as 
adequate given the circumstances with the level of communications that the AU 
possessed during AMIS from an organizational point of view.  The communications 
between the AU and the US was at a level of expectation from a respondent point of 
view. 
 
There was ongoing communication between the US and the AU headquarters. I 
think it was definitely an open level of communication with the Chairperson of 
the AU through the Assistant Security of States and the US Embassy I would 
say that communications were good. 
 
How did the AU communicate externally with the US during AMIS?  The 
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communication with the US was generally good as can be expected. 
 
Communication between AU and AMIS: 
Communications was a challenge of the AU headquarters as the organizational 
communication was not running efficiently.  In addition, the communication between 
the AU headquarters and the commander of AMIS was lacking.  
 
…I do remember them standing up the new peace and security counsel…the 
Alert Center, but again that was not functioning. 
 
…one of the things to my knowledge and this is where the United States I think 
was trying to enhance is that from a military standpoint I don't think they had the 
communications infrastructure, example, either HF or FM, you know the 
physical communication capability, you know where the field commander could 
communicate directly…it was rudimentary at best. So, they just lacked general 
communication infrastructure. And I'm not sure how they actually 
communicated physically. 
 
I do know that they transmitted written reports I think on a weekly and daily 
basis, but, that is not necessarily the most efficient. I mean that should be one 
communication mechanism, but a commander should be participating probably 
in daily calls with Djinnit (Commissioner of the Peace and Security 
Commission) and I don't know whether that happened or not. 
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…doesn't have the right kind of equipment or any kind of modern 
communication system. 
 
The senior officials at the Darfur Integrated Task Force communicated with the 
international partners at the Task Force meetings.   However, the senior official at the 
AU did not appear to be authoritative and seemed to pass on information from his chain 
of command rather being a decision maker who could communicated with the 
international partners. 
 
So the Darfur Intergraded Taskforce was run by senior African AU personnel 
and was this basically (sighs) we had (sighs)—the US had one sometimes 
usually one civilian and one military sometimes a member from like the African 
Union meeting together with representatives of partner of countries: US, UK, 
Canada, and the European Commissioner were core members, and then every 
now and again we invited like some other AU member state to come and sit in 
on a rotating basis but all decisions were made at the top. 
 
…the personality that was in charge of the Darfur Integrated Taskforce, while he 
was quite willing to talk to the partners didn't necessarily seem very 
authoritative; it was unclear where he was getting his information from. 
Sometimes that would not necessarily mess with information that would be 
gleaned from higher level meetings with in his chain of command.  Sometimes 
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they didn't really even seem to kind of know what the priorities were, the higher 
level people. 
  
Not every participant noticed cultural challenges in communication.  However, 
women were not treated equal to men despite the AU policy that 50 percent of the 
commissioner positions would be held by women.  There was the perception that 
women were treated differently than men due to a cultural difference for the Africans. 
 
There were probably cultural challenges but I didn’t see it…Cultural 
communications… they probably did have cultural challenges…I did see that 
woman had difficulty culturally with the African context along the AU was 
supposed to have 50 percent woman at the commissioner level. 
 
Cultural communication challenges were seen in how the US perceived African 
ambassadors whose level of sophistication differed.  The African ambassadors were 
duel hatted as Ambassadors to Ethiopia and accredited to the AU, so the US was able to 
leverage the stronger African ambassadors to find out what was occurring at the AU.  
The strongest African ambassadors were listed as the ambassadors from Zambia, 
Algeria and South Africa. 
 
I saw cultural communication challenges and I saw most African ambassadors 
were also Ambassadors to Ethiopia and “dual hatted” … so easy to learn about 
the AU through the bi-lateral relationship.  Some were weak and others more 
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sophisticated.  There was some for example Zambia, Algeria and South Africa 
that sent very seasoned ambassadors to Ethiopia and we had dual responsibility 
with the AU.  The US was able to engage the African ambassadors and the 
African ambassadors were happy to tutor the US on their thoughts. 
 
Participants saw the AU as a band of brothers, culturally, and from a cultural 
perspective that may have been a controversial issue to the western view. 
 
AU Headquarters—style I see – I comment member states and commission a 
genuine homo-genesis identity of AU member states and the commensurate – 
implicit were are all brothers and in this together.  However, leads to disposition 
of controversial issues that are not in step with western treatment/perspectives. 
  
One observation was that perhaps there was a divide between the Arab states of 
the AU and the non-Arab states.  One participant posited that the Arab states saw 
themselves more aligned with the Arab league vice the AU. 
 
Well, I don't know to what extent one of the fissures in Africa is between states 
that fundamentally see themselves as members of the Arab League and others 
that do not. And so, I don't know to what extent Arab States, including Sudan, 
were able to leverage that influence within the African Union I just don't know. I 
just don't have enough insight on that. 
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There was the perception that that AU was undergoing a cultural shift from the 
former OAU to the nascent AU.  This was mainly in the area of interference of the 
OAU to the AU’s view of non-indifference. 
 
I think one was that there was a cultural shift at the African Union, of course. 
You had a shift from the OAU's non-interference to the African Union's non-
indifference, and so that was the cultural shift of the African Union 
 
…one thing that has already been alluded to is that the cultural of the African 
Union of itself as an organization was changing globally from uh the principle 
of non-interference that countries were sovereign and that did not challenge that 
to a principle of non-indifference. And I think we have come a lot further on that 
now. 
 
There was direct communication on a regular basis where the commander and 
the deputy commander of AMIS traveled back and forth between Darfur and the AU 
headquarters.  The commanders debriefed the commissioner of the Peace and Security 
Commission and the President of the AU Commission. 
 
Well, the commander and the deputy commander both made regular trips back 
to Addis to debrief with Ambassador Djinnit and President Konaré and to 
provide them with an overview of what was taking place. 
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There was perception that the President of the AU commission, Konaré, who 
was a Muslim and from a predominately Muslim country, was able to open a dialogue 
with the Sudanese. 
 
…the fact that at the time President Konaré, a former president of Mali from a 
Muslim country, a predominately Muslim country, provided the stature of the 
gravitas, the comfort zone that the Sudanese needed to have or in the street 
vernacular the top cover the Sudanese needed to have--knowing that they 
weren't going to get away with anything, but knowing that they had a forum that 
they could go and have the conversation. 
 
Some participants felt that AU member contingents for peacekeepers did not 
share a broad vision-that each contingent followed their own view on how to 
accomplish the mission.  In addition, there was not a shared vision at the AU as to how 
to view the situation in Darfur.   There was the perception that some in the AU felt they 
should give Sudan room to address its own issues, while others saw the AU as a new 
organization that had the right to intervene while lessening the impact of the western 
nations.  
 
I don't think there was a broad shared vision. I think each contingent region had 
their own views on how things should be done. 
 
I think they had lots of semi-shared red lines of things that they didn't want to 
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have happen…they didn't want (sigh)--Sudan is a member, right (laughs)? So 
that's a problem when one of your own members is perpetrating genocide in 
some country. Some of them were wanting to give the member a state a chance 
to breathe and redeem itself. Others wanted to show that the organization was 
very capable. Others wanted to make it look-- I got the sense that they had 
things under control to try and minimize the western impact or footprint. So I 
think they definitely had kind of competing interests in a sort of way. I mean of 
course there were those who just said-- I think really truly felt that this genocide 
was unacceptable 
 
The communication from AMIS was handled by the AMIS force commander.   
The force commander was seen as executing the strategic plan that was developed at the 
AU headquarters.  
 
I didn't see any frustration or any disconnect between the mission, but like any 
commander on the ground you’re going to view it from your vantage point and 
it’s not always the same as the strategic leadership that is back in the capital but 
at the end of the day the force commander on the ground would provide the 
information to the AU leadership and the AU leadership would package the 
communication to the outside. 
 
…and to communicate them, and at the end of the day the commander on the 
ground executes and doesn't do the strategic planning.  
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AU method of communication: 
One participant saw the AU has having a more horizontal method of 
communication while another viewed the AU as having a centralized method of 
communication. 
 
I saw more horizontal form of communication… 
 
The AU had a centralized method of communication. 
 
The AU was small in size and that fostered a good flow of information within 
the AU.  However, the communication often stayed in individual channels and not 
shared throughout the AU as the AU was just starting out as a new organization.  
 
As for organization communicating, the AU was small enough that there was 
good communication between each at the AU other but in stove pipes as the AU 
was just getting started. 
 
…they created mission as they went along… 
 
Organization Communicating---small enough that there was good 
communication between each at the AU other but in stove pipes as the AU was 
just getting started…they created mission as they went along… 
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US communication with the AU: 
The US needed to find a way to communicate with the AU so that the Africans 
knew the US was serious.  The US, however, had to be careful in how the US members 
approached the AU without seeming offensive. 
 
It was important to figure out a way to communicate suggestions to the AU so 
that the ideas were communicating without being offensive to the Africans. 
 
On communication, the AU need to know that the US was serious and we 
needed to communicate that to the AU. 
 
Some respondents viewed the level of communication between the AU and the 
US as fine as it was and that the AU did all it could at the time of AMIS. 
 
There was nothing wrong with it. There was no need to improve it because it 
was an excellent level of communication, without the dialogue between the 
foreign ministers and the ambassadors this would not have happened, and most 
certainly they had the ear of their presidents. So, sometimes there's not a need 
for important. You couldn't have done more than they did at the time. 
 
Even with the change in US leadership, the communication level stayed 
constant, according to a participant, due to the level of mutual respect between the 
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African ambassadors and the US.  The level of respect was what keep the 
communication seamless in time of leadership change. 
 
Although there was a change in US leadership at the Assistant Secretary level,  I 
think the transition between those in play on all sides seamless because of the 
quality of the African ambassadors and their ability to understand Washington 
and communicate that back to the respective countries as well as their ability to 
provide that kind of dissemination of information by the African heads of states 
and their other foreign ministers on the ground within the AU made this possible 
and the African heads of states and President Bush that engagement, that 
seamless engagement, that respect, mutual respect was key to this moving 
forward.  
 
The way the AU tended to communicate was seen as a communication issue.  
The lack of telephone connectivity and the use of Hotmail email accounts demonstrated 
to the participants that the AU did not possess modern equipment or use more modern 
methods.  This meant that the AU could not communicate effectively. 
 
Yeah paper, literally running paper from one place to another. Telephones 
sometimes didn't work, just very unclear. I mean cell-phones you know, five 
cellphones at a time. The AU and AMIS didn't seem necessarily very secure or 
very you know, modern.  
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I mean how they did it was mostly as I recall a lot of cellphone calls and paper 
like little, you know, literally things that somebody else was going to have to 
make a copy of and get this somewhere 
 
…like Hotmail addresses and yahoo addresses, open and things like that 
 
Respondents expressed that the AU’s external communication with the US 
during AMIS was generally defined as good.  However, the communication was at 
times inadequate because the AU lacked the personnel who could do the 
communicating with the international partners.  Even if the AU had had enough 
personnel, they would have lacked the technical expertise…since there was such a large 
number of international partners, or donors, attempting to communicate with the AU at 
one time, the capability of the AU to handle such communication was not effective. 
 
The AU used one place for the international partners to communicate with the 
AU.  It was called the Darfur integrated Task Force that was run by the Africans 
with assistance from the international partners.  This allowed for the AU not 
having to have multiple questions and for international partners, including the 
US, to understand better what their needs are, and to also communicate you 
know, what our capital's thinking was about various things.  In retrospect you 
know, it was definitely better than what was there.   Each international partner 
used the Darfur integrated Task Force if they had particular concerns, otherwise 
we agreed that we would raise questions on their behalf.  Kind a meeting--it was 
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supposed to be a way for them to get all of our questions primarily. 
 
Yeah, well I mean again they didn't have external missions for communications.  
So, I don't know if they could have improved that it would have been great if 
they had one (laughs). If they had one in Washington maybe they would have 
helped, right? 
 
The Ambassador of course had access and met frequently with the peace 
security commissioner, so just general you know, meetings like that. That's 
basically how the communicating--the African Union as I mentioned didn't 
really have a mission in Washington, so there was no kind of on the ground 
communication there it was all pass via-via.  You know, we had conference calls 
sometimes they joined the conference call. Sometimes the conference calls were 
just with partners 
 
African cultural communication method: 
There was an African perceived cultural communication aspect exhibited 
between the various levels of rank among African militaries.  The African military 
culture uses communication that is mostly directive in nature as opposed to the joking 
that can occur in the US military between officer and enlisted ranks. 
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…the communications between officers enlisted very directive, not a lot of play that I 
see in western armies where officers can joke with their troops, but yet that division is 
still there, that respect for the rank is still there. 
 
AU communication with AMIS: 
The AU found itself passing the main information on AMIS through the key 
members of the African nations, such as the Presidents, Foreign Ministers and the 
African ambassadors. The mode of communications normally came from the senior 
members of each nation for that particular nation. 
 
And the coalition again with the key leadership of the AU making African 
presidents, their foreign ministers and ambassadors aware of the situation with 
AMIS from the AU perspective. The ambassadors from both Nigeria and 
Rwanda were instrumental in their engagement in the AU as the AU 
communicated the issues of deployment to and from AMIS. So the tiers were 
primarily with the foreign ministers and the ambassadors as being the primary 
mediums of communication and engagement. 
 
There was a cultural difference between the African view of communications 
and the western view of communications.  The Africans tended to view no 
communication as good news as opposed to the western view that no communication 
may be a sign of something bad.  The perception of a participant was that the AU and 
AMIS staffing for communications beyond the normal work day hours or on the 
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weekends was not a part of the African culture. 
 
I ran into the Guyana chief of staff and he had deployed a unit a few days earlier 
and sorry I don't remember exactly where, but they were out on operations. And 
just in passing I asked him if he had heard from them and he said, "Na, no we 
have heard nothing from them, and no news is good news." And I sort of went 
off. I said, "No, no. No news means they're dead." Right, "they have to call you 
every 12 hours and say we're still alive, here's where we are, here's what we are 
doing. “And he said, "No, they don't have communications for that."  
 
…there was no 24-hour operations center for the African Mission in Sudan, so at 
5 or 6:00 whatever time, the sectors might call in, "Yes, we are alive and here's 
what’s going on", with an update report, but that there is nobody monitoring that 
radio after that and you know, this is of course mind boggling to an American 
military officer. This shall never pass, right? This can't be, and I just couldn't get 
my head around it and he was like, "This is the way things are.” this is the 
Guyana army and that’s, you know, they are pretty well trained; they got plenty 
money. It's just not how they work, and so we were trying to you know, we were 
expecting them to operate using American, western, NATO standards, and they 
didn't. It wasn't, not even UN standards, they didn't...sort of at the operational 
level again nobody in Addis Ababa answered the phone after 5:00 if you get of 
Ambassador Kingibe, who was the political leader of the African mission, 
African Union mission in Sudan. If you could get a hold of him, it was usually 
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on a cellphone…again on the weekends nobody's around, at night nobody's 
answering the phone because the offices are not staffed, and that's just not a part 
of the culture.  
 
AU strategic communication: 
The AU was perceived as lacking a strategic communications office or strategy 
during AMIS.   The Peace and Security Commission now has a twitter account that did 
not exist during AMIS.  One participant believed that trust, rapport and open 
communication is the key to successful operation that the AU could not have done 
better in communication during AMIS. 
 
One of the things obviously back then in 2004 also was that the African Union 
simply didn't have a public communication strategy or office. And they haven't 
really--that's one of the areas where the African Union Commission remains 
weak. Yes, they have a twitter account and several officials have twitter 
accounts, the PSC has a twitter account, but in terms of sustained sort of press 
operation or outreach to civil society that is an area where the African Union is 
very weak. 
 
Again, because there was the trust, the rapport, the open exchange of 
information, those are keys to being successful. And because that was successful 
you had AMIS, had that not been success you would not have had AMIS. So 
that's why I said I don't see where communications could have been better in 
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2004 to 2007.  
 
Communication equipment in AMIS: 
Internal communication was an issue.  Most troop-contributing countries did not 
come to Darfur with internal communication equipment.  There was also a lack of 
personnel to run what equipment was available. 
 
…and a lot of it is based on material equipment, right? I said earlier that these 
units would show up without internal communications equipment 
 
…were no non-commissioned officers in the J6 (Communications) office.  So 
that work wasn't going to be done. One of the westerns went in and plugged 
everything up.  So, that sort of cultural thing was a real hold back, and these 
guys, I think they were Nigerians, maybe they were Anglophones from--they 
may have been Gambians, but I think they were Nigerians 
 
There was a not a consensus in the area of improvement for the AU and AMIS 
communication from the participants in the study.  There was the perception that the 
AU headquarter situation room was outdated and that the AU did not set priorities.  
 
I mean they didn't really have what they had a so-called situation room, but it 
was very much outdated.  It was unclear you know, what the priorities were for 
sending out--it tended to be news bulletins and you know, statements we 
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condemn this and that or the other. I remember there being this huge need to 
have better commitment, which the various partners were keen to help out with.   
 
The AU would have had a lot more direct access and didn't have to rely on 
messages that they had passed.  This is what my government thinks in a low 
level in a way. Or, of course, the ambassador was sent several times to 
communicate things at her level or at the deputy chief admission level. 
 
You know (laughs), they--the personality that was in charge of the Darfur 
Integrated Taskforce, while he was quite willing to talk to the partners didn't 
necessarily seem very authoritative; it was unclear where he was getting his 
information from. Sometimes that would not necessarily mess with information 
that would be gleaned from higher level meetings with in his chain of command. 
Sometimes they didn't really even seem to kind of know what the priorities 
were, the higher-level people…and so sometimes it kind a helped us because 
maybe they disclose more than they should have (laughs) and made decisions 
that they shouldn’t have, but that just what happened. 
 
The alert center at the headquarters and the communication infrastructure of the 
AU were viewed as lacking.  Transmission of written messages was seen as inefficient 
and was one of the AU’s only means of communication rather than an aspect of 
communication.  The perception of the participants was that the AU lacked modern 
communications equipment and did not have a budget to purchase or update the 
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equipment. 
 
I mean I do remember them standing up the new peace and security counsel. 
You know the Alert Center, but again that was not functioning, you know it was 
rudimentary at best. So, they just lacked general communication infrastructure. 
 
How did AU communicate internally/externally? AU lacked strategic 
communications “regard” HF/FM/UHF lacked reliable communication …no 
lacked battle rhythm for receiving communications, managing strategic mission 
and within these two “start” strategic/BR-Battle Rhythm actual essential 
protocol to request when so all management practices could be more efficiency 
communicated from strategic/Battle rhythm reporting process. I didn’t see it 
 
The AU doesn't have the right kind of equipment or any kind of modern 
communication system. There is a limit to it seems to budget you know, that's 
another issue. 
 
One method for the AU to communicate more effectually would have been to 
ask for western support.  Another avenue that the AU did not use, but could have used, 
was to contract out the communications. 
 
Improve communications by basically--and this would get back to--this is where 
they could ask for western or you know external support to provide 
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communications equipment and training or even contract it out for that matter, 
but I don't think they did that. 
 
Non-governmental organization leverage: 
The UN has a model of using NGO’s for support in communications and 
reporting.  The perception was that the AU did not leverage NGO’s for support as the 
UN does. 
 
You know the United Nations since, arguably since the 1940s or 50s, has had a 
very active and formal relationship with civil society groups. And so, at the UN 
secretary in New York you have NGOs (Non-governmental organizations) can 
be formally accredited to the United Nations through either the department of 
public information if they are more information focused or they can get what’s 
called I think consultative status with the economic and social council if they 
have competence in certain particular areas. So for example, a human rights 
group, an international human rights group, might have consultative status with 
ECOSOC. What does that mean? It means they can present reports formally to 
the United Nations. They have representatives who are accredited who can be at 
the United Nations presenting briefings, attending other briefing, a lot of 
interaction there. To my knowledge, the AU then and the AU now does not the 
mechanism like that. And so, a lot of obviously with the projects like Enough 
Project or the International Crisis Group, you know NGOs and Civil Society can 
play a huge role in arguing and advocating for particular changes and not to say 
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that the NGOs were not active in Sudan 2004, but there wasn't really a 
mechanism for the AU to engage with them. 
 
Summary of Key Sub-Question 4 
Participants viewed language as a challenge for the AU to operate as an 
organization.  There was a mix of colonial official languages of French, English and 
Portuguese as well as Arabic and a number of native languages that were used by the 
membership of the AU, although English was used as the main language of 
communication.  The use of English could and did cause some level of confusion for 
effective communication with the AU.  The AU provided communiques for the member 
states that were drafted in the four official languages of the AU: English, French, 
Portuguese and Arabic. 
A participant, who had witnessed the Rwandan contingent, reported that a 
common language was used at the national level in Rwanda.  Ki-Swahili was used by 
the national leadership of Rwanda in addressing the Rwandan troops to avoid confusion 
in communication in a country that used French, English as well as Ki-Swahili as their 
national languages. 
The level of education of the member states of countries contributing manpower 
was seen by a participant as the cause for communication challenges.  Members of the 
AU, who were chosen by their countries, did not all possess the same level of education 
and this created a communication challenge for the AU. 
Cultural differences were also a challenge that the AU faced.  There were 53 
member states, and each had its own unique culture as well an African cultural way of 
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communicating.  One participant did not see a difference in culture related to 
communication between Francophone and Anglophone countries or even between 
Muslim and Christian populations.  However, overall participants did see a cultural 
difference between the African and the western expectations of communication.   The 
lack of personnel at the AU after 5 p.m. and on weekends were examples of cultural 
differences between the western view and the African cultural norm raised by a 
participant.  Additionally, gender was not handled on an equal basis by the AU, as 
women appeared to have “difficulty culturally” within the organization. 
There was a diverse view of how the AU communicated internally.  The Alert 
Center of the AU was seen as non-functional, due to the AU’s lack of a communication 
infrastructure. Respondents reported this was due to not having the right kind of 
equipment and a modern system of communications.   
The Africans shared the same message among the senior leadership of the AU, 
regardless of cultural background.  Although there were cultural differences between 
the more Muslim-aligned Nigerians and the more Christian-aligned Rwandans, they 
were able to work out those differences.  A participant pointed out the Nigerians and the 
Rwandans cooperated in Darfur although there was a “complexity of having West 
Africans in East Africa.”   The describe a situation where the Africans saw themselves 
as “band of brothers” even in the face of the cultural shift with the transference of the 
mission from the former OAU to the present AU.  Furthermore, the Arab League was 
the premier organization seen by several member states.  There was a shift from the 
former OAU’s “non-interference” policy to the AU’s “non-indifference” policy that 
demonstrated the AU was meeting a new challenge. The fact that the African 
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ambassadors to the AU were also the Ambassador to Ethiopia was seen as a challenge 
in communication for the AU.  
An AU-led task force, called the Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF), was 
established to handle the issues of communication between the AU and AMIS. This was 
an avenue that the AU opened communication with the western partners, offering an 
avenue for the international partners to communicate with the AU on matters related to 
AMIS.  However, a participant pointed out that the DITF members often “didn’t know 
the priorities” of the AU leadership and the head of the DITF “didn’t…seem very 
authoritative.”  The DITF did offer the US and the international partners an avenue to 
bring forth issues and to receive communications updates on AMIS.  The international 
partners formed their own partners’ group so that representatives of the group would 
communicate with the DITF regarding issues related to AMIS. 
Since the President of the AU Commission, Konaré, was a Muslim from Mali, a 
participant saw this as a positive avenue for communication between the AU and the 
Government of Sudan during AMIS.   However, it appeared to two participants that 
there was not a shared vision at the AU and that the AU “wanted to give a member state 
[Sudan] breathing room.” Therefore, the AU had “semi-shared red-lines” that it did not 
want to implement on a member state as well as wanting to minimize western influence 
by having an African solution to an African issue. 
There was no consensus among the participants as to the methods of 
communication within the AU.  One participant saw communication at the AU as being 
horizontal in nature, while another it as centralized.   There was the view that the AU 
created AMIS as they “went along” and that the AU was at a size that fostered good 
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communication but that the communication did not reach everyone in the organization.  
The communication was seen as staying in individual channels due to its “newness” as 
an organization.  The AU passed information to its member states though the African 
presidents and foreign ministers as “primary mediums of communication” between the 
AU with its member states. 
There was a difference in opinion between participants in regards to the AU’s 
ability to communicate during AMIS.  The AU, according to one participant, did not 
possess a “public communications strategy or office” and that hampered 
communication.  However, there was also the view that the AU’s communication could 
not have been better in “2004-2007” due to an open exchange of information during 
AMIS and that the AU “couldn’t have done more than they did at the time.”   
There was open and on-going communication between the leadership of the AU 
and the US.  Two participants offered that they saw the communication between the US 
and the AU leadership as “good” or “good as can be expected.”  One participant offered 
that the level of communication between the US and the AU was not hampered by the 
change of US leadership at the Assistant Secretary of State level due to the 
understanding that African ambassadors had of how the US operated and through their 
individual efforts of disseminating information to their respective countries.  The US 
often used the US Ambassador to Ethiopia to communicate with the leadership of the 
AU and the US Ambassador would “often meet with the peace security commissioner” 
as a method of communication rather than using written messages.  The AU was seen as 
sending out weekly communiques, but a participant observed that this method of 
communication was “not necessarily the most efficient.” 
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The level of internal communication was seen as lacking due to units arriving in 
AMIS without internal communication equipment.  A participant observed that the 
African military structure did not possess noncommissioned officers within their 
communications directorate.  The lack of non-commissioned was seen as a cause for the 
lack of internal communication as well as the lack of communications equipment. 
Another communications challenge observed by participants was the lack of a 
situation or operations center at the AU that could be used to monitor the situation in 
Darfur.  The Alert center at the AU ‘was not functioning” and was “rudimentary at 
best.”  There was no 24-hour operations center at the AU or in Darfur.  In addition, a 
participant noted that the units in the field in Darfur did not report in to the 
headquarters.  The AU tended to operate using personal Hotmail and Yahoo accounts 
and cellphones rather than professional communications equipment.  
 
Overview of Data Analysis 
  There were a number of challenges that the AU faced in regards to executing 
AMIS.  The respondents observed challenges in the areas of organization, leadership, 
US support and communications. 
Resources and equipment: 
The respondents reported that the AU lacked resources, and that caused 
challenges to the organization and leadership by not being able to sustain a steady flow 
of required resources to adequately address AMIS.   Communications was a challenge 
through the organization due to a lack of modern communication equipment and a lack 
of an updated and operational alert center or situation room.  Participants believed that 
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there were major funding issues, created primarily by the fact that many countries that 
did not contribute despite an ability to do so. Some respondents felt that resources were 
a key before any structural changes could be effective, creating a challenge in getting 
AU resources to Amis due to issues within Sudan. 
Respondents observed that the AU “couldn’t effectively spend” and receive 
resources due to a lack of personnel that understood the partners’ processes for 
accessing donor resources to the AU.  A respondent felt that the bureaucratic process 
was not understood by the senior personnel at the AU, and the donor nations viewed the 
“extremely centralized procedures for donor nations to access the Peace and Security 
Council members” led to donor nation’s lack of desire to assist the AU. 
Personnel and Staffing: 
A critical area that challenged the AU was in the lack of experienced staff and 
leadership and not having sufficient personnel to manage and understand the scope of 
the mission. The respondents reported that there was a challenge for the AU in staffing 
its organization with well-qualified individuals that understood the mission it was 
undertaking, without the needed expertise they needed.  Along with the lack of an 
experienced staff, the AU was seen as lacking an organizational structure that would 
allow the AU to function and was challenged by a too few personnel.   Currency of 
knowledge was an area that challenged the AU’s leadership, organization and ability to 
communicate effectively. 
Participants seemed to perceive that the AU’s challenge in leadership was 
caused by a lack of skilled personnel, lack of structure, and untrained staff.  This led to 
the AU’s lack of institutional capacity. The AU required member States to provide 
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qualified personnel to the AU,   but member states did not always send experienced 
staff members to the Peace and Security Council, and the support staff often completed 
tasks “ad hoc.” Respondents noted that the AU was unable to engage in advance 
planning due to a lack of qualitied leaders and staff.  Participants pointed out that the 
leadership that did exist did not have quality staffing and that both leaders and staff 
lacked the necessary skill sets, especially in peacekeeping operations such as AMIS.  
 
Leadership: 
 Respondents saw the leadership challenge as one where the leadership “didn’t 
understand the scope of the mission and threat” but did “recognize shortfalls in 
organization.”  Most respondents felt that Ambassador Djinnit, the Peace and Security 
Commissioner, was impressive and “the quintessential ambassador,” but they also 
thought that he was “overwhelmed with…Darfur.”  Djinnit and President Konaré, as the 
head of the AU Commission, were credited by respondents as being Muslim and 
therefore more acceptable to Sudan and creating a vision.  Konaré was viewed as being 
idealistic with considerable vision.  There was a counter view regarding Djinnit in that 
he was seen as a “piece of work’ and “not effective because he’s about Djinnit.” He was 
not seen by some respondents as “trying to increase the effectiveness of the 
organization,” and both Djinnit and Konaré were seen as not creating a shared vision at 
the AU.  The senior leadership at the AU was seen as failing “to grasp the seriousness 
of the threat” in regards to AMIS. 
The leaders were seen as having to be soldiers and diplomats, and the dual skills 
of leadership and diplomacy of those leaders was seen as essential for the success on the 
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ground.  The lack of training of the leadership going into Darfur was viewed a challenge 
by the respondents.  They saw the leadership in AMIS as more or less autonomous from 
the AU.  Each of the five regional economic communities of Africa were seen as having 
their own views on how things should be done that impacted the leadership of the AU 
and AMIS. 
Respondents mentioned that a lack of personnel and staff was the greatest 
challenge to leadership at the AU, leading to the limited organizational span of the 
Peace and Security Commission.  The fact that the AU did not have the authority to hire 
or fire its own personnel and staff but had to depend upon member states for staffing, 
was seen as a challenge to the leadership of the AU.  Therefore, leadership at the AU 
was seen as “task oriented” by a respondent. 
Political Will: 
Although the respondents saw there were challenges with organization, 
resources, structure, communication, and logistics, there were participants that noted the 
AU had the political will to address AMIS.  The idea was further illuminated by 
respondents who observed “there would have been no peacekeeping mission for the 
AU” and “I want to applaud the AU” for undertaking AMIS.  Another positive view of 
the AU was a respondent who offered that the AU “has demonstrated the political will 
to commit troops” to AMIS.  There a counter argument in the data by a participant that 
felt the launching of AMIS was “not well thought out.”    
Member States: 
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The participants offered that the AU had a large membership base, leading to a 
difficult time attempting to address the needs of every member state. It was therefore 
reticent to engage in the internal affairs of their member states, such as Sudan.  The fact 
that the Chairperson of the AU commission was Muslim and therefore accepted by 
Sudan was looked upon as favorable by a respondent.  However, respondents observed 
that AMIS was a challenge for the AU because the Government of Sudan was opposed 
to intervention and having the AU conduct AMIS was a compromise to avoid western 
involvement.  The AU was viewed as “coalition of the willing,” and the challenges were 
not always negative.  There was a shortage of resources at the AU because some 
member states were not paying their annual dues and those dues were being subsidized 
by Libya.  Thus, those countries that did pay dues had undue influence in the 
organization. 
Sudan, the host nation and a member state of the AU, was seen as a challenge 
for the AU in “getting cooperation…of the host nation,” and it was Sudan that set the 
“ceiling amounts of AU…peacekeepers it was willing to take on its soil with AMIS.”  
Respondents felt that the AU was challenged by Sudan in fielding AMIS peacekeepers 
troops and that it was a “horrendous undertaking” for the AU “to put troops om the 
ground” as well as “dealing with the Sudanese government” who “put impediments in 
the way” of the AU and AMIS. 
 
Decision-Making: 
 The summits run by the AU were the forums that the AU used for decision-
making by the member states.  Respondents viewed the partners as having “a much 
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greater part of the decision making and agenda setting” since the AU was suffering 
from a lack of structure, history, and skilled staff.   The Heads of State of the member 
countries were mentioned as being able to “weld an enormous amount of influence” in 
decision making at the AU.  Respondents felt that the AU’s diplomatic effort with the 
African and non-African nations helped as it “expedited AMIS.” 
Structure: 
There was a challenge articulated by a respondent in regards to the structure of 
the AU. There was a lack of overarching structure, with the Peace and Security 
Commission having only one component, the Peace and Security Department. 
Respondents noted that there that the AU headquarter situation room was non-existent 
at the beginning of AMIS and did not have the ability to monitor the operation.   The 
structure of the AU, according to a respondent, had to be flexible, and the UN viewed 
this flexibility as both a gift and a curse, with every member state having an opportunity 
to provide troops without giving up their sovereign authority, as would be the case if the 
AU had the right to demand participation. 
The AU was not structured to deal with deploying a force into Darfur, according 
to respondents.  Although the AU was challenged, however, not all the respondents saw 
the shortfalls as the fault of the AU since the AU was new. 
History: 
The respondents viewed the AU as not being a developed organization. The AU 
was a nascent organization that faced challenges by not being prepared to handle its 
internal missions as well as a challenge to execute AMIS as a peacekeeping mission.   
The newness of the AU and the lack of an historical base of understanding of the 
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missions proposing to undertake caused a challenge for the AU to execute AMIS.  
Respondents described the AU history as possessing no “muscle memory,” a lack of 
rules due to the fact the AU was so new.  
Culture: 
 A cultural shift was observed by respondents that saw the AU as shifting from 
the non-interference policy of the OAU to the AU policy of “non-indifference.”   A 
respondent believed that the US made the mistake of viewing the AU as the same 
organization as the old OAU at the beginning of AMIS.  There was the view that to be 
more effective at the start, the US should have engaged with high-level US officials 
visiting the AU at the outset of AMIS.  
There was a cultural challenge due to the Africans lacking a strong non-
commissioned officer culture possessing technical expertise to complete the lower level 
tasks. And, the African officers lacked “respect for the competence of the enlisted 
soldiers.” An example of the lack of non-commissioned offers was noticed by a 
respondent in the J6 [communication directorate] of AMIS, stating that “the J6 did not 
have any non-commissioned offers.” 
 Respondents saw the culture of consensus leadership as a challenge for the AU 
and AMIS and viewed it as a negative aspect of the leadership and decision-making in 
AMIS.   There was a challenge observed that dealt with the culture of the African work 
day.  One, a respondent noted that nobody was around on the weekends or answering 
phones at night.  However, another respondent did not see “any difference in the 
cultural communication between Francophone and Anglophone” staff from different 
countries.  There was the thought that the culture of the AU did not foster members to 
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pay dues even though many of the countries were rich.  However, another respondent 
noted that the AU consisted of a “band of brothers” in the mission together as opposed 
to the cultural fissures caused by member states that identified as members of the Arab 
League, while other member states did not see themselves as such. 
 Respondents did believe that there was a cultural divide between western and 
European expectations as opposed to those of the African commanders. The western 
countries had high expectations, but the Africans did not meet those.  There was the 
view that the US and the AU headquarters had “an open level of communication” 
through the US Assistant Secretary of State, as well as the US Embassy in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia and that, overall, communication was quite good.  The fact that the 
African ambassadors to the AU had dual responsibility as ambassadors to Ethiopia was 
also seen as a cultural challenge for the AU. 
 There were respondents that believed there were cultural differences even within 
the same country. For example, one noted that “even though the Nigerians have a 
sizable Muslim population, there are major cultural differences.” The Government of 
Sudan, with a predominantly Muslim population, seemed to get some comfort from the 
AU peacekeepers being African, even though they were not all Muslim.    Gender 
differences in how the Africans viewed woman in positions at the AU was also reported 
by a respondent, who suggested that this created difficulty for women.  Although 
women were supposed to comprise half of the commissioners, this did not occur.  “ 
Logistics and resources: 
 Overall, the subjects of this study felt that logistics created the most problems 
for the operation, including its sustainability.   The member militaries were challenged 
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and unable to work together. The AU’s lack of a logistical base led to dependence on 
international partners for logistic support. Additionally, several felt that the AU was 
financially dependent on the international community.  For example, the US provided 
the base camps in Darfur.  Some respondents observed that the challenge of the 
logistical support that the US was supplying was further exacerbated by the contractors, 
who did not adhere to standards and timelines.  This had a negative impact on the AMIS 
mission. 
Training and procedures:  
A respondent felt that the lack of training was a challenge for the AU to execute 
a peacekeeping mission.  The AU was seen as having a challenge in understanding the 
intricacies of dealing with international donor procedures, and there was not training in 
this endeavor.  Participants pointed out the AU did not possess the basic procedures 
such as standard operating procedures for the AU staff to follow or learn, making 
“every minor task became a new discovery.”  The staff that the AU did possess was 
seen by a respondent as learning on the job, rather than being trained. Priorities were 
not set, and rules were created as they went along.  There a lack of unified training, with 
little if any training prior to deployment.   
 
US and partner support: 
 The US, along with the international partners, were seen by respondents as key 
players in documentation and planning.  The AU depended on them to run the peace 
support operations. AU resources depended on donor contributions, also presenting a 
challenge to the AU.  One of the study participants suggested that this led to many 
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donors seeking to be heard by the AU, creating a capacity problem that had adverse 
effects on AMIS. There were simply too many donors wanting influence in exchange 
for their donations.  It was noted that the US was the largest contributing, putting more 
funds for humanitarian aid into Darfur than all other players.   
 Respondents viewed establishing the DITF with the US and the international 
partners on AMIS issues as positive.  One participant felt that the establishment of the 
DITF location outside of the AU headquarters, however, created challenges for the AU 
as well as the DITF. 
 There were respondents that noted that the US faced challenges addressing the 
needs of the AU in a timely manner, especially in supporting the AU with equipment 
because it was not possible to move quickly to meet those needs.  Furthermore, US 
support between Washington and the AU was slow, and the US was slow in “coming to 
terms with…higher level diplomacy.”   An additional problem was the lack of US 
military interest in supporting the AU because it was focusing on other parts of the 
world but that “USAID and the State Department really wanted to sort this out” to find 
a way to support the AU.  Additionally, respondents pointed out that the size of the US 
bureaucracy caused problems for the US in providing support to the AU and AMIS.  
Initially, the US was US did not provide any financial resources to the AU, but once the 
US military did become involved the military support was more helpful than other parts 
of the US Government. An area where the US was viewed as being to react quickly was 
in providing airlift capabilities, as the African countries did not have that ability.  “The 
challenge of learning, according to one respondent was on “both sides [both US and 
AU].”   
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 The AU was viewed as unsure of their needs since the concept of peacekeeping 
was a new idea to them.  One respondent wanted the AU to have “US advisers rather 
than expecting them [the AU] to be fully set up.”  The AU was hampered by the 
challenge of being unsure of what they should request and what the US could provide to 
them. Articulating their requirements in detail was also problematic.  There were not 
US personnel fully dedicated to working with the AU according to one respondent, and 
the working arrangement was ad hoc. Furthermore, AU requests for support from the 
US were not well-organized and seemed to be haphazard, “…generally passed simply 
by voice or simple letter to State political officers from the Embassy [Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia]. 
 The US was involved with attempting to assist the AU with setting up an 
operations center for communication and IT, but the AU very little IT experience. A 
respondent viewed diplomacy as the US “planting a seed and hope it works out,” in an 
effort to influence how the AU thought.  The US provided a large amount of in-kind 
support rather than direct monetary support, as a respondent noted, “we built the camps 
in Darfur.”  Bilateral training and individual training was a US initiative through 
ACOTA and IMET that seen as a ”positive aspect for AMIS” by a respondent.  
 
Communications: 
 There was a difference of opinion among the study respondents about the 
organizational communication of the AU, with some seeing communication as 
horizontal in nature and others viewing it as more centralized.  Some thought that the 
small size of the AU resulted in good communication” throughout the organization, 
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although they noted that information often was limited to certain channels of 
communication. The US was seen as having to learn to communicate suggestions to the 
AU in a non-offensive manner, while still communicating that they were serious.  
The participants also noted that the telephone system was not always operable 
and there was no real plan for crisis management at the AU. Part of the problem was 
that the operations center hand no audio-visual capability, making it unable to meets the 
goals of its mission.  The lack of dedicated communications network between the AU 
and AMIS also created problems.  Study participants felt that the communications 
problems were in part due to not having updated equipment and no communications 
infrastructure.  Thus, the field commander was often unable to communicate directly 
with the AU leadership.  Additionally, DITF was separate from AU headquarters, 
creating other communications issues.   
 A final important observation was that the multitude of languages used by AU 
members created problems at times.  Some were Arabic speakers, while others used 
other African languages.  Additionally, due to colonization histories, English was used 
by some, French by others. Furthermore, there was a wide range of level of education, 
causing still further communication difficulties.  However, not every participant viewed 
language as a challenge for the AU leadership and organization.  Some felt that there 
was an adequate capacity for translation. There was a concern by one respondent that 
saw political issues as a potential communication barrier.  The senior level leadership of 
the AU commission and the AU leadership had similar messaging, therefore a 
respondent believed that “they seemed to be consulting each other with the same 
message.” 
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Chapter 5 
Discussion and Conclusions 
The purpose of the study was to determine the challenges that the AU faced in 
executing AMIS from the perspective of senior US officials from the Department of 
Defense and the Department of State who were directly involved with supporting the 
AU.  The focus of this study was determining the challenges that the AU faced with 
leadership, communications, organization and US support.  
Researcher 
This research was possible in part because I was involved in AMIS and knew 
the key senior officials in the military and the State Department who served with the 
AU. I was a member of the US team in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia from 2004 to 2007 and 
deployed to Darfur to support AMIS in 2006.  I was directly involved with the AU, the 
DITF and with the US team that administered support to the AU and AMIS.  I chose not 
be a participant in the study in order to capture the participants’ perceptions without my 
own opinions being involved with the study. 
 I determined that the US officials who participated in the US support mechanism 
were the best subjects for this study.  The subjects had been located in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia or had traveled and directly observed the AU during the execution of AMIS.  
The African officials who participated in AMIS were not recruited to be a part of this 
study as their location and availability was in question.  This was a stand-alone case 
study of US officials. 
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This study was designed to answer the question that I had in regards to my own 
observation of the AU challenges during AMIS.  I designed the key questions to seek 
the perceptions of senior US officials on the challenges faced by the AU in leadership, 
communications, organization, and US support that stemmed from my experience and 
observation as a member of the US Embassy, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, from 2004 to 
2007.  The participants did not have a working knowledge of the theories of leadership 
and communication, and the data from the interviews often did not fit with existing 
theories. The situation was also somewhat unique due to the wide range of cultures and 
nations involved in the AU, leading to the development of grounded theory. My ability 
to structure questions and elicit responses was based on my knowledge of the AU, 
AMIS and the potential participants.  I personally knew each of the participants and I 
had worked in some capacity with each, which provided me with access to the 
population.   
This study confirmed my own recollections of the challenges the AU 
experienced in executing AMIS.  I found that the respondents’ recollections were 
similar to mine but differed in perspective on the importance of the mandate that I 
viewed as not providing protection for the individual displaced persons (IDPs).  
However, the lack of mentioning the mandate or IDPs as challenges may have stemmed 
from the nature of the questions that I asked.   
There was also a problem related to recall.  Ten years had passed for most of the 
participants of the study, and in some cases 11 years.  The distance of time can result in 
the benefit of reflection, but there may also be a deficit in not able to recall all the 
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minute facts surrounding the challenges.  The distance of time creates a potential threat 
to validity of the study. 
There were a few ways that the general recollections of the respondents on the 
topics of leadership, organization, communications and US support differed from my 
own recollections of challenges faced by the AU.  I, along with the majority of 
respondents, felt that Djinnit was an exceptional African leader who demonstrated 
transformational leadership attributes. However, there was a minority assessment that 
Djinnit was a leader out for himself.    Additionally, I share the opinion of the 
respondents who believed that the AU should be lauded for its efforts to address the 
genocide in Darfur when the western nations were reluctant to execute a peacekeeping 
mission in Sudan.  
 I was not able to fully exploit the existing theories, as there were gaps in the 
data. Thus, I have recommended future research that focuses directly on the existing 
communications and leadership theories.  I found that the participants were not aware of 
the existing theories, and my intent was to elicit data that offered grounded theory on 
the challenges that the AU face during AMIS from a senior US official perspective.  
Analysis of Key Findings  
The efforts of the AU to conduct AMIS was viewed as laudable in having the 
political will to conduct AMIS in spite of not having the resources, personnel, training, 
equipment, logistical base, or expertise.   The AU, despite challenges, possessed the 
political will to conduct AMIS and execute AMIS as an all-African venture, albeit with 
US and international support with logistics, equipment, movement and resources.  
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Conducting a peacekeeping mission, such as AMIS, was outside the scope of the AU to 
conduct effectively, but the AU took on that challenge.   
The perception of the participants was that the AU decision-making process was 
vertical in that all decisions were made by the senior heads of state and passed down 
through the organization.  The research data suggest that this did not provide the AU 
with the capability to engage its mid-level leaders to conduct a horizontal form of 
organizational communication, and leadership became more transactional in nature.  
The AU senior leadership was transformational in providing a shared vision and being 
charismatic but failed to produce any standards or procedures for the mid-level leaders 
and staff to follow or adhere to in conducting AMIS or the day-to-day operations at the 
AU headquarters. 
The AU did not possess a mature organizational structure and lacked an 
operations center—alert center—that would have allowed the AU to monitor AMIS and 
to communicate with the US and other international partners, according to the 
participants.   The lack of an alert center did not provide the AU with a method to 
monitor the activities of AMIS and the leadership of AMIS often acted on its own due 
to a lack of communication between the AU and AMIS.  AMIS was left on its own with 
no rules of engagement or objectives developed as a guide for the AMIS leadership.    
The respondents had the perception that the DITF was an asset in bridging the 
communication gap between the AU and the international partners and allowed the 
international partners an avenue to monitor the activities of AMIS and to determine its 
needs and progress.   The DITF was a positive step for the AU, allowing it to access and 
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request international support.  However, the leadership of the DITF was often not aware 
of the AU priorities and therefore was not as effective as it could have been. 
The AU was further challenged, according to the perceptions of the respondents, 
by not understanding how to access the bureaucratic US support mechanism or request 
support through the US cumbersome acquisition system.  This impeded the AU in 
accessing critical resources and support from the US, a major donor nation.   The US 
was culpable as well.  The US did not compensate for the shortcomings of the AU 
request system.  The US possessed a lengthy acquisition system that the AU was not 
able to navigate. Thus, critical resources were often delayed by the lack of 
understanding on both sides, the US and the AU, leaving the AU vulnerable in several 
areas of resources, logistics and equipment requirements to conduct AMIS.  The ability 
of the AU to access US support, though not always in the western method, and the open 
communication between the US and the AU allowed for the flow of in-kind logistical 
support and airlift that was needed for the execution of AMIS.  The US policy was also 
a challenge to the AU in accessing multi-national training.  The US policy allowed for 
bi-lateral training only, and that hampered the ability of the AU to receive unified 
training for the AMIS contingents. 
 The AU membership was multi-national, consisting of 53 nations and 53-plus 
different cultural backgrounds due to the inclusion of tribal areas that crossed 
international borders.  The respondents believed that the AU was challenged by multi-
lingual usage and cultural differences that at times caused misunderstandings among 
leadership and staff within the organization.  The use of translators at meetings and 
conferences assisted in mitigating some of the ambiguities of language and culture, but 
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translators were not available in the daily operation of the AU, and this led to 
misunderstanding among the members of the AU organization.  Cross-cultural 
adaptation policies and a higher level of organizational communication, using up-to-
date communication equipment, would have been a benefit to the operation of the AU 
and AMIS. 
 The African work culture at the AU was different from that of the western 
nations in both the working environment and scope.  The study participants had the 
perception that the difference in work culture often led to a task or mission not being 
completed.  The leadership and members of the AU did not conduct official business in 
the evenings or on the weekends and were not reachable except by cell phone on a 
sporadic basis. The lack of access to the AU leadership and membership outside of 
normal working hours frustrated the US and the other western international partners.  
Exacerbating the cultural difference between the Africans and westerns was the absence 
of a strong and viable NCO corps in the African military.  The lack of a viable NCO 
corps challenged the AU and AMIS in completing a number of simple low-level tasks 
critical to the AU and AMIS in accomplishing their missions. 
 The final challenge for the AU in conducting AMIS was perceived to be the 
challenge of working with the host nation of Sudan.  The Government of Sudan had 
compromised their desire for sovereignty by allowing the AU to enter Sudan. This was 
done to ward off any UN or western intervention.  However, Sudan placed a number of 
impediments to accessing Darfur, such as requiring entry visas and equipment entry that 
impeded the ability of the AU to conduct AMIS.  The AU was culpable in allowing 
Sudan leverage in negotiations since Sudan was a member state of the AU, and several 
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members of the AU had a desire to see Sudan to address its own issues related to the 
genocide in Darfur. 
The respondents offered that the challenges of resources, equipment, personnel, 
expertise, culture, training and structure were pervasive throughout the AU in the areas 
of organization, leadership, US support and communications.  The challenges listed 
above were systemic and wide-spread throughout the AU and AMIS and crossed all 
four areas examined in this study.  
Key Sub-Questions  
 An analysis of the data is provided for each of the four key questions using 
grounded theory as a basis of comparison of the data in the responses of the 
participants.  I used the existing theories of leadership and communications where I 
found applicability as an augment to grounded theory.  The four research key questions 
are laid out below with analysis of the data.  
Challenges of Organization 
For the first key sub-question, study respondents were asked, “What were the 
challenges for the African Union organizational structure in executing the African 
Union Mission in Sudan?” An examination of the interview data revealed that there 
were a number of challenges related to the organization of the AU.  The AU was 
perceived by the respondents to be organizationally challenged by the structure, the 
number of personnel, the lack of experienced personnel, the non-availability of training, 
the lack of modern equipment, no organic resources, and a lack of guidance and 
operating procedures.  The launching of a peacekeeping mission, AMIS, did not fit any 
305 
existing theories of organization.  Therefore, a grounded theory was developed to 
encompass the major challenges faced by the AU in organization.  
Grounded Theory: “The organization of the AU was challenged by the lack of a 
developed structure, no logistical base, a shortage of personnel, inadequate resources, 
no unified training, and a lack of preparedness to launch AMIS.” 
The responses of the interview participants revealed an organizational structure 
that was not adequate to conduct a complex peacekeeping mission.  They pointed out 
that the AU was a nascent organization that did not possess a mature organizational 
structure and was not fully staffed when the decision to launch AMIS was determined in 
early 2004.  The absence of an alert center or operations center at the AU headquarters 
did not allow for the monitoring of AMIS and did not provide the AU with updates on 
AMIS.  The establishment of the DITF was a positive step taken by the organization to 
filter support and requirements from the international partners.  However, there was a 
challenge of understanding the dynamics of the mission, as the AU did not produce any 
rules of engagement or guidelines for AMIS leaders to follow or adhere to while 
conducting the mission. 
Furthermore, the AU was devoid of an organic logistical base.  The AU 
depended completely on the international partners for logistical support to include the 
development of base camps in Darfur and airlift assistance for troop movements to and 
from Darfur. 
The AU headquarters was described as challenged by a thin staff and a lack of 
experienced personnel.  AMIS was hampered in that each member nation had to 
volunteer its forces to populate the contingents for AMIS.  Some of the nations, such as 
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Nigeria, were hesitant to allow their troops to be under the command of another nation.  
Nigeria, possessing a large military, ensured its leadership in the organization by 
contributing the most troops, thus ensuring that a Nigerian would be in command. 
Resources were a major challenge for the AU in executing AMIS.  The AU had 
very few organic resources and had to depend on donor nations to provide the bulk of 
resources needed to operate AMIS.  Training, when conducted, was on a bi-lateral 
basis.   Interviewees described a challenge in the preparedness of the AU staff and the 
AMIS contingents in that there was no unified training conducted or available.  The 
staff at the AU headquarters did not receive any advance training for their positions and 
were learning the job as they were doing the jobs. In other words, due to limited 
organization, AU staff had to make decisions with no guidance or protocol to follow. 
The study participants did believe that the political will to conduct AMIS and 
that the Africans had a desire to complete the mission within the AU.  However, the AU 
was simply unprepared to handle the mission adequately.  This meant that they needed 
the assistance of international donors for most resources outside of the actual troops 
conducting the mission. 
Challenges of Leadership 
The second key sub-question asked the study respondents, “What were the 
leadership challenges for the African Union in executing the African Union Mission in 
Sudan?” Respondents reported a number of challenges related to leadership.  Some of 
the responses suggested that existing theories of leadership could be applied to the data 
to augment grounded theory.   Elements of Transformational and Transactional 
Leadership theories were apparent based on the personalities of the leaders and the 
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effects of the African culture that included emotional Intelligence and charismatic 
leadership as described as the visionary leadership of the senior leadership of the AU, 
particularly Ambassador Djinnit and President Konaré. 
Theories of Transformational and Transactional Leadership: 
The study participants described the majority of leadership characteristics of the 
AU in ways consistent with transactional leadership with the exception of the 
transformational leadership style of the very senior leaders, Konaré and Djinnit.  
However, the AU, as a conglomerate of 53 individual nations, had a complicated and 
cumbersome decision-making process. Decisions made by AU leaders were contingent 
on approval of the heads of those nations. 
Transformational leadership theory refers to visionary leadership and 
inspirational leadership with an understanding of charismatic and emotional aspects of 
leadership (Yukl, 2013).  The leadership of the AU was seen as attempting to transform 
the creditability of the organization. Ambassador Djinnit and President Konaré 
demonstrated characteristics of transformational leadership through providing a shared 
vision for the AU.   The interviewees indicated that Djinnit was a strong person. He was 
seen by most of them as having a charismatic personality (Yukl, 2013) that further 
demonstrated that he was viewed by senior US officials as a transformative figure.  
Djinnit was viewed as a quintessential diplomat and as an impressive individual.  
Respondents indicated that Djinnit demonstrated a positive self-regard and was creating 
a vision (Bennis & Naum, 1985).  The efforts of Djinnit and the respect that he garnered 
worked to the benefit of the AU in engaging with senior US and international senior 
officials.   The respondents suggested that Djinnit’s leadership kept the challenges that 
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the AU faced with AMIS from being insurmountable and allowed him to overcome 
some of the barriers that occurred as suggested by Burns (2003).  Additionally, some 
respondents felt that Djinnit’s diplomacy and the AU’s gravitas were the driving forces 
in being able to engage the leadership of Sudan.   
 Konaré was mentioned as the right person to start the organization due to his 
gravitas, although Northouse (2013) points out that a leader does not need to possess 
charisma to be a transformational leader.  The interviews also suggested that Konaré, as 
an African leader of the Muslim faith and a leader who had not been overthrown while 
serving as president of an African country, can be tied to contingency theory of 
leadership where the leadership style is matched to the organization (Fiedler, 1978). In 
Konaré’s case, his background assisted in identifying the AU as including the Muslim 
countries (Yukl, 2013).   However, Konaré was not enough of a leader to bring certain 
concepts, such as a permanent all-African standby-force.  Konaré demonstrated 
characteristics of emotional intelligence as he was able to engage effectively with the 
most senior levels of the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense. 
Chairperson Konaré was also seen as idealistic and had a lot of vision as demonstrated 
in the research on emotional intelligence of Goleman (1995) where a leader creates a 
vision. He was not, however, viewed as realistic by the respondents, and that 
diminished his ability to lead.  Thus, he failed to create the vision of transformative 
leadership (Kotter, 1990), to empower others to act (Kotter, 2012) or to diagnose the 
issues (Kotter & Schlesinger, 2008). That in turn caused the failure of the AU to 
establish an African standby-force.   
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The data demonstrated that the transformational efforts of Konaré and Djinnit 
were muted by the transactional nature of the organization.  Overall, the African culture 
of having the African heads of state make the decisions for the AU entities was 
transactional for the AU leadership who deferred decisions to the heads of state. 
Decisions were primarily made at semi-annual meetings held at the AU.  While the AU 
leadership participated in the decision-making process, African culture allowed heads of 
state to make final decisions autonomously (House, Hnages, Javidan & Gupta, 2004).  
The AU was challenged in assessing the effectiveness of leadership while 
attempting to focus on AMIS, as the AU was working on designing a type of report card 
for the leadership while undertaking AMIS.  AU leadership was viewed as failing to 
grasp the degree of threat.  AU leaders also seemed challenged in understanding the 
scope of AMIS, although they did recognize problems and were motivated to remedy 
those (Kotter & Schlesinger, 2008). 
In contrast to transformational leadership theories, transactional leadership 
theory holds that a leader finds themselves separated from their followers (Greenwald, 
2008).  There was some evidence of that, according to the interview subjects.  Several 
described that the AU lacked a broad shared vision, further complicated by the decision-
making bureaucracy of the AU that was difficult to overcome.  The head of the Peace 
and Security Commission was not viewed as empowering those under him to carry out 
the work (Bass, 1990). Decisions were channeled up the chain of command to the 
Executive Council, resulting in lengthy delays.  The respondents reported that the 
decision-making process for the leaders rested in the hands of the most senior leaders, 
similar to what was described by Makinda, Okumu and Mickler (2016).  However, even 
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the senior leaders of the AU did not have the final decision-making responsibility.  
Their decisions were not finalized without the blessing of the African heads of state 
Only after that occurred could decision be implemented by the AU commission and 
staff.  Bass (1998) referred to this as mutual self-interest in transactional leadership.   
Decisions were made at the top, as demonstrated by the Peace and Security 
Commission, which meant that the leadership of the AU was transactional at the 
intermediate level (Northouse, 2013).  The transactional nature of the AU leadership at 
the head of state level was viewed by the interview subjects as a part of the leadership 
style exhibited in the African culture. 
Grounded Theory: “The AU was challenged in leadership due to decision 
making, cultural aspects, shortage of personnel, lack of resources, no unified training 
and a shortage of equipment.”  Grounded theory was used to supplement the existing 
theories of transformational and transactional leadership as well as existing theories of 
emotional intelligence. Grounded theory was used to illuminate the challenge the AU 
leadership faced with decision-making, inferior staffing, resource and equipment 
shortages, and lack of training as describe by the respondents. 
The decision to launch AMIS was seen by the AU leadership as necessary since 
the western powers were reluctant to engage directly into Darfur.  The AU had the 
political will but was ill prepared and was also challenged by insufficient personnel, a 
lack of resources, a shortage of equipment and a multi-cultural staff.  The Government 
of Sudan did not want the interference of the western nations and allowed the AU to 
establish AMIS as a compromise. 
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The AU was described as severely challenged.  The leadership faced a shortage 
of personnel and staff in both number and expertise.  Many of the staff were seen as 
learning on the job as they did not possess the background and experience needed for 
executing a peacekeeping mission such as AMIS.  The leaders in AMIS were not 
provided rules of engagement causing them to act on their own as the mission 
progressed.  The lack of interaction and communication between the leaders of AMIS 
and the AU were the root of decision-making being ad hoc. Further, the lack of 
established objectives of the mission were absent at both the AU and in Darfur.  
Another problem was related to geographical divisions in Africa.  Decision-making was 
also challenged by the block-voting exhibited by the regions of Africa and impediments 
set forth by the host nation of Sudan. 
The AU and AMIS were populated by members from 53 nations and more than 
53 cultures.  The multi-culture civilian and military forces had different training 
regimens. They tended to operate as they did in their national communities and not as a 
cohesive multi-national organization.  This lack of inter-operability was a challenge for 
the leadership of the AU and the leadership of AMIS. 
The AU was thinly staffed and lacked the adequate number of personnel to 
accomplish the mission of the AU was well as AMIS.  The AU depended on the 
member states to provide personnel for the AU and troops for AMIS.  Several of those 
interviewed described an important cultural difference between the western nations and 
the African nations. The Africans lacked a strong and viable non-commissioned officer 
(NCO) corps.  They reported that as a result of a weak or non-existent NCO corps, a 
number of simple tasks were not accomplished. This was because the leadership was 
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culturally constrained by officers not being able to accomplish lower level tasks.  
Additionally, the leadership of the AU did not have the right to hire and fire staff 
members.  The net effect was that the AU was not able to take full advantage of the 
leadership ability of either the AU or AMIS.   
According to the interviewees, the AU leadership was challenged by a lack of 
resources to accomplish its day-to-day operations, as well as AMIS.  The organization 
did not possess its own funding stream and depended on international partners to 
provide the majority of the funding.  There were a few AU member states, such as 
Nigeria and Libya, that did provide resources disproportionate to the other members and 
this gave them clout with the leadership and decision-making of the AU regarding 
activities in Darfur. 
Training was a challenge that the AU leadership faced in its organizational 
staffing as well as the staff of AMIS.  There was no form of unified training where the 
leaders of a multi-national force could organize a culturally diverse force into a 
cohesive unit.  Individual training was another serious challenge for the AU.  Personnel 
often came to the AU without knowledge or training to accomplish their tasks.  
Additionally, the lack of an operations center with basic equipment to monitor activities 
in AMIS meant the AU leadership was often unaware of the activities unfolding in 
Darfur.  
Challenges of US Support 
The third key question was, “What were the challenges of US support to the 
African Union during the African Union Mission in Sudan?” The interview data 
suggested that the US support was slow in developing and that the US would not 
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provide any support for the AU or AMIS until the US Embassy, located in Addis 
Ababa, Ethiopia, became involved with the AU.  Washington (US Department of State) 
became aware that the AU was not continuing with the legacy of the former OAU non-
interference policy through the efforts and engagement of the US Embassy.  The US 
was not only slow to react but had a procurement system that was bureaucratic in 
nature.   The deployment of African troops was seen by the Africans as a way to stem 
the violence in Darfur without US or western interference.  However, the interviewed 
suggested that the AU required US and international partner support in order to provide 
a peacekeeping force in AMIS.  The analysis of the data did not reveal a connection 
with an existing theory.  Grounded theory was more appropriate to examine the 
challenge of US support. 
Grounded Theory: “The AU was challenged in receiving and requesting US 
support during the execution of AMIS.” 
An analysis of the data related to US support indicated that there was a 
challenge in the manner that the AU and the US operated in determining and filling 
requests for support.  The US was reluctant to engage with the AU at the beginning of 
AMIS.  The US view was that the AU was the OAU with a different name.  However, 
the US Embassy located in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia began to forge a relationship with the 
AU and began to communicate with members of the AU even when the official US 
policy was to maintain a distance from the AU.  The US policy shifted toward assisting 
the AU and AMIS and instructed the US Embassy to engage with the AU but not to 
make any promises of support until vetted by the US Department of State and the US 
Department of Defense.  The US military was deeply involved with the war efforts in 
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Afghanistan and Iraq and showed little interest in supporting the AU at the start of 
AMIS.  However, the military did provide airlift for the movement of African troops 
and did so in an expeditious manner.  The support from the US Department of State, 
however, was slow and was in-kind rather than direct monetary support. 
The respondents noted that the US mechanism for requesting support was 
bureaucratic and cumbersome.  The AU did not have the experience to develop 
procurement plans and procedures that would provide them with direct access to US 
support.  The US Department of State procurement system not did allow for rapid 
response to requests from the AU, making it a challenge for the AU.   The AU did not 
have a developed procedure for requesting US support and often did not understand 
how the US system operated or how to make requests. Cultural differences came into 
play, highlighting the differences between the bureaucratic nature of the US and the 
more personal interactions common in the AU.  The AU was viewed as demonstrating a 
lack of sophistication in requesting US support by making requests verbally or by 
requesting support by a simple letter.  Eventually, the establishment of the DITF 
assisted the AU in articulating its requests and allowed the US to coordinate with 
international donors to mitigate duplication. 
According to study participants, the US provided a strong diplomatic effort with 
Sudan on the issue of Darfur and also provided in-kind support for the development of 
an operations center at the AU headquarters to enhance its efficiency.  The US provided 
all the base camps in Darfur but was hampered by the US contractors on-site that did 
not always fulfill their obligations.   The US provided training to most African nations 
on a bi-lateral basis but was prohibited from providing multi-national training by US 
315 
policy.  Thus, the AU was not able to depend on the US to support any multi-national 
training, creating a challenge at the AU headquarters as well as with AMIS. 
In summary, US support to AMIS was constricted by both AU policies and US 
policies.  The AU, as a nascent organization, lacked sophistication and was unaware of 
how to interact with the US when requesting support.  The US was hampered by its own 
bureaucracy and protocols.   
Challenges of Communications 
The final question posed to the study participants was, “What were the 
challenges of US support to the African Union during the African Union Mission in 
Sudan?” In some places, their responses fit with theories of cross-cultural 
communication and organizational communication.  Grounded theory was used to 
augmenting the existing theories.  
Theory of Cross-Cultural Communication: 
 Respondents’ answers to the question about communication demonstrated that 
language was an area that could be an issue with member integration into working in an 
international organization.  Overcoming the barriers of intercultural communication is a 
vital aspect for international organizations to move forward into the future, and this was 
suggested in the data as both a challenge and not a challenge (Braun, 2001).  The data 
demonstrated that the AU created barriers to communication by bringing together a 
diverse cultural group with different native and official languages of 53 individual states 
with numerous cultures (Makinda, Okumu & Micklar, 2016).   
However, respondents also suggested that interpreters at the AU assisted in 
mitigating some of the cultural stress by offering each member of the AU a translation 
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in their own language.  Kim (2005) points out that stress adaptation can occur over 
time. 
Experience was brought up as a challenge for communication and offered by 
Kim (1988) as an intercultural communication issue between individuals of different 
experience backgrounds.  The six steps of Bennett’s Developmental Model of 
Intercultural Sensitivity (1986, p.182) can be used to illustrate how the members of the 
AU were able to adapt and integrate into the culture of the organization through the 
availability of translators, as well as being able to address the AU membership in their 
native language at the summits and meetings of the AU.   During the execution of 
AMIS, the AU consisted of African members who possessed a shared memory 
(Drzewiecka, 2003) of the past as Africans who had been subjected to colonization. 
This collective memory could be used as a basis for shaping the present and future as 
members of the AU.   
The use of different languages in communicating at the AU was not seen by the 
majority of study participants as an issue in adapting to a new culture, that of the AU 
(Kim, 1998).  Although Samovar and Porter (1991) discuss that non-verbal 
communication can be a barrier to communication, non-verbal communication at the 
AU or AMIS was not mentioned.   
The data did support Kincaid’s (1998) findings that the initial differences of 
different cultures at the AU diminished a shared vision as a group.   Kim (1998) 
illustrated what the data suggested, that communication among the AU membership was 
communication between the members from different cultural backgrounds.  Kim’s 
(2001) Structural Model: Factors Influencing Cross-Cultural Adaptation (see figure 8) 
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was evident in the data where new members were expected to use the English language 
for all matters related to AMIS, thus transforming their individual cultural identity to 
that of AMIS membership that represented host communication competence related to 
the organization.  The Process Model: The Stress-Adaptation-Growth Dynamic (Kim, 
2001) (see figure 9) was also evident in the data. There was the suggestion that using a 
language, other than one’s native language, could lead to misunderstanding and 
therefore increase the stress level of the individual.  Adaptation into the culture of the 
AU organization was facilitated through learning English as a second or third language 
for their participation in the AU.  The interview data suggested that the use of a 
common language versus the use of the member’s native language was always a 
challenge.  This adaptation took place at the AU, as English was used as a common 
language to facilitate adaptation.  However, some of the respondents also indicated that 
there were occasional misunderstandings between native Arabic speakers, native 
speakers of other African languages, and speakers of other languages. This was seen as 
causing stress in individuals from different cultures that became adapted to the use of a 
common language, English, over time (Kim, 2001).  The use of translators did mitigate 
some of the stress of adapting to the AU, and the use of the four official languages also 
reduced stress over time (Kincaid, 1998).  An individual adapts to a new culture by 
“acculturating” to the new host patterns of communication (Kim, 1998, p. 72).   
The data did suggest that there was a measure of shared vision at the AU that 
assisted communication among the members (Olufowote, 2006).   The AU consisted of 
members who had differing cultural backgrounds. This can be understood through the 
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work of Gudykunst (1997), who offered that communication and culture influenced 
each other over time. 
Theory of Organizational Communication: 
 The views of participants in the study were split on how the AU communicated 
as an organization.  One respondent saw the method of organizational communication 
as horizontal, while another respondent felt that the organization communicated 
vertically.  Overall, the data suggested that the method of organizational communication 
at the AU was vertical, or centralized, where members at the top were the decision-
makers (Mintzberg, 1979), and communication flowed downward (Simpson, 1959).  
McPhee and. Poole (2001) demonstrated how centralization versus decentralization can 
determine the avenues of communication.  AMIS is revealed as different from the AU 
through the method of communication between organizations.  The data suggested that 
AMIS had a decentralized method of communication with the AU, acting on its own 
without the direction of the AU and having the availability of coordinating the details of 
the mission (Harris & Nelson, 2008) without getting direction from the AU.  However, 
vertical communication was illustrated in the data due to the small staff of the AU as 
opposed to a horizontal method which is viewed as more informal (See figure 11).    
Grounded Theory: “The AU was challenged in communication related to the 
usage of multiple languages, the lack of modern communication techniques, the African 
work culture, and communication with the US and Sudan.”  Grounded theory was used 
to supplement the existing theories of cross-cultural communication and organizational 
communication to illuminate the challenge the AU faced with communication within 
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the organization and with AMIS.  The challenges that existed within the AU and AMIS 
during the AMIS mission were examined through the lenses of grounded theory. 
An analysis of the data demonstrated that the majority of the respondents saw 
the use of different languages and the cultural background of the members assigned to 
the AU as a challenge.  The theory of cross-cultural communication was not a perfect fit 
for the data analysis as it related the adaptation of individuals into a different national 
culture but failed to address the cultural adaptively related to a multi-cultural 
organization. 
A major challenge faced by the AU and AMIS was in the area of cross-cultural 
communication related to diverse language and cultural backgrounds in an organization 
consisting of 53 African nations. The actual numbers associated with cultures were in 
excess of 53, as the continent of Africa possesses 53 political lines that form nations as 
well as tribal areas that cross international boundaries. The participants in the study 
viewed the manner in which the AU communicated as an organization challenge, as 
well as how the AU communicated with the US and Sudan.   The lack of an operations 
center or alert center hampered the communications between the AU and AMIS.  The 
AU was viewed by study participants as communicating without standard operating 
methods or rules, resulting in a communications challenge. 
The interviews also suggested that the AU did not possess modern 
communications, techniques or equipment.  Members were forced to use their personal 
email accounts, such as Yahoo accounts, in order to communicate electronically.  The 
majority of the internal communication was handled via personal contact and hand-
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written documents.  Personal interaction was often a result of non-functional 
communications equipment such as the telephonic system within the AU. 
The African work culture differed from the western work schedule.  The leaders 
and members of the AU were not available for contact after 5 p.m. or on weekends.   
The lack of availability of the AU leadership and staff was viewed as a challenge in 
communications with the international partners such as the US.  The members of the 
AU were seen as having to learn on the job rather than having a set of procedures to 
follow or learn from for their respective positions. 
The AU communicated with the US through the senior leadership of both the 
AU and the US Department of State. The interviews suggested that the communication 
between the AU and the US was viewed as adequate given the lack of sophistication of 
the AU. 
The participants in this study viewed the AU as more passive when it came to 
addressing issues with Sudan.  Sudan was a member of the AU, and there was the 
perception that the AU had a desire for Sudan to remain its sovereignty.  The consensus 
was that the AU desired to allow Sudan to solve its own issues regardless of AMIS. 
Concluding Summary 
 The AU was a new organization that required assistance in all areas to conduct 
AMIS.  As such, the respondents in the study overall saw the AU as ill-prepared to 
undertake a peacekeeping mission at such an early stage of organizational development.  
There was political will by the leadership of the AU to conduct AMIS, but the 
organization was challenged by a complete lack of resources, personnel, expertise, 
organizational structure, and more.  This created challenges for both the AU and the 
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international partners trying to support the AU. Overall, the decision-making process 
was transactional in nature, but elements of transformational leadership were exhibited 
by its key leaders. This allowed a shared vision to filter down to the mid-level leaders 
and enlighten the staff.  The lack of an operations center was a major challenge for the 
AU, as it made it virtually impossible for the AU to monitor what was occurring with 
AMIS or in Darfur and challenged the leadership, communications and organization of 
the AU.  US support was a challenge to the AU in both requesting and reeving needed 
support. This was particularly important as the US was considered the major 
international donor to the AU.  Eventually, some progress was made.  In particular, the 
establishment of the DITF assisted the AU, and the international partners provided a 
direct line of communication between the donors and the AU.  One major factor in 
AMIS was that the Government of Sudan allowed the AU to establish AMIS in an 
effort to placate the West by having a peacekeeping mission on Sudan soil.  However, 
Sudan would only allow African troops to participate in the mission.  Sudan continually 
laid out impediments to stymie and slow AMIS during the 2004-2007 time-frame, 
creating an additional challenge to the AU in conducting its mission to stem genocide 
and protect the IDPs. 
Recommendations for Policy and Programs 
 The results of this study of the recollections of senior US officials directly 
involved with supporting the AU during AMIS can be used by US and international 
partners in current and future peacekeeping missions that are executed by international 
organizations such as the AU, EU OAS, NATO and the UN.  The challenges faced by 
the AU during AMIS may be generalizable to future AU peacekeeping missions and 
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used as a model for determining a “lessons learned” study of AMIS for use by US and 
AU officials. 
The challenges that the AU faced in accessing and receiving US support can be 
used by the US Department of Defense and the US Department of State in streamlining 
acquisition policy and programs in dealing with international organizations and less 
developed nations.  Multi-national and unified training is an area of concern reported by 
those who participated in the study.  This can be used to determine a more efficient 
method of training offered to international organizations by the US.  The US military 
was observed by the respondents as reacting quickly and efficiently.  The international 
community of non-governmental organizations and other civilian agencies could look at 
how the US military supported the AU as a guideline for their policies and programs of 
similar nature.   
Recommendations for Future Research 
 This study focused on the perceptions of senior US officials who were directly 
involved with assisting and working with the AU, in part or throughout, the period of 
AMIS, 2004 to 2007.  A future researcher may find it beneficial to design a similar 
study relating to the AU and AMIS that directly addresses the existing theories of 
communication and leadership. 
Furthermore, I believe there could be an interest in the academic community as 
well as those involved in peacekeeping operations in a study that focused on the 
perceptions from the African perspective, using those senior African officials who were 
directly involved with supporting the AU during AMIS addressing the same topics.  The 
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current data of this dissertation, highlighting the perceptions of senior US officials, 
could be correlated against the African perceptions of the challenges. 
 Another area of the AU and AMIS that future research could study would be the 
perceptions of senior non-African (and non-US) international officials who were 
directly involved with supporting or monitoring the AU.  It would be informative to 
study the challenges that were faced in the areas of organization, leadership, US support 
and communications from their perspective. The perceptions of international senior 
officials would include those senior officials from partnering countries such as Norway, 
Sweden, the European Union, Germany, France and NATO that contributed non-US 
personnel to support the AU during AMIS. 
 The Culture, Leadership and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies 
that was conducted by House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman and Gupta (2004) could be 
expanded to include an organization such as the AU rather than a focus on regional or 
country specific findings.  How the northern African members of the AU and the sub-
Saharan members view leadership and communication may suggest that the cultures of 
the diverse membership within an organization may or may not differ.  Another aspect 
to study with the GLOBE model would be gender dynamics in the AU during AMIS. 
Limitation of Study 
The fact that I was able to capture the perceptions of 66.7 percent of the senior 
US official population creates a limitation, as all potential participants were not 
available for the study.  To a degree the data collected from 8 respondents can be 
generalized to the population of 12 potential participants as they all worked together, 
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and I believe that the data is generalizable as it captures the majority of the target 
population. 
Another limitation of the study is that I interviewed senior US officials and data 
collected may not be generalizable to non-US senior officials who were directly 
involved with the AU. 
Researcher’s Conclusion 
 The AU was praised for conducting AMIS in the face of resistance from Sudan 
and the lack of a number of resource-related items.  AMIS can be viewed as a success 
despite a number of short comings that existed at the AU.  The data collected in this 
study can provide a road-map for future AU and US engagement with peacekeeping 
efforts on the continent of Africa as well as other locations.   
I believe that there were a number of obstacles that the AU was able to mitigate 
through the efforts of the US and international partners.  The AU was able to fulfill its 
stated objective of handing the genocide in Darfur through a mission created and 
executed by Africans.  The AU, as well as any organization, must receive resources 
from a multitude of sources.  The AU was a success in that it was able to reach out to 
the US and the international partners for support, although it was not always in the 
western method of handling communication and issues.  The cultural differences 
between the African leadership and organizational style and the western view was 
exemplified in the data and can lead both sides to a better understanding of how to 
request and provide support in the future.   The AU, despite being a new organization, 
was able to access resources and function as an organization to conduct AMIS.   AMIS 
ran from 2004 to 2007 despite a number of challenges to its execution.  The UN took 
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over the peacekeeping mission in Sudan in 2007 when AMIS was successfully turned 
over to become UNAMID. 
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Appendix A 
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations 
ACOTA: African Contingency Operations and Training Assistance 
AFRICOM: Africa Command 
AQIM:  al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
AMIS: African Union Mission in Sudan 
APREP: African Peacekeeping Record Response Partnership 
AU- African Union 
CENTCOM: Central Command 
CJTF-HOA: Combined Task Force-Horn of Africa 
DBKO: Department for Peacekeeping Operations of the UN 
ECOWAS: Economic Community of Western African States 
EUCOM: European Command 
DITF: Darfur Integrated Task Force 
EU: European Union 
FM: Frequency Modulation 
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HF: High Frequency 
HIPPO: High-level Panel on Peace Operations of the UN 
HMMWV: High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle 
IMET: International Military Education and Training 
J6: Communications Staff 
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
PAE: Pacific Architects and Engineers 
PEPFAR: President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS relief 
PSOD: Peace and Security Division 
OAU: Organization of African Unity 
OEF: Operation Enduring Freedom 
OIF: Operation Iraqi Freedom 
REC: Regional Economic Community 
RPA: Rwandan Patriotic Army 
RDF: Rwandan Defense Force 
SADC: Southern African Development Community 
365 
TCC: Troop Contributing Country 
UN: United Nations 
UNAMID: UN-African Union Mission in Darfur 
US: United States 
USAID: United States Agency for International Development 
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Appendix B 
Recruitment Letter 
Study # 256 
FROM: Joseph Q. Martinelli TO: John/Jane Doe 
Dear Doe 
 
I am a doctoral student at the University of Oklahoma and I am conducting a research project for my 
dissertation entitled: “Effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Sudan: Case Study 2003-2007.” 
 
I am reaching out to you as a former member of the US team that worked closely with 
supporting the African Union during the African Union Mission in Sudan to request 
that you participate in my study that will consist of an in-person interview to be 
conducted at a time and place convenient for you, if you agree to participate. I will 
conduct the interview using a recording device and/or notes. 
 
Your participation is voluntarily and you may decline this offer to participate in my 
study. Please see the attached disclosure document that informs you of the 
parameters of the study you right to accept or decline to participate in the study. 
 
Please be assured that your identification will not be disclosed and completely anonymous. 
 
I would be honored to have you included in this study that is a part of my PH.D. study 
at the University of Oklahoma. I am under the sponsorship of faculty member Dr. 
Susan Sharp who can be located at:  ssharp@ou.edu or 405-325-2829. I can be 
contacted at: josephmartinelli@hotmail.com or 202-870-9929. 
 
 
Thank you so much for your 
consideration. Sincerely, 
Joseph Q. Martinelli 
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Appendix C 
IRB Approved Schedule of Questions 
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE: 
 
Q: Describe the African Union organizational structure, 2003-2007. 
 
Probe: What were the organizational challenges that the African Union faced during AMIS, 2003-2007, at 
the headquarters in Addis Abba? 
 
Probe: How could the AU have improved its organizational structure at the AU headquarters to better 
execute AMIS, 2003-2007? 
 
Q: Describe the AMIS organizational structure in Darfur, 2003-2007. 
 
Probe: What were the organizational challenges of AMIS in Darfur, 2003-2007? 
 
Probe: How could the AU have improved the organizational structure of AMIS in Darfur? 
 
Q: What are the factors of AU or AMIS organizational structure that I did not ask, that you would add? 
 
LEADERSHIP: 
 
Q: Describe the African Union style of Leadership, 2003-2007 (or, for example, 'Describe the African 
Union Leadership, 2003-2007'). 
 
 
Probe: What were the leadership challenges that the African Union leadership faced during AMIS, 2003-
2007, at the headquarters in Addis Abba? 
 
Probe: How could the AU have improved the leadership style at the AU headquarters to better 
execute AMIS, 2003-2007? 
 
Q: Describe the leadership style of AMIS in Darfur, 2003-2007. 
 
Probe: What were the leadership challenges of AMIS in Darfur, 2003-2007? 
 
Probe: How could the AU have improved its leadership in Darfur to better execute AMIS, 
2003-2007? Q: What are the factors of AU or AMIS leadership that I did not ask, that you 
could add? 
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US SUPPORT: 
 
Q: Describe how the AU requested US Support for AMIS, 2003-2007? 
 
Probe: What were the challenges for the AU in seeking US support for AMIS, 2003-2007? 
 
Probe: How could the AU have improved its request mechanism for US support for AMIS, 2003-2007?Q: 
Describe the US Support to AMIS, 2003-2007. 
 
Probe: What were the challenges for the US in providing support to the AU for AMIS, 2003-
2007? Probe: How could the US have improved its support to the AU during AMIS, 2003-
2007? 
Q: What are the factors and challenges of US Support and AU request for US Support that I did not 
ask, that you could add? 
 
COMMUNICATION: 
 
Q: How did the AU headquarters, in Addis Ababa, communicate internally during AMIS, 2003-2007? 
 
Probe: What were the challenges for the AU in communicating internally within the AU during AMIS, 
2003-2007? 
 
Probe: How could the AU have improved its internal communication at the AU headquarters during AMIS, 
2003- 2007? 
 
Q: How did the AU communicate externally with the US during AMIS, 2003-2007? 
 
 
Probe: How could the AU have improved its external communication between the AU headquarters and the 
US during AMIS, 2003-2007? 
 
Q: What are the factors of AU or AMIS communication internally and externally that I did did not ask, that 
you could add? 
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Appendix D 
Consent Form 
Signed Consent to Participate in Research  
 
Would you like to be involved in research at the University of Oklahoma? 
I am Joseph Q. Martinelli from the Department of Advanced Studies and I invite you to 
participate in my research project entitled Effectiveness of the African Union Mission in 
Sudan: Case Study 2003-2007. This research is being conducted at your location, to be 
determined by you. You were selected as a possible participant because of your 
involvement with the African Union and the African Union Mission in Sudan, during 
the period 2003-2007.  
Please read this document and contact me to ask any questions that you may have 
BEFORE agreeing to take part in my research. 
What is the purpose of this research? The purpose of this research is to determine from 
the US perspective the effectiveness of the African Union Mission in Sudan from your 
perspective. 
How many participants will be in this research? About nine (9) people will take part in 
this research. 
What will I be asked to do? If you agree to be in this research, you will be asked a series 
of questions related to your perception in the areas of African Union organization, 
leadership style, US support, and communication during the African Union Mission in 
Sudan during the period 2003-2007. Your response to these questions is all that will be 
asked of you. 
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How long will this take? Your participation will take approximately 30-45 minutes in 
total to respond to the questions asked under the four categories of organization, 
leadership US support and communication.  It is anticipated that only one (1) meeting 
will be required to record your response. 
What are the risks and/or benefits if I participate? “There are no risks and no benefits 
from being in this research. 
What do I do if I am injured? If you are injured during your participation, report this to 
a researcher immediately. Emergency medical treatment is available. However, you or 
your insurance company will be expected to pay the usual charge from this treatment. 
The University of Oklahoma Norman Campus has set aside no funds to compensate you 
in the event of injury. 
Will I be compensated for participating? You will not be reimbursed for your time and 
participation in this research. 
Who will see my information? In research reports, there will be no information that will 
make it possible to identify you. Research records will be stored securely and only 
approved researchers and the OU Institution Review Board will have access to the 
records. 
You have the right to access the research data that has been collected about you as a 
part of this research. However, you may not have access to this information until the 
entire research has completely finished and you consent to this temporary restriction. 
Do I have to participate? No. If you do not participate, you will not be penalized or lose 
benefits or services unrelated to the research. If you decide to participate, you don’t 
have to answer any question and can stop participating at any time. 
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Will my identity be anonymous or confidential? Your name will not be retained or 
linked with your responses unless you specifically agree to be identified. The data you 
provide will be destroyed unless you specifically agree for data retention or retention of 
contact information at the end of the research. Please check all of the options that you 
agree to:  
I agree to being quoted directly.      ___ Yes ___
 No 
I agree to have my name reported with quoted material.  ___Yes ___ No  
I agree for the researcher to use my data in future studies.  ___Yes ___ No  
Audio Recording of Research Activities to assist with accurate recording of your 
responses, your interview may be recorded on an audio recording device. You have the 
right to refuse to allow such recording without penalty.  
I consent to audio recording.     ___ Yes ___ No 
Will I be contacted again? The researcher would like to contact you again to recruit you 
into this research or to gather additional information.  
_____ I give my permission for the researcher to contact me in the future.  
_____ I do not wish to be contacted by the researcher again. 
Who do I contact with questions, concerns or complaints? If you have questions, 
concerns or complaints about the research or have experienced a research-related injury, 
contact me at 202-870-9929 or email: josephmartinelli@hotmail.com or the faculty 
adviser, Dr. Susan Sharp at 405-325-2829 or email: ssharp@ou.edu. 
You can also contact the University of Oklahoma – Norman Campus Institutional 
Review Board (OU-NC IRB) at 405-325-8110 or irb@ou.edu if you have questions 
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about your rights as a research participant, concerns, or complaints about the research 
and wish to talk to someone other than the researcher(s) or if you cannot reach the 
researcher(s). 
You will be given a copy of this document for your records. By providing information to 
the researcher(s), I am agreeing to participate in this research. 
 
 
Participant Signature                                                 Print Name  
 
 
Date 
 
 
Signature of Researcher Obtaining Consent             Print Name 
 
 
Date 
 
 
Signature of Witness (if applicable)                           Print Name 
 
 
Date 
 
 
 
